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Stephens, D.J.) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs argue that CA9 erred in holding that 
resp United States Olympic Committee (hereafter "resp") need not 
1Judge Kozinski, joined by Judges Pregerson and Norris, 
dissented from the denial of rehearing en bane. 
1)f.\YJ"j - ~ob _ SP~ CovQ..,, v\cj VY\C.~0 . 
• 
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prove "likelihood of confusion" in an action under 36 u.s.c. 3380 
to enjoin petr's use of the word "Olympic." Alternatively, p~trs 
argue that as applied, 1380 unconstitutionally abridges their 
first amendment rights. 
2-:--·Fic~ DECISION BELOW: In 1981 petr Thomas Waddel, 
M.D., a former Olympic athelete, and others formed a nonprofit 
corporation named the San Francisco Arts and Athletics 
Association (SFAAA). Under petr SFAAA's auspices the Gay Olympic 
Garnes were organized, featuring athletes from 11 countries 
competing in a number of events, some ten of which are events at 
the regular Olympic Games (e.g., marathon), and seven others of 
which are not (e.g., bowling). The purposes of the Gay Olympics, 
which was open to both homosexuals and heterosexuals, included 
portraying homosexuals in a positive light and stressing self-
fulfillment as more important than winning. 
Resp informed petrs Waddell and SFAAA that it considered 
their use of the word "Olympic" actionable under 36 U.S.C. ~380. 2 
2Title 36 u.s.c. 1380 provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) Without the consent of the [United States Olympic Committee] 
any person who uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale 
of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical 
exhibition, athletic performance, or competition--
. . . . 
"(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", or "Citius Altius Fortius", 
or any combination or simulation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a 
connection with the Corporation or any Olympic Activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the Corporation 
for the remedies provided in the [Trademark Act of 1946]. 
However, any person who actually used the ••• words, or any 
combination thereof, in subsection (a) (4) of this section for any 
lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for 
(Footnote continued) 
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Petrs initially indicated that they would discontinue using 
"Olympic," but after consulting with the local ACLU chapter 
resumed its use, on the theory that petrs had as much right to 
use the word "Olympic" as the numerous other organizations that 
had used the term without resp's permission. Resp filed an 
action under ~380, and obtained a preliminary injunction (Petn 
App. H, mislabelled as a CA9 opinion), which was affirmed by CA9 
(Hug, Farris, Gadbois) (Petn App. G). The DC next granted resp 
summary judgment on its claims and issued a permanent injunction 
against petrs that tracks the language of }380. Petn App. F. 
The DC also awarded resp $96,600 in attorney's fees, based on a 
finding that petrs had willfully infringed resp's right to 
exclusive use of the word "Olympic". Petn App E. 
CA9 affirmed the summary judgment in resp's favor and the 
entry of the injunction but reversed and remanded on the award of 
attorney's fees. Petn App. A. The latter issue is not now 
before the Court, so I will not summarize that portion of CA9's 
opinion. 
CA9 recognized that there is a disputed factual issue as to 
the likelihood of confusion caused by petrs' use of the word 
"Olympic." However, the court held that the "likelihood of 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
the same purpose and for the same goods or services. " 
"(c) The Corporation shall have exclusive right to use ••. the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any 
combination thereof subject to the preexisting rights described 
in subsection (a) of this section." 
• 
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confusion" language in 3 3 80 ( a) ( 4) does not apply to use of the 
words "'Olympic', 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius Fortius,'" but 
only to use of "any combination or simulation thereof." The 
court explained that 5380 was adopted to replace former 1379, 
which prohibited any use of the protected words or any 
combination thereof. "In view of the pre-existing criminal 
sanction that prohibited non-confusing uses and the intent to 
broaden [resp's] protection and to ensure its power to license 
the symbols and words," Petn App. 7, CA9 concluded that resp nee d 
not show confusion to prevail under 1380. See United States 
Olympic Committee v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 266-267 
( CA 2 ) , c er t • den i e d , 1 O 5 s • ct • 3 8 7 (No . 8 4- 4 4 2 ) (uni t e d states 
Olympic Committee need not prove likelihood of confusion to 
prevail under 3380); United States Olympic Committee v. 
International Federation of Bodybuilders, 219 U.S.P.Q. 353, 361 
(D.D.C. 1982) (similar holding); Stop the Olympic Prison v. United 
States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (3380 designed "to establish strong protection for the 
Olympic symbols, in part to ensure the market value of licenses 
for their use"). 
CA9 rejected petrs' reliance on various Lanham Act defenses. 
When Congress enacted )380 as part of the Amateur Sports Act, it 
provided that Lanham Act remedies would be available to resp but 
omitted any reference to Lanham Act defenses. In light of the 
purposes of the Amateur Sports Act, which gives resp more power 
than any ordinary trademark holder by allowing it to prohibit 





expressly included Lanham Act defenses in a similar statute, see 
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, CA9 concluded that 
Congress did not intend to allow assertion of Lanham Act defenses 
in an action under 1380. 
CA9 also rejected petrs' contention that )380, as applied, 
violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause. The court found it unnecessary to consider 
whether resp discriminated in determining against whom it will 
enforce 3380, because resp is not a state actor. Petrs argued 
that state action flowed from the judicial enforcement of 1380, 
citing Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). However, CA9 held 
that "[i]n the absence of special benefits flowing to the state 
from the challenged action, see Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 ••• (1961), state action will not be 
found unless there was a governmental decision to violate 
rights." Petn App. 9. The fact that the United States conferred 
special property rights in resp's trademarks does not make resp's 
exploitation of those rights state action. Cf., e.g., Hudgens v. 
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-521 (shopping center owner's prohibition 
of picketing held not to constitute state action). CA9 found 
more persuasive petrs' reliance on the fact that the government 
financed resp and jointly marketed Olympic medals with it. 
However, the court cited Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 
840-841 (1982), for the proposition that neither financing nor 
contractual relationships by themselves suffice to make a private 
entity a government actor. The court distinguished Martin v. 
International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 677 (CA9 1984), 
• 
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which found state action in a case involving the organization of 
the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, on the ground that in Martin the 
government involvement was significantly more extensive than in 
this case. 
Petrs apparently also argued that by barring non-confusing 
speech, 3380 violates their commercial speech rights under the 
First Amendment. 3 See Central Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 563-564. CA9 rejected this 
argument, stating that the word "Olympic" and its associated 
symbols and slogans are essentially property, the protection of 
which does not violated the First Amendment. Cf., e.g., Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-577 
(1977) (property rights in performance of human cannonball act may 
• properly receive priority over First Amendment rights of 
broadcaster). The court concluded that "[b]ecause SFAA had 
satisfactory alternative means for expressing its opposition to 
the Olympics, it has no First Amendment right to use 'Olympics' 
or the Olympic symbols to promote its games or products." Petn 
App. 13. 
CA9 rejected petrs' contention that the injunction granted 
by the District Court was an abuse of discretion given the less 
severe remedies available, such as entry of a declaratory 
3This is how CA9 hesitantly interpreted petr's argument. See 
Petn App. 11. However, as the Contentions section of this Memo 
will show, petrs now argue that CA9 erred in classifying petrs' 
speech as commercial. It is not clear precisely what form petrs' 
argument took below. 
,, .. .·• 
• 
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judgment. CA9 found no abuse of discretion in view of the fact 
that petrs had initialy agreed with resp to discontinue use of 
the word "Olympic" and then resumed its use without disclosure to 
resp. 
Petrs sought rehearing en bane, which was denied. Judge 
Kozinski, joined by Judges Pregerson and Norris, dissented. 
Judge Kozinski criticized the panel's opinion as giving short 
shrift to the important first amendment interests at stake: 
"To say that the word Olympic is property begs the 
question. What appellants challenge is the power of 
Congress to privatize the word Olympic, rendering it 
unutterable by anyone else in connection with any 
product or public event, whether for profit or, as in 
this case, to promote a cause." Petn App. 31-36 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) • 
Judge Kozinski found 5380, as interpreted by the panel, to 
be significantly different from intellectual property law. 
Trademarks, copyrights, and patents are subject to a variety of 
statutory and common-law defenses, and they reserve only those 
rights necessary to protect the owner's economic interest. Such 
rights are generally limited to uses created by by owner, and are 
intended to allow the owner to derive gain from the expenditure 
of talent and energy. Thus limited, rights in intellectual 
property are easily harmonized with the first amendment. See, 
e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 105 
s.ct. 2218, 2228-2231. 
"However, when cut loose from their conceptual 
moorings, intellectual property rights can raise 
- --8-
serious constitutional concerns. Here, the Act's 
ironclad prohibition against every commercial or 
theatrical use of the word Olympic (unrestrained by the 
need to show likelihood of confusion or to overcome 
Lanham Act defenses) stakes out an intellectual 
property fiefdom quite unlike anything we have seen in 
our law before. By giving [resp] exclusive possession 
of the word, Congress has diminished the rights of 
everyone else, withdrawing from the public domain a 
term used by many and useful to more." Petn App. 38-39 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
Judge Kozinski stated that his first amendment concerns were 
heightened by the manner in which resp exercises its stewardship 
over the word "Olympic." Resp has permitted wide use of t h e 
word, both by groups resp directly supports, such as the Special 
Olympics, and by groups resp knows to be using the word and has 
elected not to sue, such as the International Police Olympics. 
Since the case is being decided on a motion for summary judgment, 
• it must be accepted as true that resp is intentionally 
discriminating against petrs. In Judge Kozinski's view, 
"[t]roublesome as would be a total withdrawal of the word 
[Olympic] from public discourse, an exclusion that is invoked 
• 
pursuant to a subjective assessment of the wholesomeness of the 
proposed speaker or propriety of the proposed message is more 
troublesome still." Id., at 40-41. Judge Kozinski did not, 
however, directly argue that resp is a state actor. 
Judge Kozinski concluded that resp should have the burden of 
showing that }380 serves a substantial governmental interest. 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447 
U.S. 557, 564 (1980). He found it difficult to evaluate the 
government's interest because the case has been decided on a 
motion for summary judgment. However, he expressed doubt that 
• 
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the government could justify even a minor infringement on petrs' 
first amendment rights if the government's interest is merely to 
subsidize resp. See Pacific Gas 7 Electric Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commn., 106 s.ct. 903, 916 (MArshall, J., concurring). 
Assuming arguendo that the gover nment has a sufficient interest 
in subsidizing resp to abridge some of petrs' first amendment 
rights, the question remains whether ~389 is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest. Again noting the difficulty of resolving 
that question on a scant record, Judge Kozinski expressed the 
view that further inquiry is needed to determine why resp's 
commercial licenses could not be adequately protected by giving 
resp rights coextensive with the Lanham Act. He also suggested 
that in view of what he saw as the serious constitutional 
problems with 3389, it would be appropriate to consider a 
narrowing construction of the statute. 
Finally, Judge Kozinski objected to the fact that the panel 
had approved "a permanent injunction that significantly blunts 
rights to public expression without the slightest showing that 
the enjoined use would harm anyone." Petn App. 50. This is 
contrary to the admonition in Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 
175, 183, that "[a]n order issued in the area of First Amendment 
rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will 
accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional 
mandate and the essential needs of the public order." 
3. CONTENTIONS: In their statement of the facts, petrs 
note that the Record reflects that they offered, before suit was 
filed in this case, to place the words "not associated with the 
- --10-
U.S. Olympic Committee or any Olympic activity" upon all of their 
goods, literature and properties. 
Petrs first contention is that Congress intended S380 only 
to create a trademark in resp as to the word Olympic. The 
language in S380(c) bestowing an "exclusive right to use ••• the 
wor[d] 'Olympic'" closely parallels the "exclusive right to use" 
language of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. )1115(b), which governs 
trademarks. The "tending to cause confusion" language of 36 
U.S.C. S380(a) (4) and the fact that the remedies granted resp 
under 5380 are incorporated by reference from the Trademark Act 
strengthen the conclusion that Congress intended only to give 
resp the rights of a trademark holder. This is consistent with 
the interpretation of 3380 by the first DC to consider it. See 
Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 
F. Supp. 1112, 1118-1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
Petrs argue that CA9's interpretation of 5380, by ignoring 
the language and legislative history of the Act, creates needless 
constitutional problems. Under CA9's interpretation, a best-
selling book containing the word "Olympic," a newspaper whose 
headline includes the word "Olympic," and an NAACP-sponsered 
"Academic Olympics" for black schoolchildren would all be subject 
to injunction at resp's behest. 
Petrs further contend that "the trademark law doctrines that 
generic terms cannot be trademarked and that a party may use an 
incontestable trademark fairly to describe its goods or services 
have roots in the fundamental principle of freedom of speech that 
government does not own the language, and may not command persons 
• 
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to speak it in particular ways II Petn 28. The word 
"Olympic" is an ancient and generic word which the government 
cannot simply appropriate. 
Petrs take issue with CA9's characterization of this case as 
one involving commercial speech. Petrs' speech may contain a 
subsidiary commercial element, but its primary purpose is to 
communicate a message about homosexuals and competition, which is 
entitled to maximum protection under the First Amendment. Cf. 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) ("[T]he mere 
fact that religious literature is 'sold' by itinerant preachers 
rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism into a 
commercial enterprise"). 
Petrs also contend that CA9 erred in holding that resp is 
not a state actor. Resp is "an entity created and chartered by 
Congress, given powers to perform an array of public functions 
relative to amateur athletics throughout the nation and to U.S. 
participation in the Olympic Games, and given public resources 
including sizeable sums of money and an unprecedented 'trademark' 
upon a generic term." Petn 37. That at least enough to create a 
'triable issue of fact as to whether there was state action. See 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). Indeed, CA9 has 
previously held that resp was engaged in state action in staging 
the 1984 Summer Olympic Games. Martin v. International Olympic 
Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 677 (CA9 1984). Petrs also rely on 
Fortin v. Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344, 347-348 (CAl 
1975), which found state action when the Little League, to which 
- --12-
local g o vernment had given special access privileges to local 
parks, provided softball games for boys only. 
Petrs attack the DC's injunction as a prior restraint of 
ideological speech. Next, assuming arguendo that this is a 
commercial speech case, petrs argue that the injunction did not 
strike the proper balance between resp's property interests and 
the public's interest in avoiding the suppression of protected 
expression. Cf., e.g., Consumers Union of United States v. 
General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (CA2 1983) (scope of fair use 
doctrine is broader when information conveyed relates to matters 
of high public concern). The proper balance here would have been 
to allow petrs to use the word "Olympic" with a disclaimer of any 
connection to resp. 
Finally, petrs contend that if Congress only intended to 
bestow, and only had constitutional authority to bestow, a 
trademark as to "Olympic' upon resp, then petrs are entitled to 
assert the defenses allowed under the Lanham Act, including "fair 
use" and "no likelhood of confusion." These defenses are factual 
questions, and should not have been resolved on summary judgment. 
Resp argues that petr errs by trying to fit S380 into the 
mould of trademark law. "It is clear that the Congressional 
intent in enacting ]380 was to promote the United States Olympic 
effort by entrusting [resp] with unfettered control over the 
commercial use of Olympic-related designations." United States 
Olympic Committee v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 266 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 105 s.ct. 387 (1984). The purposes of ~380 include 
both ensuring that any use of the Olympic designation is 
- --13-
authentic, thus preventing public confusion, and preventing 
dilution of the value of Olympic trade designations. United 
States Olympic Committee v. International Federation of 
Bodybuilders, 219 u.s.P.Q. 352, 360 (D.D.C. 1982). Accord, 
United States Olympic Committee v. Union Sports Apparel, 220 
U.S.P.Q. 526, 529 (E.D.Va. 1983). The dilution doctrine grants 
protection beyond the classic "likelihood of confusion" test, and 
prohibits any use of a mark that dilutes its distinctive 
qualities. See 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
( 2d ed. 19 8 4) :; 2 4 : 13. 
Resp argues that petrs have rnischaracterized the scope of 
- - · 
the judgment below. The injunction does not prohibit petrs from 
using Olympic in "virtually any context," Petn 41, nor did CA9 
hold "that Section 380 gave [resp] the power to prohibit all uses 
of 'Olympic' by any person, whether or not for commercial and 
trademark purposes," Petn 20-21. As the CA9 panel that affirmed 
the preliminary injunction noted, petrs "are not enjoined from 
making factually correct statements which mention the Olympic 
Garnes." Petn App. 85. Moreover, resp has never suggested that 
3380 prohibits all uses of "Olympic." Rather, the statute is 
limited to use of "Olympic" for "the purpose of trade, to induce 
the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical 
exhibition, athletic performance, or competition." When one 
court found that "Olympic" was being used for political speech, 
it held that such use was not prohibited by 3380 because it was 
outside the range of uses prohibited by the statute. Stop the 
Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. 112 
- --14-
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). In contrast, petrs used Olympic to draw 
attention to their own international athletic competition, which 
was deliberately patterned after the Olympic Games conducted by 
resps. This was an attempt to catch a free ride on the goodwill 
created by resp. 
Resp argues that petrs have no greater right to use 
"Olympic" by virtue of the fact that SFAA is a nonprofit 
corporation. Resp itself is a nonprofit corporation, and it 
would be anomolous to find that it could not protect its rights 
against interlopers like petr. 
Resp also challenges petrs' argument that the injunction is 
overbroad because resp's interests could have been protected by 
the disclaimer that petrs offered to make with every use of the 
word "Olympic." Resp relies on Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 
12, n. 11 (1979), for the proposition that "there is no First 
Amendment rule ••• requiring a State to allow deceptive or 
misleading commercial speech whenever the publication of 
additional information can clarify or offset the effects of the 
spurious communication." 
Finally, resp argues that its enforcement of 3380 is not 
state action. This Court has held that for private activity to 
constitute state action, the level of governmental involvement in 
the private activity must be substantial, and the State must have 
significantly involved itself with invidious discrimination. 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). Resp is 
not a state actor because it "exists and operates independently 
of the Federal government." DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 
- --15-
492 F.Supp. 1181, 1193 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam, 701 F.2d 2216 
(CADC 1980). In DeFrantz, the court found no state action in 
resp's decision not to send athletes to the Moscow Olympics, 
despite the fact that this decision was reached upon the specific 
request of the President and Vice-President of the United States 
as well as in response to Congressional resolutions. It follows 
a fortiori that there was no state action here. The finding of 
state action in Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 
F.2d 670 (CA9 1984) is distinguishable, because it involved a 
high degree of coordination between the local government and the 
independent local committee that conducted the 1984 Summer 
Olympics. Resp concludes that if it is a state actor, so is 
every holder of a trademark or copyright. 
4. DISCUSSION: Resp's argument that 5380 is an 
antidilution statute is not implausible, but there was no finding 
below that petrs' use of "Olympic" diluted the value of resp's 
mark. Rather, the DC and CA9 treated )380 as giving resp a 
remedy against any use of "Olympic" for "the purpose of trade, to 
induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition." 
Under such an interpretation, a play on a classical theme 
entitled Olympic Intrigue or an ad for Olympic Avenue Pizza would 
appear to be subject to injunction, a result which I doubt 
Congress intended. 
If ~380 is indeed an antidilution statute, as resp contends, 
the reasonable construction would be that resp must prove 
dilution, and that petrs can defend by showing that their use 
'' - -16- -
does not dilute resp's mark any further than it has already been 
diluted by the numerous uses of the word "Olympic" which resp has 
implicitly or explicitly sanctioned. The grant of summary 
judgment precluded petrs from raising such a defense. 
A construction of the "tending to cause confusion" language 
of 3380(a) (4) as modifying the entire phrase "the words 
'Olympic", 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any 
combination or simulation thereof" is grammatically somewhat 
awkward but logically quite plausible. A construction of the 
"tending to cause confusion" language as only modifying 
"combinations or simulations thereof" produces the formalistic 
result~ hat resps have no defense for labeling their games "Gay 
~ 
Olympic Games" but could have defended by showing no likelihood 
of confusion had they chosen a label such as "Gay Anti-Olympics" 
or "Gay Olimpics." 
I have briefly looked over the legislative history of the 
Amateur Sports Act and find it inconclusive. Since the language 
of 3380 was modified on the advice of the Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks, see 1978 u.s.c.c.A.N. at 7497, the Court might 
consider a CVSG to get the Commissioner's views on the proper 
construction of the Act and the place it has in intellectual 
property law. However, since the Commissioner has no enforcement 
authority with respect to 5380, I don't recommend a CVSG. 
Assuming arguendo that CA9 construed the statute as Congress 
intended, I agree with Judge Kozinski and petr that the case 
presents a substantial first amendment question. Although 
Congress could doubtless act to prevent uses of the word 
. ' - --17-
"Olympic" that confusingly suggest official sponsorship, CA9 has 
read the statute as giving resp a property interest in the word / 
"Olympic" that goes beyond the need to prevent confusion. Surely 
• 
there are limits on Congress's ability to give a property 
interest in a heretofore generic word; I doubt that anyone would 
argue that Congress could give the Bi-Centennial Commission 
exclusive use of the word "Constitution" or "Bi-Centennial." I 
agree with Judge Kozinski that it was incumbent on the panel to 
identify a substantial federal interest justifying the reach of 
;380, and that the panel failed to do so. 
While I think this case was wrongly decided, it is not a 
clear candidate for certiorari. It produces no direct circuit 
split, and involves a statute with rather narrow applications. I 
expect CA9 will treat the panel's decision as a sport rather than 
as precedent to apply broadly. On the other hand, the fact that 
CA9 may treat the case as insignificant need not be the final 
consideration. If the Court chooses to treat the case as 
significant, it can become so. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: This case is an arguable candidate for 
a grant. 
There is a response. 
September 29, 1986 Dimon Opinion in petn 
- -ral 10/02/86 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob ~t:<-4M 
No. 86-270, San Francisco Arts and Athletics Association, et al. 
v. United States Olympic Committee 
Petrs are the organizers of the "Gay Olymp ic Garnes," an .--
event designed to portray homosexuals in a positive light. Ath-
letes from 11 countries competed in 17 events ranging from the 
marathon to bowling. 
Resp filed an action to enjoin petrs' use of the word 
"Olympic" under 36 U.S.C. §380. That statute, set out at page 2, 
- -- ___,, 
footnote 2 of the pool memo, gives the Olympic Committee certain 
property rights over the word "Oylrnpic." The DC granted summary 
~ __, 
judgment for resp and issued a permanent injunction. CA9 af-
firmed. Three judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en 
bane. 
The petn raises three interesting issues: 
1. What is the nature of the Olympic Committee's property 
right in the word "Olympic?" Petrs argue that resp has no more 
than an ordinary trademark. CA9 concluded that resp may refuse 
to permit even non-confusing uses, and that petrs are not permit-
ted to assert Lanham Act defenses. Section 380, which was in-
tended to broaden resp's protection, replaced a statute that im-
posed a er irninal sanction for any use of the protected word. 
Section 380 is part of the Amateur Sports Act, which provides 
r 
,. , - • page 2. 
that Lanham Act remedies are available to resp but omits any ref-
erence to Lanham Act defenses. 
2. Is the Olympic Committee a state actor? Although the 
government provides financing for resp, and the government and 
resp jointly market Olympic medals, CA9 found that resp is not a 
state actor . 
./ 
3. Does §380 violate the First Amendment? CA9 rejected 
) 
petrs contention that their use of the word "Olympic" is protect-
ed commercial speech. CA9 held that, because the word "Olympic" 
is property, its protection does not infringe First Amendment 
rights. In his dissent from the denial of rehearing, Judge 
Kozinski argues that the panel's interpretation of §380 confers 
excessively broad rights on resp. Common-law and statutory de-
fense to trademark infringement generally save intellectual prop-
erty rights from conflicting with First Amendment rights. Here, 
the First Amendment concerns are heightened by the fact that resp -
has permitted use of the word "Olympic" by many groups, including 
the~ pecial Olympics and th~ rnational Police Olympics. 
Judge Kozinski did not argue that resp is a state actor, however. 
In my view, each of the three questions is a substantial 
one. On the other hand, CA9's decision conflicts with no other 
circuit court decision, and the decision here seems likely to 
have a rather narrow application. On balance, therefore, I rec-
ommend a vote to DENY. 
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To: Justice Powell February 11, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-270, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
Cert. to CA~ (Goodwin, Yl.a 
======= 
Stephens) 
(Kozinski, Pregerson, Norris; diss. from denial of reh'g en 
bane) 
Tuesday, March 24, 1987 (third argument) 
I. Summary 
The question presented in this case is whether Con-
gress can bestow on the U.S. Olympic Committee the exclusive 







This case arises out of the San Francisco Arts and 
Athletics' ( SFAA) use of the phrase "Gay Olympics" to de-
scribe an athletic competition it sponsored. The SFAA 
sought to use the word to convey a heal thy, wholesome image 
of homosexuals. The SFAA used the word on posters and fly-
ers, and on T shirts and trinkets sold as part of the event. 
The U. s. Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) brought suit under the Amateur 
Sports Act of 1978, 36 u.s.c. §§371-96, against SFAA to re-- - ~ 
strain the use of "Olympics" to describe the athletic event. 
The ~ issued a temporary restraining order and then a pre- I) C. ~ 
limi nary i nj unction, which the 'i:A9 affirmed. Mte r further ~~ ,;,... 
proceedings, summary judgment anR a _permanent injunction <A-.tf ~~ 
were awarded to usoc and roe. The / CA9 affirmed, as follow~. 
The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 confers a corporate 
charter on USOC and gives that body certain rights in the 
~
word "Olympic" and related symbols. The Act provides: 
(a} Without the consent of [USOC], 
who uses for the purpose of trade, to 
sale c5r any goods or services, or to (promote 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, 
competition --
(4) the w5:> rds l"Olympi§ " "olympiad," "Citius 
Altius Fortius," or any combination or simulation 
thereof ~ ending to c use confusion", to cause mis-
take, to de ei , or to alse y suggest a connec-
tion with [USOC] or any Olympic activity; 
~ ~ 1 .vl-. 
~~~ 
~·~~·\ 
shall be ~ ubject to suit in a civil 
the [USOC] or m ies provi e ~
? action by 
I n the 
[Trademark Act of 1946]. 
36 u.s.c. §380(a) (4). 
~ad-~~ 
l,~a..e-h-,_,{__ 




It is uncontested that SFAA used "Olympic" in the 
' ~ romo,9:...Q_~ ~L i~ames. The use involved not only the ad-
vertising of the games, by the selling of products with the 
word "Olympic" on them. Because confusion between USOC' s 
use and SFAA's use was a disputed question of fact, the sum-
mary judgment can be sustained only if the Act does not re-








the legislative history lead to the conclusion that the ~  
"tending to cause confusion" language applies only to "any 
combination or simulation," not to the word "Olympic." Oth-






reading of the Act and the legislative history indicate that . 
• 
the Trademark Act defenses do not apply to this Act • 
SFAA contends that the application of the statute to 






has discriminated between homosexual ------- groups and others to ~ 
1£ft nforce its rights in "Olympic." It is unnecessary to re-
~ f olv tis difficult question because we conclude that the 
/ !SOC is not _a s ~ SFAA also appears to argue that 
the Act violates the rights of commercial speech under the 
• 
First Amendment. But the word "Olympic" and its associated 
I I '-' 
symbols and slogans are essentially property. Such property 
can be protected without violating the First Amendment. Be-
cause SFAA had satisfactory alternative means for expressing 
. . 
its opposition to the Olympics, it has no First Amendment 
right to use "Olympics" or the Olympic symbols to promote 
its games or products. 
~ 
-----L,(:. 5 o <- ~ 












As to the relief granted, the DC did not abuse its 
discretion in granting a preliminary injunction as opposed 
to the less intrusive declaratory judgment. 
Three judges dissented from the denial of rehearing 
en bane. The panel interpreted the Act as giving USOC the 
exclusive right to use the word "Olympic," whether undertak-
en for profit or for a nonprofit purpose. The USOC may ob-
tain an injunction against use of the term without showing 
likelihood of confusion and without overcoming the defenses 
normally available in trademark infringement actions. In-
terpreted in this fashion, the Act represents a sweeping 
exercise of sovereign power. By passing the Act, Congress 
extracted a word from the English language and gave it to a 
private party to use in connection with any commercial en-
deavor or public event. This raises serious First Amendment 
concerns that the panel failed to address or acknowledge. 
The word "Olympic" has a meaning unique within our 
language. It is questionable whether Congress can deny ev-
eryone all use of it. Words are important. Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Denying SFAA the use of the 
word "Olympic" thwarts its purpose of fostering a wholesome, 
normal image of homosexuals. The Supreme Court has been 
extremely reluctant to approve restrictions against the use 
of particular words. The rights conferred on USOC are mate-
rially different from traditional intellectual property 
rights where a careful balance is struck between the inter-
ests of the property owner and the public. These rights are 
• 
• 
- - page 5. 
narrowly tailored to serve their purpose. Here, Congress 
has chosen a useful word and removed it from public use. 
First Amendment concerns are heightened by the alle-
gations that USOC has used its word monopoly in a discrimi-
natory manner. We must accept SFAA's allegations as true on 
a motion for summary judgment. 
Once it is concluded that the First Amendment is 
implicated by giving usoc the work "Olympic," the next in-
quiry must be whether doing so directly advances a substan-
tial governmental interest. If, as it appears, USOC's only 
interest is financial, then it does not appear substantial 
enough to outweigh the burden. Because of the substantial 
First Amendment concerns, it may be appropriate to resort to 
a narrowing construction of the Act, all owing groups to 
prove defenses or lack of confusion. Finally, the permanent 
injunction was too restrictive and does not survive the high 
scrutiny required for prior restraints. 
III. Analysis 
A. Interpretation of the Act 
The CA9 's interpretation of the Act is in accord 
with the other courts that have ruled on the issue, and ap---------------. 
pears to be consistent with established methods of statutory 
interpretation and the legislative history. Firs the 
plain language, read according to ordinary rules of punctua-
tion, indicates that "tending to cause confusion" refers 
only to a "combination or simulation," not to the word 
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would be a less natural reading and should 05 done only if a 
narrowing construction is required. Q , the ~ re-
placed a criminal statute that prohibited nonconfusing uses 




to Trademark Act {Lanham Act) defenses, USOC al-
a trademark in "Olympic," so if the defenses were 
incorporated into the Act, it would provide no additional 
protection. Moreover, Congress expressly included Trademark 
Act defenses in another statute. The omission in this stat-
ute therefore can fairly be said to be intentional. 
Although this Court could strain to read a more lim-
ited meaning into the Act, such a result would not be in 
accord with congressional intent. Accordingly, the validity 
of the Act should be analyzed assuming that Congress intend-
ed to grant USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without 
proof that another use is confusing and not subject to 
Trademark Act defenses. 
B. First Amendment Concerns 
At the heart of this case is the question of whether --------------- -~ 
Congress can take a word and bestow its exclusive use on a -pr iv ate {or quasi-governmental) agency. In this respect, 
the first question is whether use of the word "Olympic" 
should be viewed as commercial or noncommercial speech. At 
first blush, it appears that the question should be analyzed 
' ' 
as commercial speech. The fact is that the ~~ohibitions of 
the statute are limited to purposes of trad~, to sell goods, .. 





- - page 7 • 
The history of the statute confirms that Congress intended 
to bestow the word on USOC for the purpose of fund raising. 
Petr does not contend that the commercial purpose of the 
statute is a sham for the suppression of ideas. 
But the question does not fit neatly into commercial 
speech analysis. "The First Amendment's concern for commer-
- · cial speech is based on the informational function of adver-
tising." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv-
ice Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). The closest analogy 
in the commercial speech context may be the use of a trade 
name. In \fu edman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 
-
1, 11 (1979), you --observed, writing for the Court: 
~ 
Once a trade name has been in use for some 
time, it may serve to identify an optometrical 
practice and also to convey information about the 
type, price, and quality of services offered for 
sale in that practice. In each role, the trade 
name is used as part of a proposal of a commercial 
transaction. Like the pharmacist who desired to 
advertise his prices in Virginia Pharmacy, the 
optometrist who uses a trade name "does not wish 
to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philo-
sophical, or political. He/ does not wish to re-
port any particularly newsworthy fact, or to make 
generalized observations even about commercial 
matters." Id., at 761. His purpose is strictly 
b~ ss. The use of trade names 1n connection 
with optometrical practice, then, is a form of 
commercial speech and nothing more. 
~ lff1,. 
~ ~~ 
J/ , ~ 
The word "Olympic" does not really convey informa----.. 
tion helpful to the buyer of the product. Instead, it is 
meant to conjure up nuances of meaning that create a certain 
image for the entity using the word. But the image is not 
intended to "sell" a product in the commercial sense. The 
,, ~ 







purpose of using the work is not "strictly business." True, 
~ , 
SFAA wants to put the word on T shirts and trinkets to sell, 
but this is properly viewed as incidental to the main event 
----. 
-- the Gay Olympics. The Gay Olympics themselves are not a 
profit-making venture. Their purpose is to convey a politi-
c 
cal idea. Therefore, it does not appear correct to charac-
terize SPA.A's use of the word "Olympic" as "a form of com-
mercial speech and nothing more." Given SFAA's claim, this 
case must be analyzed under general First Amendment princi-
ples. 
Trademark law recognizes that when individuals give 
value to a word, they are entitled to its exclusive use • 
The exclusive use benefits both the user and the consmners 
who come to identify the user with the name. The Trademark 
Act provides for certain defenses, e.g., the alternate use 
is not confusing, the word has become "generic," or the use 
of the word is a "fair use in description." Here, Congress 
can be said to have granted USOC a "super trademark." USOC 
is entitled to exclusive use without the defenses. More-
over, the grant is broad because trademarks are usually more 
specific. For examPl e, a trademark in the term "United 
States Olympic Committee" would be far more specific and 
would not limit other uses as much. A trademark in the word 
"Olympic" is probably best thought of as "descriptive." 
Under the Trademark Act, an individual can obtain a trade-
mark in a "merely descriptiveri ~ark if the mark has acquired 
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• applicant's goods in commerce." An example of a descriptive 
term entitled to trademark protection is "Park 'N Fly." 
Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 195 
(1985). 
• 
Al though the government has prohibited use of one 
word, it has not absolutely prohibited petr's ability to -----~ 
convey its message or even to use the word "OLympic" in a 
manner other than to promote its athletic event. Thus, the 
-==:========::::;.:::::-= ----------
teaemark restr i ct i or11- s appropriately analyzed as a time, 
----place ano manner restriction. Under this test (1) the re-
striction must further an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; (2) the governmental interest must be 
unrelated to the suppression of expression; and (3) the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest. United States v.v;f; 'Bri~n, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968). 
Here, there is no real dispute as to (2): the gov--
ernmental interest is to aid USOC in fund raising, not to 
~ - -- -
suppress expression. The result depends upon how the bal-
ance is struck between elements (1) and (3). A governmental 
interest in fund raising is not particularly strong when 
weighed against any First Amendment interest. The interest 
could be extended, however, to promotion of the country in 
-..______,____. - ------
general through the Olympic Games.hevertheless, numerous - --- - ----·•--
alternate methods of funding exist short of exclusive use of 












• priate funds, or grant USOC only a normal trademark. As to 
the First Amendment interest allegedly inf ringed, petr and 
the dissent argue that the word "Olympic" has "meaning 
unique within our language" and that the concept it embodies 
cannot be expressed otherwise without a loss of the nuance 
of meaning. Viewed this way, the question is similar to 
that presented in ~ hen, supra, where the Court stated, 
"[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can for-
bid particular words without also running a substantial risk 
of suppressing ideas in the process." 403 U.S., at 26. Co-
hen can be distinguished, however, because there the govern-
ment sought to prohibit use of the word because of the idea 
• 
that word conveyed. 
bition is commercial. 
Here, the purpose of the speech prohi- f~ f-v 
---------------
The statute does not prohibit the use 
of the word in intellectual or political debate. 
In sum, the question of whether a purely commercial -purpose outweighs any infringement on First Amendment rights 
is a close one. It appears, however, that most of the bene-
fit petr seeks to reap from the use of the word "Olympic" is 
directly related to the value created by the USOC. Accord-
ingly, even under trademark law exclusive use would be ap-
propriate. Alternate methods for SFAA to convey its message 
seem almost as good. The statute is not intended in any way ------to suppress ideas. For all of these reasons, the incidental ---restraint alleged appears justifiable. 
• The other possibility is for the Court to recognize 













the Act is required. The Act is most questionable to the 
extent that it prohibits uses of the word "Olympic" that 
have no possibility of confusion. Al though it is unlikely 
that the USOC would bring such a suit, under the broad terms 
of the statute, it could sue Olympic Airlines (the Greek 
airline). This broad scope seems unnecessary to accomplish 
the legitimate government purpose. The language of the 
statute is sufficiently ambiguous that the Court could find 
an absence of clear congressional intent, and a need to 
adopt a limiting construction reading the words "tending to 
cause confusion" as modifying "Olympic" as well as combina-
tions and simulations thereof. This reading would ensure 
that the statute is narrowly tailored to prohibit only those 
uses of "Olympic" that genuinely would endanger USOC's fund 
raising abilities. If this route is adopted, a remand to 
the CA9 to determine whether SFAA' s use entails the possi-
bility of confusion is appropriate. 
B. Discriminatory Enforcement 
Discriminatory enforcement appears to be the theme 
underlying this case. SFAA believes that the USOC will not 
let it use the word "Olympic" because it does not want homo-
sexuals associated with the image of the Olympic games. The 
dissent is corre: t that ~he ~l legations of discriminatory //) 
enforcement must be taken as truJ ' on the motion for summary ¥/ 
judgment as they are disputed. The panel avoided the issue 
,__ 
by finding that USOC is not a state actor. Thus, this Court 
will not reach the merits of the discriminatory enforcement 
- - page 12. 
• 
issue either. If usoc is found to be a state actor, then 
the case should be remanded to the CA9 to make the appropri-
ate determinations. 
At first glance, it seems anomalous that when Con-
gress grants a private entity exclusive use of a word, that 
entity can grant access to the word in a discriminatory man-
ner. For example, Con-
ll ~ 
st~ on issue a statement that no black groups 
would be all owed to use the word "Olympic" 
g ~ ( would be allowed to do so? The state action prece-
dents, \ however, point toward this result. In a similar 
case, the Court found that the fact that the State conferred 
monopoly status on a utility did not render the utility's 
conduct state action. Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345 (1974). Al though the symbiotic relationship 
between the gov~rnment and the USOC could offer some support 
for a finding of state action, Burton v. Wilmington Parking , 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the more recent state action 




conduct itself must be fairly attributable to ·- _____ ____, 
See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). Here, 
~ te and its members are not government offi-
cials. The fact that the government conferred an exclusive 
right upon the group would not appear to make any action 
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quently, the state action portion of the CA9's decision ap-
pears correct. ~ 
c. Scope of the Relief 
Petr argues that the injunction entered in this case 
is too broad, and that instead, the court should have issued 
a declaratory judgment or found that the use of a disclaimer 
would suffice. The words of the injunction merely tracked 
the words of the statute, 
~
so the validity of the remedy 
would seem to depend on the validity of the statute. If the 
statute is constitutional and USOC can prohibit use of the 
word "Olympic" in the context presented here, then the in-
junction does not appear overbroad or unduly intrusive. The 
injunction only prohibited uses of the word specifically 
presented to the court and ruled upon. It does not prohibit 
future uses of the word in a noncommercial context. As to 
the effectiveness of a disclaimer, this seems to be a factu-
al inquiry. It seems within the DC' s discretion to deter-
mine what remedy is needed to effectuate the purposes of the 
statute under the circumstances of this case. 
IV. Conclusion 
Al though the argument made in this case may appear 
similar to the losing argument in the "propoganda" case ar-
gued earlier this term, it is significantly more trouble-
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appears that Congress intended to grant usoc something 
broader than a trademark in the word "Olympic." 
2. The next issue is whether the grant of exclusive 
use of this word violates the First Amendment. Although the ----- - ·~ 
statute prohibits uses of the word for primarily commercial 
purposes, it is cl ear that 12etr' s intended use was not 
strictly commercial. Thus, the general First Amendment -----=------





3. The First Amendment question really comes down ~ ~ 
to a balance between the state interest and the speech in------------· ----------
f ringement alleged by petr. One result is to find that the -speech infringement in the particular word is insubstantial 
...._____---.;: . 
and not much greater than an ordinary trademark. Under this 
view, there would be no First Amendment violation. The 
slightly better view may be that a governmental commercial 
~
interest especially must be narrowly tailored to the govern-
ment interest sought to be protected. Therefore, a narrow-
ing construction of the Act to prohibit only uses of the 
word "Olympic" tending to cause confusion is appropriate. 
Under this view, a remand to the CA9 to determine whether 
the use is confusing is required. '7 
~~-:). 
4. The final question is whether USOC can be liable 
for discriminatory application of the standard set out in 
' 
the Act. This Court's precedents appear to indicate that 
,,. \ \ 
USOC is hbt a state actor and therefore cannot be held lia-,, 
ble der the Constitu ion. 
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March 24, 1987 
No. 86-270, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
This case presents the question of whether Congress can 
grant the United States Olympic Committee exclusive use of the 
word "Olympic.'' 
1. The first question is whether the statute should be 
read to grant exclusive use.~ he most natural reading of the 
statute is that is does. Although it would be possible, it would 
be very strained to say that Congress merely intended to grant a 
regular trademark. 
2. The second question is whether the exclusive use 
grant violates the First Amendment. You have indicated that you 
do not think that it does. This is a defensible position. To 
- - page 2. 
resolve the First Amendment issue, you must weigh the burden on 
s eech against the state interest. You could find that the bur-
den is not significant because there are other words to use, and 
that the state interest in fostering amateur athletics and in 
protecting a word that has value because of the Olympic Commit-
tee's actions outweighs the slight burden. 
3. The third question is whether the enforcement of the 
exclusive right violates the Equal Protection Clause. It seems 
clear that the Olympic Committee is not a state actor. This re-
solves the issue. 
4. Were you to proceed under the above a nalysis, you 
could AFFIRM the judgment of the CA9. 
** *** 
There appears to be some sentiment among the other cham-
c -
bers to read Trademark Act defenses into the statute so as to 
l i mit its application and not reach the Fi rst Amendment question. 
~ 
As indicated above, this is a more strained reading of the stat-
ute that should be adopted only if you bel i eve that there are 
real First Amendment problems with the grant of exclusive use. 
Should you want to adopt it, however, I think that -i.t.... is def ensi-
ble. 
-i& - -
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Re: 86-270 - San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
v. U.S. Olympic Committee 
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Dear Lewis: 
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June 4, 1987 
-
Re: 86-270 - San Francisco v. u.s. Olympic 
Committee 
Dear Lewis: 
As I believe I have indicated to you, I am 
waiting to see what is written in dissent because I 
have some concern about the State action holding. I 
am inclined to think that even if there is State 
action, that there is no constitutional violation. I 
therefore expect to concur in your judgment and most 
of your opinion, but I have put this case on the back 
burner until I see what the dissent has to say. 
Justice Powell 






lfp/ss 06/05/87 OLYM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
-
TO: Leslie DATE: June 5, 1987 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
86-270 Olympic Committee Case 
I have reread Part IV of our opinion for the 
first time since we circulated. It is difficult for me to 
understand how any member of this Court could think, in 
light of the text of Part IV and the footnotes, that the 
USOC is a governmental actor or - in view of footnote 20 
that there has been any discriminatory enforcement. I 
assume there is nothing in the record to refute the facts 
in note 20. 
Nevertheless, as Sandra and John seem still 
concerned as to the "state action" question, I think we 
should at write something that would justify a 
recirculation and perhaps focus attention on this part of 
our opinion. Possibilities include the following: 
1. Make the minor language changes in n. 20 I 
have made in pencil and add a paragraph along the 
following lines: 
"Even if there were reason to believe that the 
usoc is a governmental actor, the record before 
- -
us makes it clear that the usoc 
strictly in accord with its charter 
has been no actionable discrimination. 
necessarily has discretion as to 
against whom it files opposition to 









2 . Footnote 21 is quite important. I have two 
suggestions. We now mention only four of the 69 federally 
created private corporations. 
perhaps the most relevant. 
You selected these four as 
Take another look, however, 
for additional federally created corporations that might 
be added to the note. 
Then, possibly add as a new paragraph in note 21 
something along the following lines: 
ss 
"It hardly need be said that if federally 
created private corporations were to be viewed 
as governmental rather than private actors, the 
consequences would be far reaching. Apart from 
subjecting these private entities to suits under 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment, presumably - by analogy -
similar type nonprofit corporations established 
under state law could be viewed as governmental 
actors subject to such suits." 
L.F.P., Jr. 
-lsg 06/05/87 





June 5, 1987 
No. 86-270, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
I have inquired with the clerks in various chambers about 
the status of this case with their Justice. The Brennan clerks 
are still trying to figure out a convincing state action theory. 
Their theory will probably be that this Court has never confront-
ed an entity that is the exclusive representative of the United 
States in the international sphere. They will distinguish all 
other state action cases on this basis. This theory is very ten-
tative, and doesn't appear particularly convincing. I suggest 
that we not try to address it until it is put in writing. 
Justice O'Connor has no theory of her own. She was in-
trigued by Justice Brennan's state action argument at conference 
- - page 2. 
and wants to read his dissent before she makes up her mind. Jus-
tice Stevens is in somewhat the same position. His clerk did not 
know how he planned possibly to find state action, but still 
reach our result. I have reviewed the case and confirmed that if 
this Court finds state action, a remand is required. Since this 
case was decided on summary judgment, petr's allegations of dis-
criminatory enforcement at least create a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact that must be resolved at trial. The conference notes 
indicate that Justice Blackmun passed on the first vote and then 
was persuaded by Justice Stevens. Therefore, he is letting Jus-
tice Stevens take the lead and is waiting to see what the dissent 
has to say. 
I have made some minor changes in the draft and will re-
circulate it. I do not see any major changes that are required 




To: The Chief Justice 
Justice White 
Justice Marshall / 




J us.tice Scalia 
.1-ll 
From: Justice Brennan 
JUN 1 7 198~ . 
Circulated: _ ______ _ _ 
Recirculated: _____ _ _ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES j~ 
l3Lil s ;,,~ No. 86-270 
SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC. AND d...,,c,apf-
THOMAS F. WADDELL, PETITIONERS v. UNITED 
STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND INTER- ~~ # -1f . .. 
NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE . - '---v; _,., 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT Of , ~ • 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ~ 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. ~ ~ 
The Court fails to appreciate both the congressionally cre-
ated interdependence between the United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) and the United States, and the signifi-
cant extent to which § 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 
36 U. S. C. § 380 (1978), infringes on noncommercial speech. 
I would find that the action of the USOC challenged here is 
government action, and that § 110 is both substantially 
overbroad and that it discriminates on the basis of content. 
I therefore dissent. 
I 
For two independent reasons, the action challenged here 
constitutes government action. First, the USOC performs 
important governmental functions and should therefore be 
considered a governmental actor. Second, there exists "a 
sufficiently dose nexus between the [Goverment] and the 
challenged action" of the USOC that "the action of the latter 
may be fairly treated as that of the [government] itself." 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 351 
(1974). 
A 
Examination of the powers and functions bestowed by the 
Government upon the USOC makes clear that the USOC 





2 SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0. C. 
must be considered a government actor. It is true, of 
course, that the mere "fact '[t]hat a private entity performs a 
function which serves the public does not make its acts [gov-
ernmental] in nature."' Ante, at 19-20 (quoting Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 842-843) (emphasis added); 
such a definition, which might cover "all ... regulated busi-
nesses providing arguably essential goods and services," 
would sweep too broadly. Jackson, supra, at 345-346. 
The Court has repeatedly held, however, that "when pri-
vate individuals or groups are endowed by the State with 
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become 
agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its 
constitutional limitations." Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296, 
299 (1966) (emphasis added). See Terry v. Adams, 345 
U. S. 461 (1953) (private political association and its elections 
:constitute state action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 
(1946) (privately owned "company town" is a state actor). 
Moreover, a finding of government action is particularly ap-
propriate when the function performed is "traditionally the 
exclusive prerogative" of government. Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 353 (1974). In my view, 
Congress has endowed the USOC with traditional govern-
mental powers that enable it to perform a governmental 
function. 1 
1 The Court argues that the USOC's function of coordinating private ath-
letic organizations is not one "traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of 
government, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 353 
(1974). See ante, at 20. Even if the coordination function were the only 
function delegated to the USOC, which it is not (see discussion ofrepresen-
tation function, infra), the Court's argument would not be dispositive. Al-
though the Court has 1n the past implied that a finding of governmental 
action likely follows when a private party performs a function that is tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of government, e. g., Jackson, supra, at 
352-353, the Court has never expressly limited the definition of govern-
ment function to such circumstances. Such a limitation would be most im-
prudent, for it would freeze into law a static conception of Government, 
and our judicial theory of government action would cease to resemble con-
86-270-DISSENT 
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The USOC performs a distinctive, traditional govern-
mental function: it represents this Nation to the world com-
munity. The USOC is, by virtue of§§ 374 and 375 of the 
Act, our country's exclusive representative to the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (IOC), a highly visible and influen-
tial international body. The Court overlooks the extraordi-
nary representational responsibility that Congress has placed 
on the USOC. As the Olympic Games have grown in inter-
national visibility and importance, the USOC's role as our na-
tional representative has taken on increasing significance. 
Although the Olympic ideals are avowedly non-political, 
Olympic participation is inescapably nationalist. Member-
ship in the IOC is structured not according to athletes or 
sports, but nations. 2 The athletes the USOC selects are 
viewed, not as a group of individuals who coincidentally are 
from the United States, but as the team of athletes that rep-
resents our Nation. During the House Debates on the Am-
ateur Sports Act, Representative Michel expressed it well: 
"American athletes will go into these same [1980 Olym-
pic] games as products of our way of life. I do not be-
lieve that it is the purpose of the games to set one way of 
life against another. But it cannot be denied that spec-
tators, both in Moscow and all over the world, certainly 
will have such a thought in mind when the events take 
place. So it would be good for our nation and for the 
athletes who represent us if the cooperation, spirit of in-
dividuality, and personal freedom that are the great vir-
tues of our system are allowed to exert their full influ-
temporary experience. This case illustrates the point. As discussed, 
infra, Congress reshaped the USOC in 1978 in part to fulfill a role-that of 
exclusive national coordinator for all amateur athletics related to interna-
tional competition-which no private party had ever filled. 
2 See IOC Rule 24(B) ("NOCs [National Olympic Committees] sha11 be 
the sole authorities responsible for the re-presentation of their respective 
countries at the Olympic Games as well as at other events held under the 
patronage of the IOC"), reprinted in International Olympic Committee, 
Olympic Charter 1985, at 16 (emphasis added). 
86-270-DISSENT 
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ence in the games." 124 Cong. Rec. 31662 (Sept. 26, 
1978). 
Every aspect of the Olympic pageant, from the procession of 
athletes costumed in national uniform, to the raising of na-
tional flags and the playing of national anthems at the medal 
ceremony, to the official tally of medals won by each team, 
reinforces the national significance of Olympic participation. 
Indeed, it was the perception of shortcomings in the nation's 
performance that led to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. In 
the words of the President's Commission, "[t]he fact is that 
we are competing less well and other nations competing more 
successfully because other nations have established excel-
lence in international athletics as a national priority." 1 The 
Final Report of the President's Commission on Olympic 
Sports 1975-1977, at ix (1977) ("Final Report") :(emphasis 
added). . 
Private organizations sometimes participate in interna-
tional con(erences resplendent with billowing flags. But the 
Olympic Games are unique: at stake are significant national 
interests that stem not only from pageantry but from politics. 
Recent experience illustrates the inherent interdependence 
of national political interests and the decisions of the USOC. 
In his State of the Union address of January 23, 1980 (a 
forum, one need hardly add, traditionally reserved for mat-
ters of national import), the President announced his opposi-
tion to American participation in the 1980 summer Olympic 
games in Moscow. 3 The opposition was not premised on, 
e.g., the financial straits of a private corporation, but on the 
implications of participation for American foreign policy. 
Echoing the President's concerns, the House of Represent-
atives passed a resolution expressing its opposition to Ameri-
3 The President's Address is reprinted in 1 Public Papers of the Presi-
dents, Jimmy Carter 1980-1981, at 196 (1981) ("Public Papers"), and also.in 
126 Cong. Rec. 380 (Jan. 23, 1980). 
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can participation. 4 In a speech on April 10, 1980, the Presi-
dent threatened to take "legal actions . . . [if] necessary to 
enforce the decision not to send a team to Moscow." 5 
Shortly thereafter, with the national and international stakes 
of the USOC's decision set forth by the President and Con-
gress, and with reports in the press of possible cuts in federal 
aid to the USOC, 6 the USOC announced that the United 
States would not participate in the 1980 Olympic games. 7 
• See 126 Cong. Rec. 562-580 (Jan. 24, 1980). The comments of Rep. 
Ritter during the debate are illuminating: "Moving or boycotting the Olym-
pics is a strong step in the right direction, but it must be seen by all Ameri-
cans as part of an overall strategy to deal intelligently with the USSR." 
Id., at 575. 
5 The President explained that "[u]nder Olympic principles-and this is 
very important-athletes represent their nations. Athletes who, are not 
part of a national team cannot compete in . the Olympics. The United 
States does not wish to be represented in a host country that is invading 
and subjugating another nation in direct violation of human decency and 
international law. If legal actions are necessary to enforce the decision 
not to send a team to Moscow, then I will take those legal actions." Public 
Papers, supra, at 636 (emphasis added). 
• See Dewar and Scannell, White House Looks at USOC's Tax Status, 
Washington Post Al, A14 (April 9, 1980). See also 6 The Olympian 5 
(March 1980) (reprinting President Carter's letter to the USOC, written in 
his capacity as "Honorary President of the USOC," in which the President 
explains the "deeper issues ... at stake" in the USOC's decision); Paul, 
Jr., Historic decision at Colorado Springs means USA will not participate 
at Moscow, 6 The Olympian 4 (May/June 1980) (hereafter "Historic deci-
sion"), (describing meetings of USOC officials with "Cabinet members and 
military leaders" to discuss question of United States participation in 1980 
Olympic Games). 
7 The Resolution adopted by the USOC House of Delegates on April 12, 
1980 stated in part: "Resolved, that since the President of the United 
States has advised the United States Olympic Committee that in light of 
international events the national security of the country is threatened, the 
USOC has decided not to send a team to the 1980 Summer Games in Mos-
cow." 6 The Olympian 6 (May/June 1980). See also "Historic decision," 
supra, at 4 (quoting USOC President Kane's statment "[o]f course, the 
USOC will accept any decision the President makes in view of his analysis 
of what is best for the country"). 
· 86-270-DISSENT 
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Although the lesson had been learned long before 1980, 8 this 
sequence of events laid bare the impact and interrelationship 
of USOC decisions on the definition and pursuit of the na-
tional interest. 
There is more to the USOC's public role than representa-
tion. The current USOC was born out of governmental dis-
satisfaction with the performance of the United States in in-
ternational athletic competition. This dissatisfaction led 
Congress to grant the USOC unprecedented administrative 
authority over all private American athletic organizations re-
lating to international competition. The legislative history 
reveals, contrary to the Court's assumption, ante, at 20, that 
no actor in the private sector had ever performed this func-
tion, and indeed never could perform it abs.ent enabling 
legislation. 
In 1975, President Ford established a Commission on 
Olympic Sports to investigate the deteriorating performance 
of America's athletes at the Olympic games, and to recom-
mend solutions. The Commission traced the problems to a 
lack of central coordination, and "recommend[ed] the institu-
8 The national political ramifications of the USOC's decisions also were 
evident in 1968, when the USOC suspended American medalists Tommie 
Smith and John Carlos from the United States Olympic Team. The ath-
letes had called attention to racial troubles in America by raising black-
gloved fists during the medal ceremony. D. Chester, The Olympic Games 
Handbook 177 (1975). 
The international political impact of the Games is an inescapable fact of 
the modern era. For example, Jesse Owens' dramatic performance in the 
1936 Olympic games was widely perceived as a rebuke to Hitler and Na-
zism. Id., at 90-94. The labeling of the 1960 Taiwanese team as repre-
sentative of "Formosa" rather than of China prompted one member to 
march in protest. Id., at 142. And the tragic, politically motivated at-
tack on the Israeli Olympic Team in 1972, in which 11 Israeli athletes, 5 
Arabs, and one German policeman were killed, forever dispelled any illu-
sion that the Olympics could exist apart from the violent vicissitudes of in-
ternational politics. Id., at 175. As Avery Brundage recognized in 1972, 
"[t]he greater and more important the Olympic Games become, the more 
they are open to commercial, political, and . .. criminal pressure." Ibid. 
86-270-DISSENT 
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tion of a central sports organization for the United States." 
1 The Final Report of the President's Commission on Olym-
pic Sports 1975-1977, at 11-13 (1977) ("Final Report"). 
In enacting the Amateur Sports Act, Congress gave life to 
the Commission's primary recommendation, that the USOC 
be restructured 9 to assume this new role of "central sports 
organization." See S. Rep. No. 95-1627, pp. 8-9 (1978). It 
greatly expanded the charter of the USOC, giving it "perpet-
ual succession and power to serve as the coordinating body 
for amateur athletic activity in the United States directly re-
lating to international amateur athletic competition." 36 
U. S. C. §375(a)(l). It also granted the USOC the power to 
recognize an organization as the "national governing body" 
for a particular sport, and endowed the USOC with the 
power to resolve all conflicts and disputes that would arise 
among the multitude of private organizations and individuals 
over which it would hold sway. See 36 U. S. C. §§ 375(a)(5), 
382b. 10 Thus, in the Amateur Sports Act, Congress granted 
the USOC the authority and ability to govern national ama-
teur athletics related to international competition. 
The public hearing and reporting requirements of the Act 
reflect the public nature of the USOC's mission. Under 
§ 375(b)(2), the USOC may not amend its constitution or by-
9 The Commission "gave special attention to an examination of the U. S. 
Olympic Committee (USOC)," and found it "to be a maddening complex of 
organizations ... unwieldy in its make-up and structure. " 1 The Final 
Report of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports 1975-1977, p. 17 
(1977) ("Final Report"). The Commission also found that the USOC "was 
not [originally] conceived to fill the role of national coordinator of amateur 
sports. It was simply, by virtue of its name, membership and financial 
ability, drawn into a vacuum created by the unmet needs in U. S. amateur 
sports. " Ibid. The Commission's Final Report concluded that "[i]t goes 
without saying that the role of Congress will be crucial. The creation of a 
central sports organization . . . and other recommendations will require 
Congressional approval. " Id. , at 130 (emphasis added). 
10 See S. Rep. No. 95-1627, pp. 9-10 (1978) (summarizing the "en-
large[d] ... purposes and powers of the USOC [that] permit it to carry out 
its expanded role"). 
86-270-DISSENT 
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laws unless it "gives to all interested persons, prior to the 
adoption of any amendment, an opportunity to submit writ-
ten data, views, or arguments concerning the proposed 
amendment for a period of at least 60 days after the date of 
publication of the notice." Similarly, the USOC may not rec-
ognize a particular amateur sports organization as the "na-
tional governing body" for that sport without first holding a 
public hearing on the matter. 36 U. S. C. § 391(a). The Act 
institutionalizes yet another public check on the USOC by re-
quiring it annually to "transmit simultaneously to the Presi-
dent and to each House of Congress a detailed report of its 
operations for the preceding calendar year, including a full 
and complete statement of its receipts and expenditures and 
a comprehensive description of the activities and accomplish-
ments of the [USOC] during the preceding year." 36 
U. S. C. § 382(a). The USOC must also submit annual "de-
tailed" reports to the President and Congress on the expendi-
tures of funds made available to it by Congress, and provide 
"detailed and comprehensive" descriptions of the programs it 
expects to finance out of government grant money in the 
coming year. 36 U. S. C. §§ 382(b), 384(b). 
The function of the USOC is obviously and fundamentally 
different than that of the private nursing homes in Blum v. 
Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991 (1982), or the private school in 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830 (1982), or the private 
Moose Lodge in Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972), 
or even the public utility in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., supra. Unlike those entities, which merely provided 
public services, the USOC has been endowed by the Federal 
Government with the exclusive power to serve a unique na-
tional, administrative, adjudicative, and representational 
role. 11 The better analogy, then, is to the company town in 
11 These attributes would also distinguish the USOC from most of the "69 
other federally created private corporations such as the American Legion, 
Big Brothers-Big Sisters of America, Daughters of the American Revolu-
tion, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States," ante , at n. 21, whose 
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Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946), or to the private 
political party in Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953). 
Like those entities, the USOC is · a private organization on 
whom the Government has bestowed inherently public pow-
ers and responsibilities. Its actions, like theirs, ought to be 
subject to constitutional limits. 
B 
Apart from the argument that the USOC is itself a govern-
ment actor, there is a second reason to find government ac-
tion. At a minimum, this case, like Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961), is one in which the 
Government "has so far insinuated itself into a position of in-
terdependence with [the USOC] that it must be recognized as 
a joint participant in the challenged activity." Id., at 725. 12 
The action at issue in Burton was the refusal of a private 
restaurant that leased space in a public parking facility to 
serve a black customer. Central to the Court's analysis was 
what later cases have termed "the symbiotic relationship" of 
the restaurant to the parking facility. E. g., Moose Lodge, 
supra, at 175; Rendell-Baker, supra, at 843. This relation-
ship provided the "sufficiently close nexus between the State 
and the challenged action of the [private] entity so that the 
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself." Jackson, supra, at 351. 
The USOC and the Federal Government exist in a symbi-
otic relationship sufficient to provide a nexus between the 
USOC's challenged action and the Government. First, as in 
presumed status as private actors is not threatened by a finding of govern-
ment action here. 
12 The Court fails to mention Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 U. S. 715 (1961), a case on which petitioner heavily relies. In each of 
the decisions principally relied on today, the Court thought it important to 
discuss and distinguish Burton. See Moose Lodge, supra, at 175; Jackson 
v. Metrapolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 357-358 (1974); Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830,· 842-843 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 
1010-1011 (1982). 
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Burlon, the relationship here confers a variety of mutual 
benefits. 13 As discussed supra, the Act gave the USOC au-
thority and responsiblities that no private organization in this 
country had ever held. The Act also conferred substantial 
financial resources on the USOC, authorizing it to seek up to 
$16 million annually in grants from the Secretary of Com-
merce, § 113(a), and affording it unprecedented power to con-
trol the use of the WQrd "Olympic" and related emblems to 
raise additional funds, § 110. As a result of the Act, the 
United States obtained, for the first time in its history, an 
exclusive and effective organization to coordinate and admin-
ister all amateur athletics related to international compe-
tition, and to represent that program abroad. 
· Second, in the eye of the public, both national and interna-
tional, the connection _between the decisions of the United 
States Government and those of the United States Olympic 
Committee is profound. 14 The President of the United 
States has served as the Honorary President of the USOC. 
The national flag flies both literally and figuratively over the 
central product of the USOC, the United States Olympic 
Team. The connection is not lost on the athletes: who can 
imagine an Olympic hopeful postponing a lucrative profes-
13 The Court observed in Burton that the relationship between the public 
authority and the restaurant "confer[red] on each an incidental variety of 
mutual benefits." Burton, supra, at 724. For example, the location of 
both parking and dining services in one building could well generate addi-
tional demand for each service. Ibid. In addition, any improvements in 
Eagle's leasehold would not lead to increased taxes since the fee was held 
by a tax-exempt agency. Ibid. 
14 In Burton, the Court also found significant evidence that would link 
the two actors in the public's eye. There was "the obvious fact that the 
restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a 
public parking service." ibid., and the fact that "the Authority located at 
appropriate places [on the facility] official signs indicating the public char-
acter of the building, and flew from mastheads on the roof both the state 
and national flags," id., at 720. This evident interdependence created 
public perceptions of "grave injustice·" that the Court could not ignore. 
Id., at 724. 
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sional career with the explanation, "I can't pass up this 
chance to represent the United States Olympic Committee"? 
More fundamentally, as Representative Michel observed, it 
is through our participation in the Games that we display 
"the great virtues of our system." 124 Cong. Rec. 31662 
(Sept. 26, 1978). 
Even more importantly, there is a close financial and legis-
lative link between the USOC's alleged discriminatory exer-
cise of its word-use authority and the financial success of both 
the USOC and the Government. 15 "It would certainly be 
irony amounting to grave injustice" if, to finance the team 
that is to represent the virtues of our political system, the 
USOC were free to ·employ government-created economic le-
verage to prohibit political speech. See Burton, supra, at 
724. Yet that is exactly what petitioner alleges. In § 110 of 
the Act, Congress granted the USOC not a "normal trade-
mark" but an unprecedented right of "exclusive use of the 
word 'Olympic' without regard to whether use of the word 
tends to cause confusion," and without "incorporat[ing] de-
fenses available under the Lanham Act." Ante, at 4-8; see 
Part II-A, infra. The purpose of this grant of unique discre-
tion was to enhance the fundraising ability of the USOC. 
The Court puts it well: 
"Section 110 directly advances these governmental inter-
ests [promoting the USOC's activities] by supplying the 
USOC with the means to raise money to support the 
Olympics and encourages the USOC's activities by en-
suring that it will receive the benefits of its efforts." 
Ante, at 13-14 (emphasis added). 16 
15 In Burton, the Court could not: "ignor(e], especially in view of Eagle's 
affirmative allegation that for it to serve Negroes would injure its busi-
ness, that profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but also· 
are indispensable elements in, the financial success of a government 
agency." Ibid. 
· " See also United States Olympic Committee v. Intelicense Corp., 737 
F. 2d 263, 264 (CA2) (§ 110 intended to enable "USOC to safeguard the 
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If petitioner is correct in its allegation that the USOC has 
used its discretion to discriminate against certain groups, 
then the situation here, as in Burton, is that "profits earned 
by discrimination not only contribute to, but are indispens-
able elements in, the financial success of a governmental 
agency." Burton, supra, at 724. Indeed, the required 
nexus between the challenged action and the Government ap-
pears even closer here than in Burton. While in Burton the 
restaurant was able to pursue a policy of discrimination be-
cause the State had failed to impose upon it a policy of non-
discrimination, the USOC could pursue its alleged policy of 
selective enforcement only because Congress affirmatively 
granted it power that it would not otherwise have to control 
the use of the word "Olympic." I conclude, then, that the 
close nexus between the Government and the challenged ac-
tion compels a finding of government action. 
C 
A close examination of the USOC and the Government 
thus reveals a unique interdependence between the two. Al-
though at one time amateur sports was a concern merely of 
private entities, and the Olympic Games an event of signifi-
cance only to individuals with a particular interest in athletic 
competition, that era is passed. In the Amateur Sports Act 
of 1978, Congress placed the power and prestige of the 
United States Government behind a single, central sports 
USOC's ability to use financial resources that are a critical component of 
America's capacity to send world class amateur athletes into international 
competition without the massive government subsidies enjoyed by compet-
itors from other nations"), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 982 (1984); Stop The 
Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee , 489 F. Supp. 1112, 
1120 (SDNY 1980) (footnote omitted) ("[S]ection (110], read as a whole, ev-
idences a legislative intent to establish strong protection for the Olympic 
symbols, in part to ensure the market value of licenses for their use. Re-
cent experience has shown such licensing to be a substantial inducement 
for contributions from a wide variety of commercial corporations, and the 
drafters of subsection (b) appear to have had this clearly in mind"). 
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organization. Congress delegated to the USOC functions 
that Government actors traditionally perform-the represen-
tation of the Nation abroad and the administration of all pri-
vate organizations in a particular economic sector. The 
representation function is of particular significance here, in 
my view, because an organization that need not adhere to the 
Constitution cannot meaningfully represent this Nation. 
Because the USOC performs a government function, and be-
cause its challenged action is inextricably intertwined with 
the Government, I would reverse the Court of Appeals find-
ing of no government action, and remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings. 17 
II 
Section 110(a)(4) prohibits "any person" from using the 
word "Olympic" "[ w ]ithout the consent of the [USOC] for the 
purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, 
or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, 
or competition." 18 The Court construes this section to give 
11 Because both the Court of Appeals and the District Court found no 
government action, neither evaluated petitioner's evidence regarding the 
USOC's policy of selective enforcement. 781 F. 2d 733, 736-737 (CA9 
1986); App. 11-271. Although the Court recognizes this, ante, n. 20, it 
nevertheless proceeds to offer its view that petitioner's "evidence of dis-
criminatory enforcement is far from compelling." Ibid. At this stage of 
the proceedings, however, the proper forum for any such evaluation is the 
District Court. 
18 Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act, 36 U. S. C. § 380 provides in 
part: 
[(a)]"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the 'fYIJ,r-
pose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic peeformance, or competition-
"(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely repre-
senting association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic 
Committee or the [USOC]; or . . 
"(4) the words 'Olympic,' 'Olympiad,' 'Citius Altius Fortius,' or any com-
bination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, 
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the USOC authority over use of the word "Olympic" which 
far surpasses that provided by a standard trademark. The 
Court ignores the serious First Amendment problems cre-
ated by its interpretation. It holds that§ 110(a)(4) regulates 
primarily commercial speech, and that this section only those 
incidental restrictions on expressive speech necessary to fur-
ther a substantial governmental interest. Ante, at 11-12. 19 
I disagree. The statute is overbroad on its face because it 
is susceptible of application to a substantial amount of non-
commercial speech, and vests the USOC with unguided dis-
cretion to approve and disapprove others' noncommercial use 
of "Olympic." Moreover, by eliminating even noncommercial 
uses of a particular word, it unconstitutionally infringes on 
the SF AA's right to freedom of expression. The Act also re-
stricts speech in a way that is not content-neutral. The 
Court's justifications of these infringements on First Amend-
ment rights are flimsy. The statute cannot be characterized 
as a mere regulation of the "manner" of speech, and does not 
serve any government purpose that would not effectively be 
protected by giving the USOC a standard commercial trade-
mark. Therefore, as construed by the Court, § 110(a)(4) can-
not withstand the First Amendment challenge presented by 
petitioner. 
A 
The USOC has held a trademark in the word "Olympic" 
since 1896, ante, at 7, and § 110(a)(3) of the Amateur Sports 
Act perpetuates the USOC's protection against infringement 
of its trademarks. To be more than statutory surplusage, 
to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity' · 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies 
provided in the Act of July 5, 1946" (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the· 
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act, 15 U . . S. C. § 1051 et seq.]) (emphasis 
added). 
19 In the Court's view, § 110(a)(4) does not necessarily extend to purely 
expressive speech. Ante, at 12 and n. 13. 
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then, § 110(a)(4) must provide something more than a normal 
trademark. Thus, the Court finds that § 110(a)(4) grants to 
the USOC a novel and expansive word-use authority. 20 
The SF AA contends that, as interpreted by the Court, the 
Act is overbroad, violating the First Amendment because it 
prohibits "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct." Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Es-
tates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 494 (1982). I agree. The Ama-
teur Sports Act is substantially overbroad in two respects. 
First, it grants the USOC a commercial trademark in the 
word "Olympic," but refuses to interpret the Act to incorpo-
rate the defenses to trademark infringement provided in the 
Lanham Act. These defenses are essential safeguards which 
prevent trademark power from infringing upon constitution-
ally protected speech. Second, the Court construes 
§ 110(a)(4) to grant the USOC unconstitutional authority to 
prohibit use of "Olympic" in "the promotion of theatrical and 
athletic events," even if the promotional activities are non-
commercial or expressive. Ante, at 11. 21 
20 The legislative history of the Act is consistent with its plain language 
and indicates that Congress granted word-use authority beyond the power 
to enforce a trademark. Congress' purpose was to give the USOC author-
ity "to protect certain symbols, emblems, trademarks, tradenames and 
words by civil action." H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 10 (1978) (emphasis 
added). Significantly, throughout the House Report, Congress refers to 
the USOC's authority over the use of "Olympic" as a matter separate from 
USOC's authority to enforce its trademarks. See, e. g., id., at 6; 7, 10, 15, 
37-38. Nowhere in the legislative history is there any hint that Congress 
equated USOC's word-use authority over "Olympic" with its trademark 
power. 
21 In interpreting the Amateur Sports Act, the Court selectively incorpo-
rates 3ections of the Lanham Act. Although the Court refuses to incorpo-
rate §§ 1066 (requirement of consumer confusion) and 1115 (statutory de-
fenses) of the Lanham Act, it does appear to incorporate§ 1127. Ante, at 
7-8. This latter section limits the scope of trademark protection to a word 
''used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish 
them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15 U. S. C. § 1127. 
The Court does not explain, however, the inconsistency between the deft-
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1 
The first part of § 110 prohibits use of the word "Olympic" 
"for the purpose of trade" or "to induce the sale of any goods 
or services. There is an important difference between the 
word-use authority granted by this portion of § 110 and a 
Lanham Act trademark: the former primarily affects non-
commercial speech, 22 while the latter does not. 23 
Charitable solicitation and political advocacy by organiza-
tions such as SF AA 24 may in part consist of commercial 
nition of trademark protection in § 1127 (which limits protection to com-
mercial uses) and the scope of the protection that § 110(a)(4) grants the 
USOC (including the noncommercial promotion of athletic and theatrical 
events). 
22 As the District Court recognized: 
"You're saying something that I have trouble with. You're talking Trade-
mark Act and trademark law, trademark policies and philosophies of this 
country. But we have a unique situation here which takes it out of the 
typical trademark-type litigation. [Section 380 of the Amateur Sports 
Act] imposes civil liability . . . upon any person who uses [the word 
"Olympic"] without U. S.O.C. consent to promote any athletic perform-
ance or competition .... The plaintiffs here are seeking to enforce a law 
which creates a unique and different situation .... " Civ. Action 
No. C-82-4183-JPV (ND Ca 1984) (reprinted in App. 259). 
23 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979) (trademark protections 
only extend to "strictly business" matters and involve "a form of commer-
cial speech and nothing more"). In no trademark case that the Court has 
considered have we permitted trademark protection to ban substantial 
noncommercial speech. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and 
Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 201 (1985) (Lanham Act provisions prevent "com-
mercial monopolization" of descriptive language in the public domain). 
24 The SF AA engages in political advocacy and charitable solicitation, ac-
tivities that are protected by the First Amendment. See Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 (1980) (charitable 
solicitation by an organization committed to political advocacy "involve[s] a 
variety of speech interests-communication of information, the dissemina-
tion and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes-that 
are within the protection of the First Amendment"). It is chartered as a 
nonprofit, educational organization whose purpose is to inform the general 
public about the "gay movement" and "to diminish the ageist, sexist and 
racist divisiveness existing in all communities regardless of sexual orienta-
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speech regulated by trademark law, but the expressive ele-
ment of such speech has been sheltered from unconstitutional 
harm by Lanham Act defenses. Without them, the Amateur 
Sports Act prohibits a substantial amount of noncommercial 
speech. 
Trademark protection has been carefully confined to the 
realm of commercial speech by two important limitations in 
the Lanham Act. First, the danger of substantial regulation 
of noncommercial speech is diminished by denying enforce-
ment of a trademark against uses of words that are not likely 
"to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive." See 15 
U. S. C. § 1066. Confusion occurs when consumers make an 
incorrect mental association between the involved commer-
cial products or their producers. See E. Vandenburgh, 
Trademark Law and Procedure § 5.20, p. 139 (2d ed. 1968). 
In contrast, § 110(a)(4) regulates even nonconfusing uses of 
"Olympic" and therefore encompasses an extraordinary 
range of noncommercial speech. 25 
tion." App. 93, 102. The SF AA solicited charitable donations and dis-
tributed t-shirts, buttons, and posters using the word "Olympic." 
25 In its complaint, the USOC included a cause of action under § 14330 of 
the California Business and Professional Code, which protects trademark 
holders against uses which dilute the value of their trademark. App. 
7-14. The USOC has not explained, however, why the remedies provided 
by the California dilution statute are insufficient. 
It is worth noting that, although some state dilution statutes do not re-
quire proof of actual confusion, they do impose other limitations that are 
not imposed by § 110. "The dilution doctrine cannot and should not be car-
ried to the extreme of forbidding use of a trademark on any and all prod-
.ucts and services, however remote from the owner's usage." J. McCar-
thy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition§ 24:16, p. 229 (2nd ed: 1984); see 
also J . Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice§ 5.05(9), p. 5-42 (1986) . 
Only "strong" trademarks are protected by dilution statutes, and the plain-
tiff 's trademark must not previously have been diluted by others. J. Mc-
Carthy, supra, § 24:14, p. 224; E. Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Pro-
cedure 150 (1~). It is generally necessary to show similarity between 
trademarks and a "likelihood" of confusion. See J. Gilson, supra, 
. § 5.05(9), p. 5-42. Moreover, state dilution statutes do not generally 
apply to descriptive, nontrademark uses of words. 
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The fair use defense also prevents the award of a trade-
mark from regulating a substantial amount of noncommercial 
speech. See 15 U. S. C. § 115(b)(4). The Lanham Act al-
lows "the use of the name, term, or device . . . which is de-
scriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe 
to users the goods or services of such party." Ibid. 26 Again, 
a wide array of noncommercial speech may be characterized 
as merely descriptive of the goods or services of a party, and 
thus not intended to propose a commercial transaction. Con-
gress' failure to incorporate this important defense in 
§ 110(a)(4) confers an unprecedented right on the USOC. 
See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., supra, 
at 200-201 (noting that fair use doctrine assists in preventing 
the "unprecedented" creation of "an exclu~ive right to use 
language that is descriptive of a product"). 27 
In sum, while the USOC's trademark of "Olympic" allows 
the USOC to regulate use of the word in the "strictly busi-
ness" context, the USOC's authority under §.110(a)(4) to reg-
ulate nonconfusing and good-faith descriptive uses of the 
211 It is important to note that even after a trademark has acquired sec-
ondary meaning, it may be used in a good-faith, descriptive manner under 
the Lanham Act. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra, § 11:16, p. 475. 
27 One commentator has described the First Amendment significance of 
this Lanham Act defense with respect to the regulation of commercial 
speech: 
"Virginia Pharmacy [425 U. S. 748 (1976)] and the underlying policies in 
favor of free commercial speech are closely parallel to those which apply to 
the branch of trademark law dealing with descriptive words and phrases. 
The same or very similar policies have been followed for more than a half 
century by courts and legislatures applying the rule of trademark law that 
descriptive words and terms cannot be monopolized as trademarks. . . . 
Without such availability, fair and open competition might be impaired, the 
available vocabulary of descriptive words would be reduced, advertisers 
could not freely describe their products, and the public might be deprived 
of information necessary to make purchase decisions. . . . If the court 
finds . . . that defendant is using the term in a purely descriptive manner, 
it presumably can support its holding by reliance on the Virginia Phar-
macy doctrine and policies." J. Gilson, supra, § 5.09[5], pp. 5-88 to 5-89. 
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word "Olympic" grants the USOC discretion to prohibit a 
substantial amount of noncommercial speech. Section 
110(a)(4) is therefore substantially overbroad. See Secre-
tary of State of Md. v. J. H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 959 
(1984); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 
444 u. s. 620, 632 (1980). 
2 
A key Lanham Act requirement that limits the impact of 
trademarks on noncommercial speech is the rule that a trade-
mark violation occurs only when an off ending trademark is 
applied to commercial goods and services. See 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 1066 and 1127. The Amateur Sports Act is not similarly 
qualified. Section 110(a)(4) "allows the USOC to prohibit 
the use of 'Olympic' for promotion of theatrical and athletic 
events," 28 even if such uses "go beyond the 'strictly business' 
context." Ante, at 11; see also ibid (statute extends to pro-
motional uses "even if the promotion is not to induce the sale 
of goods"). 29 This provision necessarily regulates only non-
commercial speech, since every possible commercial use of 
28 Noncommercial promotion may include critical reviews of theatrical 
performances, anticipatory notices and descriptions in the media of athletic 
competitions, and distribution of educational literature describing the so-
ciopolitical reasons for holding the public events. See Central Hudson 
Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra, at 580 (STEVENS, J., concur-
ring) (promotional advertising encompasses more than commercial speech). 
For example, in response to the injunction, the SF AA excised the use of 
"Olympic" from its promotional and educational literature, cautioned its 
phone operators to refrain from using the term, and advised media repre-
sentatives not to use this word in conjunction with articles about the cul-
tural and athletic events sponsored by the SF AA. App. 88-92, 94-115. 
29 Before concluding that the incidental regulation of some expressive 
speech is justified, ante, at 16-17, the Court states that it is not clear that 
§ 110 restricts purely expressive uses of "Olympic," ante, at 12. Such 
vagueness suggests that the Amateur Sports Act dangerously chills even 
purely expressive speech. In the instant case, a local newspaper organiza-
tion excised "Olympic" from an edition in response to the imposed injunc-
tion. App. 89. See also note 28, supra. 
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the word "Olympic" is regulated by preceding sections of the 
statute. 30 
While the USOC has unquestioned authority to enforce its 
"Olympic" trademark against the SFAA, § 110(a)(4) gives it 
additional authority to regulate a substantial amount of non-
commercial speech that serves to promote social and political 
ideas. The SF AA sponsors a number of nonprofit-making 
theatrical and athletic events, including concerts, film 
screenings and plays. 31 These public events are aimed at 
educating the public about society's alleged discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, age, sex, and nationality. App. 
93-99. In conjunction with these events, the SF AA distrib-
utes literature describing the meaning of the Gay Olympic 
Games. References to "Olympic" in this literature were de-
leted in response to the injunction, because of § ll0's applica-
tion to the promotion of athletic and theatrical events. App. 
88-89, 94, 97. 
3 
Thus, contrary to the belief of the Court, § 110 may pro-
hibit a substantial amount of noncommercial speech, and is 
therefore unconstitutionally overbroad. Schaumberg v. Cit-
izens for a Better Environment, supra, at 632. This over-
breadth is particularly significant in light of the unfettered 
30 Every commercial use of "Olympic" is regulated under passages of the 
statute which precede this part of§ 110. The USOC is authorized to regu-
late use of the word as a trademark under § 110(a)(3). All remaining com-
mercial uses of "Olympic" not regulated by that subsection are governed by 
§ 110(a)(4)'s authorization of the USOC to control the use of "Olympic" by 
"any person . . . for the purpose of trade" or "to induce the sale of any 
goods or services." Consistent with the Court's interpretation, this au-
thorization gives the USOC the right to Lanham Act remedies , even if 
SF AA's use of "Olympic" is noncommercial, nonconfusing, and merely 
descriptive. · · · 
31 The SF AA's amateur athletic events include competition by age-
groups with mixed genders in some sports to promote a climate of compe-
tition that emphasizes personal improvement rather than winning, and pro-
motes goodwill toward all ages , sexes, and races. App. 98. 
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discretion the Act affords to the USOC to prohibit other enti-
ties from using the word "Olympic." Given the large num-
ber of such users, 32 this broad discretion creates the potential 
for significant suppression of protected speech. "[A] law 
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the 
prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and 
definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is uncon-
stitutional." Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 
150-151 (1969). See also Niemtko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 
268, 272 (1951). "Proof of an abuse of power in the particular 
case has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the con-
stitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemina-
tion of ideas." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97 
(1940). This broad discretion, with its potential for abuse, 
also renders § 110 unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 
B 
The Court concedes that "some" uses of "Olympic" prohib-
ited under§ 110 may involve expressive speech. Ante, at 11. 
But it contends that "[b]y prohibiting the use of one word for 
particular purposes, neither Congress nor the USOC has pro-
hibited the SF AA from conveying its message. . . . Section 
110 restricts only the manner in which the SF AA may con-
vey its message." Ante, at 12 (emphasis added). Section 
110(a)(4) cannot be regarded as a mere time, place, and man-
ner statute, however. By preventing the use of the word 
"Olympic," the statute violates the First Amendment by 
prohibiting dissemination of a message for which there is no 
adequate translation. 
In Cohen v. California, we rejected the very notion ad-
vanced today by the Court when considering the censorship 
of a single four-letter expletive: 
32 See Brief of Respondent 40-41. In Los Angeles and Manhattan 
alone, there are over 200 enterprises and organizations listed in the tele-
phone directories whose names start with the word "Olympic." 789 F. 2d 
1319, 1323 (CA9 1986) (Kozinski, J. , dissenting). 
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"we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can 
forbid particular words without also running a substan-
tial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, 
governments might soon seize upon the censorship of 
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the 
expression of unpopular views. We have been able ... 
to discern little social benefit that might result from run-
ning the risk of opening the door to such grave results." 
403 U. s. 15, 26 (1971). 
The Amateur Sports Act gives a single entity exch,1sive con-
trol over a wide range of uses of a word with a deep history in 
the English language and Western culture. Here, the 
SF AA intended, by use of the word "Olympic," to promote a 
realistic image of homosexual men and women that would 
help them move into the mainstream of their communities. 
As Judge Kozinski observed in dissent in the Court of Ap-
peals, just as a jacket reading "I strongly resent the draft" 
would not have conveyed Cohen's message, so a title such as 
"The Best and Most Accomplished Amateur Gay Athletes 
Competition" would not serve as an adequate translation of 
petitioners' message. 781 F. 2d, at 1321. Indeed, because 
individual words carry "a life and force of their own," transla-
tions never fully capture the sense of the original. 33 The 
First Amendment protects more than the right to a mere 
translation. By prohibiting use of the word "Olympic," the 
3.1 J runes Boyd White has written: 
"When we look at particular words, it is not their translation into state-
ments of equivalence that we should seek but an understanding of the pos-
sibilities they represent for making and changing the world. . . . Such 
words do not operate in ordinary speech as restatable concepts but as 
words with a life and force of their own. They cannot be replaced with 
definitions, as though they were parts of a ·closed system, for they consti-
tute unique resources, of their nature. Their meaning resides not in their 
reducibility to other terms but in their irreducibility. . . . They operate 
indeed in part as gestures, with a meaning that cannot be restated." J . B. 
White, When Words Lose Their Meaning 11 (1984). 
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USOC substantially infringes upon the SF AA's right to com-
municate ideas. 
C 
The Amateur Sports Act also violates the First Amend-
ment because it restricts speech in a way that is not content-
neutral. A wide variety of groups apparently wish to ex-
press particular sociopolitical messages through the use of 
the word "Olympic," but the Amateur Sports Act singles out 
certain of the groups for favorable treatment. As the Court 
observes, ante, at 18, n. 20, Congress encouraged the USOC 
to allow the use of "Olympic" in athletic competitions held for 
youth ("Junior Olympics" and "Explorer Olympics") and 
handicapped persons ("Special Olympics"), 36 U. S. C. 
§ 374(13), while leaving to the USOC's unfettered discretion 
the question of whether other groups may use it. See, e. g., 
USOC v. Golden Age Olympics, Inc., Opp. No. 62,426 (re-
printed in App. 383) (denial of use of "Olympic" to senior citi-
zens group); USOC v. Int'l Federation of Body Builders, 219 
U. S.P.Q. 353 (DDC 1982) (denial of use to organization pro-
moting body building). 
The statute thus permits the USOC to endorse particular 
noncommercial messages, while prohibiting others. Such a 
scheme is unacceptable under the First Amendment. 34 
"Above all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972). 
See also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 648-649 (1984) 
(holding that Government determination of publishability of 
34 Due to the particular meaning of"Olympic," the suppression of the use 
of the word has its harshest impact on those groups that may benefit most 
from its use, such as those with debilitating birth defects, see USOC v. 
March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, No. CA 83-539 (D Colo 1983), 
and the aged, see USOC v. Golden Age Olympics, Inc., Opp. No. 62,426. 
Compare Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 
u. s. 748, 763 (1976). 
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photographs based on whether message is "newsworthy or 
educational" constitutes content-based discrimination in vi-
olation of First Amendment). 
D 
Even if§ 110(b)(4) may fairly be characterized as a statute 
that directly regulates only commercial speech, its incidental 
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are greater than 
necessary to further a substantial government interest. The 
sole government interest proffered for giving the USOC 
sweeping powers over the use of "Olympic" is the desire to 
provide a financial subsidy to the USOC. Brief for Respond-
ents 24. At minimum, it is necessary to consider whether 
USOC's interest in use of the word "Olympic" could not ade-
quately be protected by rights coextensive with those in the 
Lanham Act, or by some other restriction on use of the word. 
Even in the absence of§ 110(a)(4), the USOC would have 
authority under the Lanham Act to enforce its "Olympic" 
trademark against commercial uses of the word that might 
cause consumer confusion and a loss of the mark's distinctive-
ness. 35 There is no evidence in the record that this authority 
is insufficient to protect the USOC from economic harm. 
The record and the legislative history are barren of proof or 
conclusion that noncommercial, nonconfusing, and 
nontrademark use of "Olympic" in any way dilutes or weak-
ens the USOC's trademark. See Stop the Olympic Prison v. 
USOC, 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1123 (SD NY 1980) (dismissing 
USOC's dilution claim because no actual proof of such injury). 
No explanation is offered, for instance, as to how the use of 
"Olympic" in theatrical events in conjunction with a dis-
claimer "not associated with the USOC" harms the economic 
force of the trademark. See Brief of Petitioner 12. The 
Court contends that § 110 may prohibit uses of "Olympic" be-
35 In this litigation, the USOC filed causes of action under the Lanham 
Act, the Amateur Sports Act, and the California dilution statute. App. 
7-14. 
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cause it protects an "image carefully cultivated by the 
USOC." Ante, at 16. Again, there is no proof in the record 
that the Lanham Act inadequately protects the USOC's com-
mercial interest in its image or that the SF AA has harmed 
the USOC's image by its speech. 36 
Language, even in a commercial context, properly belongs 
to the public, unless the Government's asserted interest is 
substantial, and unless the limitation imposed is no more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve that .interest. See ante, at 
13, n. 14; see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, 
Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 215, n. 21 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), cit-
ing Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F. 2d 
1317, 1320 (CCPA 1981) (recognizing importance of "free use 
of the language" in commercial speech context). 37 The 
36 Nor is there any evidence that SF AA's expressive speech caused eco-
nomic or reputational harm to the USOC's image. In Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U. S. 405 (1974), a State asserted a similar interest in the integrity 
of America's flag as "'an unalloyed symbol of our country,' " and contended 
that there is a substantial government interest in "preserving the -flag as 
'an important symbol of nationhood and unity."' Id., at 421. The Court 
considered whether a State could withdraw "a unique national symbol from 
the roster of materials that may be used as a background for communica-
tions." Id., at 423 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). It reviewed a state law 
that limited the use of the American flag and forbade the public exhibition 
of a flag that was distorted or marked. Id., at 407, 422. The appellant 
was convicted for violating the statute by displaying the flag upside down 
in the window of his apartment with a peace symbol attached to it. Eight 
Members of the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to appellant's activity. "There was no risk that appellant's acts would mis-
lead viewers into assuming that the Government endorsed his viewpoint," 
and "his message was direct, likely to be understood, and within the con-
tours of the First Amendment." Id., at 414-415. The Court concluded 
that since the state interest was not "significantly impaired," the convic-
tion violated the First Amendment. Id., at 415. Similarly, in this case, 
the SF AA's primary purpose was to convey a political message that is 
nonmisleading and direct. This message, like the symbolic speech in 
Spence, is protected by the First Amendment. 
37 See also Eada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F. 2d 8, 11 (CA9) 
("_one competitor will not be permitted to impoverish the language of com-
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Lanham Act is carefully crafted to prevent commercial 
monopolization of language that otherwise belongs in the 
public domain. See Park 'N Fly, Inc., supra, at 200-201. 38 
The USOC demonstrates no need for additional protection. 
In my view, the SF AA therefore is entitled to use the word 
"Olympic" in a nonconfusing and nonmisleading manner in 
the noncommercial promotion of a theatrical or athletic 
event, absent proof of resultant harm to the USOC. 
I dissent. 
merce by preventing his fellows from fairly describing their own goods"), 
cert. denied, 400 U. S. 916 (1970). 
38 The Act "provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure 
to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the 
ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers." Id. , at 
198. 
.. 
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MEMORANDUM 
1k 
TO: Leslie and Ronald DATE: June 17, 1987 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
86-270 Olympic Committee 
As I read WJB' s dissent ( a first hurried 
reading), I dictate observations as I go along that may or 
may not serve any purpose other than to make me 
concentrate. 
I 
For the first 15 pages, WJB's dissent argues that 
"the action challenged here constitutes government 
action". He makes two points: (i) the Committee performs 
"important governmental functions" and therefore is a 
government actor; and (ii) there exists a sufficiently 
close nexus between the government and the challenged 
action of the Committee to constitute the Committee action 
as that of the government itself." The dissent relies on 
the fact the Inter~ational Olympic Committee is organized 
on a national basis, and the teams represent nations. I 
note that this also may be true of the Davis Cup tennis 
competition. We should check to see whether the same can 
be said for international bri clqp a nd chess, and perhaps 
.• 2 • 
for the rowing teams that are invited to Henley. I know 
that the Harvard freshmen were defeated by an Irish 
national team. 
As expected, the dissent relies on the fact that 
President Carter announced his "opposition to American 
participation . . . in the Moscow games". [ Leslie and 
Ronald: Check the President's speech to see whether he 
purported to exercise any "command" as distinguished from 
opposition. The same should be done with respect to the 
resolution adopted by Congress. Apparently the President 
did threaten to take "legal action".] 
The threat to take legal action indicates that he 
personally had no authority to command the Committee, and 
that its decisions are made privately by the USOC. This 
is quite evident from n. 7, p. 6, quoting the resolution 
apparently adopted by the USOC House of Delegates to the 
effect that the USOC ;'has decided not to send a team". 
This hardly suggests government action. 
On p . 8, t~e dissent quotes from the charter of 
the USOC. One of the quotes can be viewed as supporting 
us, as apparently the charter e xpressly authorizes the 
Committee "to resolve all conflicts and disputes that 
would arise among the mul titude o f p r i v ate organizations . 
3. 
II 
• I P• 8. This .case involves such a dispute. It is 
being litigated only by the Committee and not by the 
United States or any agency thereof. 
Am I right, ·Leslie, that the USOC receives no 
federal funding? The dissent does recognize that the USOC 
is a "private organization", but relies on the claim that 
thf overnment has bestowed "inherently public powers and 
responsibilities" on the USOC, p. 10 [At least this 
concedes that USOC is a "private organizatio~ Even if 
one agreed that some of its powers could have been 
exercised by government, a decision was made by government 
to create a private entity. Moreover, the only action at 
issue in this case is litigating to protect a trademark 
conferred by government. As we have noted in our opinion, 
the issuance of a trademark does not transform a private 
entity into a public one. 
Subpart I-B 
The dissent also argues, as a separate reason, 
that the governme~t is a "joint participant in the 
challenged activity", as was true in Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715. [In my view, Burton is 
irrelevant. The restaurant at issue was located, under a 
lease, in a publicly owned and on0ra te d automobile parking 
4. 
building that had been built with public funds and solely 
for public purposes. The Parking Authority was held to be 
an agency of the state of Delaware. The restaurant 
discriminated against ~egroes. 
state was a "joint participant". 
This Court held that the 
There can be no serious 
contention in this case that the United States is a joint 
participant with the Committee seeking to protect its 
trademark. I appreciate, of course, that the claim is 
made that the preservation of the trademark by suits has 
been on a discriminatory basis but the predicate facts 
that existed in Burton do not exist here.] 
II 
In this part of the dissent, WJB addresses the 
merits, and would invalidate the pertinent part of the 
statute protecting the use of the word "Olympic". 





On the basis of 
to ~ t .o this 
the usoc with "unguided 
a first reading, I am not 
First Amendment argument as I 
think our opinion already adequately answers it. Of 
course, I would like to have you r thoughts and Ronald's on 
this question. 
5. 
* * * 
I intended noting above that in footnote 17, p. 
15, the dissent refers to "USOC's policy 
enforcement". The footnote then goes on 
of selective 
~ 
4.ft'e say that 
A 
there should be a remand. I think at least we could, in 
our footnote, say that nothing in the record before us 
supports the dissent's implication that USOC has had a 
"policy of selective enforcement". Indeed, the public 
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From. Justice O'Connor 
Circulated : JUN t- 8 1987 
.Recirculated: 
O
lympic ~ . States -United Inc. v. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, Concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I agree with the Court's construction of SllO of the 
Amateur Sports Act, 92 Stat. 3048, 36 u.s.c. §380, and with its 
holding that the statute is "within constitutional bounds." 
Ante, at 
Court's opinion. 
Therefore, I join Parts I through III of the 
But largely for the reasons explained by JUS-
TICE BRENNAN in Part I-B of his dissenting opinion, I believe the 
United States Olympic Committee and the United States are joint 
participants in the challenged activity and as such are subject 
to the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Ac-
cordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals' finding of no 
government action and remand the case for determination of peti-
tioners' claim of discriminatory enforcement. 
-
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86-270 San Francisco Arts v. U.S. Olympic 
Committee 
Mo.- C-A--t.C. 
This case is fte-Pe from the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit. In the Amateur Sports Act of 
1978, Congress granted the United States Olympic 
Committee exclusive use of the Olympic symbo~ the 
word "Olympic"/ for commercial and certain P..E_Omotional 
purposes. 
Petitioner, a nonprofit corporation,/ called 
San Francisco Arts and Athletics / planned to hold a 
nine-day series of athletic events. These games wer ~ 
advertised under the name "Gay Olympic Games". -
When petitioner refused to discontinue use of 
the name "Olympic", suit was filed by th~ ommittee in 
the federal District Court for the Northern District of 
California. That court agreed with the Olympic 
Committee. It granted summary judgment, as well as CL-.. 
permanent injunctionr gainst petitioner. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
Two questions are presented: First, whether 1.+-~1-
the by Congress g-fiHH: of exclusive use of the word 
A 
"Olympicy violates the First Amendment; and second, 
) IA.rk..~ l-£L, ~ $' 
-bt-<~o-/~ 
~t.._,f-- ,4_, ~ r!...t 'Vl~ 
2. 
whether the Committee's enforcement of its right to use 
the name, / was gov~ rnme~ act!,,_on/ and therefore could 
violate the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
For the reasons stated in our opinion, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals/ and affirm its 
decision. First, we sustain, as reasonable, the 
congressional grant of exclusive use of the word 
~~~ 
"Olympic". The word rsAassociated with the famous 
games. 
It also clearly has commercial and promotion 
value/as a result of the efforts},ver many years/ by 
the United States Olympic Committee. 
~~ 4~✓ 
The right granted to the Committee is similar 
~ A 
to the recognized property right in W.££?s ( that 
L,,1..-
customarily ~ granted under trademark law. 
Second, we find that the Committee is private, 
W.t!.-~ · 
with its own governing body. ~ tis not a governmental 
t\ -
actor. We therefore have no occasion to reach the 
merits of petitioner's constitutional claio/that there 
has been discriminatory enforcement. 
rlu-<- t:J'~ 
3. 
Justice O'Connor has filed an opinion, joined 
by Justice Blackmun, concurring in Parts I, II, and III 
of the Court's opinion, and dissenting in part. 
Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Justice Marshall has joined. 
- -
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San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic 
Committee 
FIRST DRAFT 
This case presents the question of the scope and 
constitutionality of a provision of the Amateur Sports Act 
of 1978, 36 U.S.C. §§371-396 (1982), that authorizes the 
United States Olympic Committee to bring suit to prohibit 




Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
[SFAA] is a nonprofit California corporation. 1 SFAA 
· originally sought to incorporate under the name "Golden 
Gate Olympic Association," but was told by the Department 
of Corporations that the word "Olympic" could not appear 
in a corporate title. J.A. 95. After its incorporation 
in 1981, SFAA nevertheless began to promote the "Gay 
Olympic Games," using those words on its letterheads and 
mailings and in local newspapers. Ibid. The Games were 
to be a 9-day event to occur in August, 1982, in San 
Francisco, California. SFAA expected athletes from 
hundreds of cities in this country and from cities all 
1 sFFA's president, Dr. Thomas F. Waddell, is also a 
petitioner. 
""""1"66., 
~ - 7' 
5 .>V" r ~,,, 
3. 
over the world. Id., at 402. The Games were to open with 
"a ceremony that will rival the traditional Olympic 
Games." Id., at 354, 402, 406, 425. A relay of over 
· 2,000 runners would carry a torch from New York City 
across the country to Kezar Stadium in San Francisco. 
Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The final runner would enter 
the stadium with the "Gay Olympic Torch" and light the 
"Gay Olympic Flame." Id., at 357. The ceremony would 
continue with the athletes marching in uniform into the 
stadium behind their respective city flags. Id., at 354, 
357, 404, 402, 414. Competition was to occur in 18 
different contests, with the winners receiving gold, 
silver and bronze medals. Id., at 354~355, 359, 407, 410. 
cover the cost of the planned Games, SFAA sold T-
shirts, buttons, bumper stickers and other merchandise 
bearing the title "Gay Olympic Games." Id., at 67, 94, 
2 107, 113-114, 167, 360, 362, 427. 
4. 
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 [Act], 
36 u.s.c. §380, grants respondent United States Olympic 
Committee [USOC] 3 the right to prohibit the use of the 
word "Olympic" and various Olympic symbols for certain 
commercial and promotional purposes. 4 In late December 
2The 1982 athletic event was ultimately held as planned 
under the name "Gay Games I." J.A. 473. A total of 1300 
men and women from 12 countries, 27 states and 179 cities 
participated. Id., at 475. The "Gay Games II" were held 
in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating 
from 17 countries. Brief for Respondent 8. The 1990 "Gay 
Games" are scheduled to occur in Vancouver, B.C. Ibid. 
3The International Olympic Committee 
respondent. 
4section 110 of the Act provides: 
is also 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person 
who uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the 
sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical · exhibition, atbletic performance, or 
competition--
( 1) the symbol of the International Olympic 
Committee, consisting of 5 interlocking rings; 
(Footnote continued) 
a 
1981, the executive .director of the USOC wrote to SFAA, 
informing it of the existence of the Amateur Sports Act, 
(Footnote 4 continued from previous page) 
(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of 
an escutcheon having a blue chief and vertically 
extending red and white bars on the base with 5 
interlocking rings displayed on the chief; 
(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, 
or insignia falsely representing association 
with, or authorization by, the International 
Olympic Committee or the [USOC]; or 
(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius 
Altius Fortius", or any combination or 
simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, 
to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely 
suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
shall be subject to suit in a civil action by 
the [USOC] for the remedies provided in the Act 
of July 5, 1946 960 Stat. 427; popularly known 
as the Trademark Act of 1946). However, any 
person who actually used the emblem in 
subsection (a)(2) of this section, or the words, 
or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) 
of this section for any lawful purpose prior to 
September 21, 1950 shall not be prohibited by 
this section from continuing such lawful use for 
the same purpose and for the same goods and 
services. In addition, any person who actually 
used, or whose assignor actually used, any other 
trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia 
described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of this 
section for any lawful purpose prior to 




and requesting that . SFAA immediately terminate use of the 
word "Olympic" in its description of the planned Games. 
SFAA at first agreed to substitute the word "Athletic" for 
· the word "Olympic", but, one month later, resumed using 
r 
(Footnote 4 continued from previous page) 
this section from continuing such lawful use for 
the same purpose and for the same goods or 
services. 
(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and 
suppliers of goods and services to use the trade 
name of the [ USOC] as well as any trademark, 
symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International 
Olympic Committee or of the [USOC] in 
advertising that the contributions, goods, or 
services were donated supplied, or furnished to 
or for the use of, approved, selected, or used 
by the [USOC] or the United States Olympic or 
Pan-american team or team members. 
(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to 
use the name 'United States Olympic committee'; 
the symbol described in subsection (a)(l) of 
this section; the emblem described in subsection 
(a)(2) of this section; and the words 'Olympic', 
' O 1 ym pi ad ' , ' Ci t i us A 1 t i us F o r ti us ' o r any 
combination thereof subject to the preexisting 
rights described in subsection (a) of this 
section." 36 u.s.c. §380. 
7 . 
the term. The USOC . became aware that SFAA was still 
advertising its Games as "Olympic" through a newspaper 
article in May, 1982. In August, the USOC brought suit in 
· federal District Court for the Northern District of 
California to enjoin SFAA's use of the word "Olympic." 
The District Court granted a temporary restraining order 
and then a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After further 
proceedings, the District Court granted USOC summary 
judgment and a permanent injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
14-J 




Act r gran ~ USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" 
without requiring USOC to prove that the unauthorized use 
was confusing and without regard to the defenses available 
8. 
to an entity sued for a trademark violation under the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051 et~ It determined that it 
did not have to reach SFAA's contention that USOC enforced 
its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court 
~ 
~ / hat USOC is not a state actor bound by the 
constraints of the Constitution. The court also found 
that USOC's "property right [in the word 'Olympic" and its 
associated symbols and slogans] can be protected without 
violating the First Amendment." 781 F. 2d, at 737. ~ 
~
~ -s--c.a.s-e:,, ~ court de t e r mine-ti that "[b]ecause SFAA had 
satisfactory alternative means for expressing its 
opposition to the Olympics, it has no First Amendment 
right to use 'Olymp~cs' or the Olympic symbols to promote 
its games or products." Ibid. The court denied SFAA's 
petition for rehearing en bane. Three judges dissented, 
9 • 
finding that the panel's interpretation of the Act raised 
serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 1319, 1326 
(1986). 
We granted certiorari, u. s. (1986), to review 
the issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation 
decided by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. 
II 
SFAA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting the Act as granting USOC anything more than a 
normal trademark in the word "Olympic." "The starting 
point in every case involving construction of a statute is 
the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 72,3, 756 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Section 110 of the Act provides_: 
2 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person 
who uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the 
sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibit i on, athletic performance, or 
competition--
(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius 
Altius Fortius", or any combination or 
simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, 
to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely 
suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
shall be subject to suit in a civil action by 
the [USOC] for the remedies provided in the 
[Lanham] Act." 36 U.S.C. §380(a). 
10. 
SFAA argues that the clause "tending to cause confusion" 
is properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." But 
because there is no comma after "thereof," the more 
natural reading of the section is that "tending to cause 
confusion" modifies' only "any combination or simulation 
·. ) ~~-
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~ ne the legislative history of this section. 
A 
Before Congress passed section 110 of the current 
Act, unauthorized use of the word "Olympic" was punishable 
criminally. The relevant statute prohibited: 
"any person ... other than [USOC] ... for the 
purposes of trade, theatrical exhibition, 
athletic performance, and competition or as an 
advertisement to induce the sale of any article 
whatsoever or attendance at any theatrical 
exhibition, athletic performance, and 
competition or for any business or charitable 
pu r pose to use ... the words 'Olympic', 
'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any 
combination of these words ... If any person 
violates the provision of__...this section he shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." 36 u.s . c. 
§379 (1976) (emphasis added). 
The House Judiciary Committee formulated the language of 
section 110 that was ultimately adopted. The committee 
explained that the previous "criminal penalty has been 
found to be unworkable . as it requires the proof of a 
12. 
criminal intent." H.R. Rep. No. 1627, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 15 [House Report]. The changes from the criminal 
statute "were made in response to a letter from the Patent 
· and Trademark Office of the Department of Commerce" that 
the committee appended to the end of its report. This 
letter explained: 
"Section 110(a)(4) makes actionable not only use 
of the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius 
Altius Fortius', and any other combination 
thereof, but also any simulation or confusingly 
similar derivation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cal..fS"e mistake, to deceive, or to 
falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or 
any Olympic activity .... 
Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions 
from the existing statute enacted in 1950 and 
adds some new prohibitions, e.g. words described 
in section (a)(4) tending to cause confusion, to 
cause mistake, or to deceive with respect to the 
[USOC] or any Olympic activity." Id., at 38 
(emphasis added). -
13. 
This legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
intended to provide the USOC with exclusive use of the 
word "Olympic" without regard to whether use of the word 
· tends to cause confusion. 
SFAA further argues that the reference in section 110 
to Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the 
normal trademark defenses as well. This argument ignores 
the clear language of the section. This shorthand 
reference replaced a longer list of remedies typically 
available for trademark infringement, e.g., injunctive 
relief, recovery of profits, damages, costs and attorney's 
fees. 15 U.S.C. §§1116, 1117. This list contained no 
reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12866 
(May 8, 1978). ·Moreover, USOC already held a trademark in 
the word "Olympic." J.A. 378-382. Under SFAA's 
14. 
interpretation, the .Act would be largely superfluous. In 
sum, the language and legislative history of section 110 
indicate~~ongress intended to grant the USOC 
~ 
exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without regard to 
6) ? f-~ 
whether use of the word tends to cause confusion1 o-r to the 
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This Court has recognized that "[n]ational protection 
of trademarks is desirable ... because trademarks foster 
competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to 
the producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N 
!_!y v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 
(1985). In the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051 et~' 
Congress established a system for protecting such 
trademarks. A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or 
15. 
device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a 
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and 
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by 
· others." §1127. Under the Lanham Act, the owner of a 
trademark is protected from unauthorized uses that are 
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive." §1114(1)(a). An alleged trademark infringer 
also has available numerous statutory defenses. §1115. 
The protection granted to USOC's use of the Olympic 
words and symbols differs from the normal trademark 
protection in that USOC need not prove that a contested 
use is likely to cause confusion, and the unauthorized 
user of the word does not have available the statutory 
-~ 
16. 
defenses. 5 SFAA argues, in effect, that the differences 
between the Lanham Act and section 110 are of 
constitutional dimension. First, SFAA contends that the 
· word "Olympic" is a generic word that, under the Lanham 
Act, cannot be a trademark. SFAA argues that this 
prohibition is constitutional and thus that the First 
Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trademark in 
the word "Olympic." Second, SFAA argues that the First 
Amendment prohibits Congress from granting exclusive use 
of a word absent the requirement that USOC prove that an 
unauthorized use is likely to cause confusion. We address 
these contentions in turn. 
5The user may , however, 
defenses, such as !aches. 















This Court has recognized that words are not always 
fungible, and that the suppression of particular words 
"run[s] a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the 
process." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
Yet this recognition g a l~ s). been balanced against the 
additional recognition that when a word acquires value "as 
a result of organization and the expenditure ·of labor, 
skill, and money" by an entity, that entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in 
~ the word. International New Service v. Associated Press, 
ye. I t' 2)d e- . ,. ,-r.._ ( 'y- :,I'_ 1v I o ...'....\ tdF / 6 ~ _ 1 
248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). ~ here the property is a word, 
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There is in this case to decide whether 
Congress ever cou;t. grant a private entity exclusive use 
of a generic wor~ ecause, in enacting section 110, 
Congress reasonably could conclude that the value of the 
word "Olympic" for commercial and promotional purposes was 
the product of USOC's "own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense." Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977). 
The USOC, and its predecessor organization, have used the 
word "Olympic" since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games -------------
began. J.A. 358. ~ s, i(s FAA's contention that Congress 
simply plucked a generic word out of the English 




6 The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing a 
more informal organization. It received its first 
corporate charter in 1950. 
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~~-
in-accar-a-te. Congress reasonably could find that since 
1896, the word "Olympic" has acquired what in trademark 
law is known as a secondary meaning -- it "has become 
· distinctive of [USOC's] goods in commerce." 15 U.S.C. 
§§1052(e), (f). See Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 
supra, at 194. The right to adopt and use such a word "to 
distinguish the goods or property [of] the person whose 
mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, 
has been long recognized." Trade-Mark Cases, supra, at 
92. Because Congres onclude that USOC 
has distinguished the word "Olympic" through its own 
efforts, Congress' decision to grant USOC a limited 
property right in the word "Olympic" falls within the 
scope of trademark law protectipns, and thus certainly 
within constitutional bounds. 
20. 
B 
Congress also reasonably could conclude that USOC 
should not be required to prove that an unauthorized use v -
of the word "Olympic" is likely to confuse the public. 7 
To the extent that section 110 applies to uses "for the 
purpose of trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or 
services," 36 U.S.C. §380(a), its application is to 
commercial speech. Commercial speech "receives a limited 
l\;1 form of First Amendment protection." Posadas de Puerto 
@) 
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 
2968, 2976 (1986). A restriction on commercial speech may ) 
----be justified if the government's interest in the 
7To the extent that section 110 regulates confusing 
uses, it is •within normal. trademark bounds. The 
government constitutionally may regulate "deceptive or 
misleading" commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. 
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restriction , is substantial, directly advances the 
I\ 
21. 
government's as~erted interest, and is no more extensive 
than necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas 
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 !1980). \Q' 11?Yr0~, 
"----
Here, Congress' interest in providing USOC with 
exclusive use of the word "Olympic" is, as with ~ other 
trademarf , in ensuring that USOC receives the benefit of 
I\ 
its own efforts. But in the special circumstance of the 
usoc, the congressional interest is a broader public 
interest in promoting the participation of amateur 
athletes from the United States in the quadrennial world 
.._3&:, u . (,. , L I ~ 31-
event of the modern~day Olympics. Section 110 directly 
advances these governmental interests by supplying USOC 




encourages USOC's activities by ensuring that it will 
receive the benefits of its efforts. Congress' legitimate 
interests respecting the use of the word "Olympic" to sell 
· products are not limited to those uses that are likely to 
cause public confusion. The USOC's ability to raise funds 
by licensing use of the Olympic designations is directly 
tied to USOC's control over their use. Obviouslv, 
J'ntities will pay to use the words and symbols only if 
required to do so, and much of the value of the words and 
symbols, that is, their "commercial magnetism," see 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 
U.S. 203, 205 (1942), comes from their limited use. 
Congress reasonably. could determine that commercial uses 
of the word "Olympic" would all-0w others to profit as a 





this circumstance, the First Amendment does not provide 
license for SFAA "to reap where it has not sown," 
International News Service v. Associated Press, supra, at 
· 239, by appropriating for its own commercial use a word 
that has value primarily due to the efforts of USOC. 
~ ection 110 also allows USOC to prohibit the use ~ 
"Olympic" ~ or promotion of theatrical and athletic events. ) 
Although many ' oJ these promotional uses will be commercial 
speech, some uses m go beyond the "strictly business" 
context. See Friedman v~ ~ogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
In this case, SFAA claims that~ of the word 
"Olympic" was intended to convey a political statement 
24. 
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of .homosexuals 
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about the status in society. 8 lffl't ~ y 
)Si'=--
prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, 
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited SFAA 
from conveying its message. SFAA held its ,-u r 
!ft\. t t -~ 
athletic event> under the n kroe "Gay Games I" and "Gay Games 
II" in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See supra, n. 2. No r 
is the purpose of section 110 to restrict the expressive 
8According to SFAA's president, the Gay Olympic Games 
offer three "very important opportunities. 
1) To provide a healthy recreational 
alternative to a suppressed minority. 
2) To educate the public at large towards a 
more reasonable characterization of gay men and 
women. 
3) To attempt, through athletics, to bring 
about a positive and gradual assimilation of gay 
men and women, as well as gays and non-gays, and 
to diminish the ageist, sexist and racist 
divisiveness · existing in all communities 





use of the word "Olympic." 9 Section 110 restricts only 
the manner in which SFAA's message may be conveyed. The 
restrictions on expressive speech are properly 
· characterized as incidental to the primary congressional 
purpose of encouraging and rewarding USOC's activities. 
The appropriate inquiry is thus whether the incidental 
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms is greater than 
is necessary to further the governmental interest. United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).@'-{!)y·-r)J 
9one court has found that section 110 does not prohio1 
the use of the Olympic logo of five interlocking rings at d ~ 
the Olympic torch on a poster expressing opposition tot 
planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placi , 
New York, into a prison. The court found that the use f 
the symbols did not fit the commercial or ~ ~ 
~~ ~.Ar 
definition of uses in section 110. Sto ------,,~-----.__.._.,.._ 
Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, --- -
1112, 1118-1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
\ 01-u-- t:) ~ ~ 
Section 110 a ,1,1. ows the usoc/4 prohibit pure 
promotion_a1/trse of th / J?d "Olympic" onli 
/ 
26. 
promotion relates to a theatrical or a thletic event. The 
,/ 
USOC created the value of the word by using it in . ( 
r( ' &- L 
I.. f)<. ,+ 
connection with an athletic event. Thus ,L use of the word 
to promote an athletic event will directly impinge on 
USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. SFAA's proposed 
use of the word is an excellent example. Th~ "Gay 
Olympics" were to include a torch relay, a parade with 
uniformed athletes divided by city, an "Olympic anthem" 
and "Olympic Committee," the award of gold, silver, and 
bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three 
overlapping rings. All of these featu r es directly 
parallel the modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games 




that occurred in ancient Greece. 10 The image SFAA sought 
to invoke was exactly the image carefully cultivated by 
usoc. ;:;;AA's expressive use of the word cannot be 
divorced from the value inherent in the word primarily 
because of USOC's efforts. 11 Thus, USOC's right to 
prohibit use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of 
" ,UA ~ j 
VV ,y,L.l (/ 
10 I ( o../1 ' ,/ 11 
The ancient Olympic Games lasted five day ~ There was '-[r'- t 
a burning fire for religious sacrifice, but the to/rch r-tJlL 
relay was an innovation of the modern Olympic Committee. "' 
There appears to have been no parade of athletes divided 
by locality, and the athletes were naked, not uniformed. 
The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of wild olive. 
Only the modern Olympics use gold, silver and bronze 
medals. The logo of overlapping rings was created by the 
International Olympic Committee, with the colors of the 
rings representing the colors of the flags of al l the 
countries participating in the modern Olympic Games. See 
generally The Olympics: A Book of Lists 10-13 (1984); M. 
Finley & H. W. Pleket, The Olympic Games: The first 
Thousand Years 1-13 (1976) 
11 sFAA's contention that it is a nonprofit corporation 
and was not using the word "Olympic" tor commercial gain 
does not change the fact that SFAA sought to convert the 
goodwill generated by the USOC to its own purposes. wj theu ~ 
~ • 'C-n-.A,-"1',IJ:"1 • • 6':>..e: tJ; ~s- <&.- <1 • ·- e.: ,'Lo.:f ;~ 
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28. 
athletic events is at the core of its legitimate property 
right.12 
~ ?a.-11- wd 
~ 
1-
. l~ ;,1-..; 
·~~~ 
argues that even if the exclusive use granted by -, 
section 110 does not violate the First Amendment, USOC's 
1 t~") - 6 .,... :1 '"- .,:. ·-1., Ii- •·~-' #"'v ~ 
enforcement of that right is discriminatory in violation 
( z) 0-1· ~~~ ' 
~ J,/tu.-f-1/u. of the Fifth Amendment. 13 The fundamental inquiry is 
1) ~'5 At/~ 
1 h-·~,_ ""-tD S'/2.1.-/~~~,t.4-~A, --- ·"' ;;~w-,.,,. ~ er,,.. tJ '"""""'-J). , J ~ /..t 
r~ 
J ~,1 
+ ,;:Ld.. t,r, ~ 44..f!' /.--4.f ri./~,J.. ~-1 ~ ~P-..t,.-~~ ,;, 1 
12Although a theatrical production is not as closely 
related to the primary use of the word by USOC as is an 
athletic event, Congress reasonably could have found that 
when the word "Olympic" is used to promote such a 
production, it would implicate the value given to the word 
by usoc. 
13 sFAA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its 
discriminatory enforcement claim. The Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed 
association in this case is between the USOC and the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply 
to the Federal Government and contains an equal protection 
component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
"[This Court's] approach to Fifth Amendment equal 
protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to 
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). 
SFAA raised the issue of discriminatory enforcement in its 
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whether USOC is a governmental actor to whom the 
prohibitions of the Constitution apply~ USOC is a 
"private corporation established under Federal law." 36 
D? ~ 0- ✓ ~-- -~ . 
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G~t-and the fact that Congress granted it a .s-
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corporate charter does not chanqe this factl. All 
corporations act under charters granted by a government, 
usually by a State. They do not thereby lose their 
essentially private character. Even extensive regulation 
by the government does not transform the actions of the 
regulated entity into those of the government. See 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
(Footnote 13 continued from previous page) 
issue fully. Accordingly, we . address the claim as one 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
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Nor is the fact that Congress has granted USOC exclusive 
use of the word "Olympic" dispositive. All trademarks are 
granted pursuant to the Lanham Act, a congressional 
statute. The actions of the trademark owners nevertheless 
~~ S' 
remain private. /(.the purpos ~ of the grant to USOC was to 
help it acquire funding. The Government may subsidize 
private entities without assuming constitutional 
responsibility for their actions. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 
U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 
8 3 o, 8 4 o ( 19 8 2) ; Mor eave r , the supe t Q :i: s i on-o-E-a-ma..t.e.u; 
" 
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exclusive prerogative" of the Federal Government· l Jackson tJ 
C, V61eC ~ 
~ 5 3; I Bl um v. v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 
Yaretsky, supra; at 1011) J ~ mateur Sports ~ was 
enacted "to correct the disorganization and the serious 
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factional disputes that seemed to plague amateur sports in 
the United States." House Report 8. See Oldfield v. 
Athletic Congress, 779 F. 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing s. 
Rep. No. 770, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978)). The Act 
merely authorized the USOC to coordinate activity that has 
always been s-up~ rvi s e-d-~y private entities. 14~ 
µ r<tf t -rl . 
At bots om, this Cou if t has held that a government 
"normally can be held responsible for a private decision 
d 
only when it has exercise ~ coercive power or has provided 
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, 
that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 
[government]." Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 991; Rendell-
14 The Commission that recommended the current USOC powers 
"made it clear that it did not want the Federal Government 
dir,cting amateur athletics in this country." H. R. Rep. 
162 ~ , 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978). 
32. 
" 
Baker v. Kohn, supra, at 840; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 
· 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). USOC's choice of how to enforce 
its exclusive right to use the word "Olympic" is simply 
not a governmental decision. There is no evidence that 
the Federal Government coerced or encouraged -usoc in the 
exercise of its right. At most, the Federal Government, 
by failing to supervise USOC's use of its rights, can be 
said to exercise "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in 
the initiatives" of USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 
1004-1005. This is not enough to make USOC's actions 
those of the Government. Ibid.; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 




co., supra, at 357 . . Thus, SFAA's claim that usoc has 
enforced its rights in a discriminatory manner must 
fail 15 
IV 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
15 In its petition for certiorari, SFAA argued only that 
because USOC is a "state actor" it is prohibited from 
"selecting among diverse potential users of the word 
'Olympic", based upon speech-suppressing and invidiously 
discriminatory motives." Pet. for Cert. i. SFAA now 
argues that under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), 
the District Court's entry of the injunction prohibiting 
SFAA's use of the word 'Olympic" constitutes governmental 
action sufficient to require a constitutional inquiry into 
the USOC's motivation in seeking the injunction. This new 
theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed 
within the questions presented and thus is not properly 
before the Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 21.l(a). In any 
event, Shelley was. based upon an application of civil 
rights legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Its applicability to the 
situation in this case is highly questionable. 
l_r.(] 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
( 
The question before us is whether a prosecutor~ 
~7:7, 
question respecting a criminal defendant's silence after 
receiving Miranda 1 warnings requires reversal of the 
defendant's conviction. 
I 
In 1980 Neil Gorsuch was kidnapped, robbed, and 
murdered after leaving a bar in Jacksonville, Illinois. 
Three men were charged with the crimes: Randy Williams, 
1Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473 (1966). 
2 . 
Clarence Armstrong, and the respondent, Charles Miller. 
Williams confessed, and later entered into a plea 
agreement whereby most . of the charges against him would be 
dropped if he would testify at the separate trials of 
Armstrong and Miller. 
At Miller's trial, Williams testified the he, his 
brother, and Armstrong had met Gorsuch in a tavern on the 
evening of February 8. Armstrong offered the victim a 
ride back to his hotel, and the four men left together at 
about 1:30 a.m. After Williams' brother was dropped off, 
Armstrong began beating Gorsuch in the pack seat of the 
car. According the Williams' testimony, the . group stopped 
briefly at Williams' parents' home to pick up a shotgun, 
and the men then drove to the trailer home where Miller 
was staying. Williams claimed that Miller joined the 
rt...~f 
group, w+ri-eh then traveled to a bridge on an isolated 
road. Williams stated that once there each of the 
men shot the victim in - the head with the shotgun. 
~/-
Miller took the stand on his own behalf and 
I\ 
c,.._..,,, 
quite different story. On direct examination he 
I\ 
that he had taken no part in the crime, but that 
and Williams had come to the trailer home after the 
was committed seeking Miller's advice. Respondent 
testified that Armstrong confessed that he and Williams 
3. 
had beaten and robbed the victim, and that they had killed 
him to avoid being identified as the perpetrators. 
The prosecutor began his cross-examination of Miller 
as follows: 
"Q: Mr. Miller, how old are you? 
"A: 23. 
"Q: Why didn't you tell this story to anybody 
when you got arre~ted?" App. 31. 
4. 
Defense counsel imm~diately objected. Out of the hearing 
of the jury, Miller's lawyer requested a mistrial on the 
ground that the prosecutor's question violated Miller's 
· right to remain silent after arrest. The trial judge 
denied the motion, but~~e jury to "ignore the 
~ 
question, for the time being." Id., at 32. The 
prosecutor did not pursue the issue further, nor did he 
mention it during his closing argument. At the conclusion 
~ ~~ (~~~~qj'-?«fj 15 
of the ~ ' defense counsel did n~ request spe ~ l:-f--4. c 
~  
Ainstructionj concerning the prosecutor's questio~ t he 
judge ~~ed the jury to "disregard questions 
" 
... to which objections were sustained." Id., at 47. 
Miller was convicted of murder, aggravated kidnapping, and 
robbery, and sentenced to 80 years in prison. 
On appeal the State conceded that the prosecutor's 
~~ 
9/j,, r 111 
~ 
5. 
question about Mill~r's postarrest silence was prohibited 
by this Court's decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976), but argued that the error was harmless under the 
· standards of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 2 
Th~ ppellate Court d( ~ nois~ rejected 
~f~~ 
W reversed the conviction, concluding that 
the argument and 
the evidence 
against Miller "was not so overwhelming as to preclude all 
reasonable doubts about the effect of the prosecutor's 
comments." 104 Ill. App. 3d 57, 61, 432 N.E. 2d 650, 653-
trf 9~ 
654 (4th Dist. 1982). The !~lino.is Supreme Court 
/1.. 
disagree~ ~ and reinstated the trial court's 
decision. 96 Ill. 2d 385, 450 N.E. 2d 322 (1983). The 
. a~~~~ 
2 
In Chapman,i the Court held that even errors of 
constitutional m gnitude may be harmless if it is clear 
beyond a reas nable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to t e defendant's conviction. 386 U.S., at 
24. ~•• L ~ ~1 ~  ..... •-I- ;:;t.;;:~ j:v b~-
. ? f-t..._,{',,_,,_,_ ,.,._,J--
a..~ ~ ..___ ~ 
c~ . 




v~tf l- · 
t1 
6 • 
court noted that th~ prosecutor's question was an isolated 
comment made in the course of a lengthy trial, that the 
jury had been instructed to disregard the question, and 
· that the evidence properly admitted was sufficient to 
establish Miller's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 
at 396, 450 N.E. 2d, at 327. It therefore held that the 
error was insufficient to require reversal of the 
conviction. 
. a_ ~ k~ i,.,-a..,~ ri,, 
Miller then filed) afl-- ~ ~ ce&sf~f - habeas corpus 
in the Federal District Court for the Central 
74- fu=.1<-~ ~ dL.-u,c',J ,t,,_, 1-1..- 1}.z_,,, f-
d7::::,. i C: i I I I' h~ CvM-
/~ 
District of Illinois. y ~ -
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh ~ 
rt l f'V\..~ DCs II\._,.. fC hf..~ J....,, ~ Qs2'\ 
Circuit, 772 F. 2d 293 (1985), -a-ntr ~ eargument en bane, 
~ , / ~~v 
~_.., trJ,4./A<-~~~,. a. 
I\.~ the f u 11 co u r; ;/ 7 8 9 F . 2 d 4 3 8 ( CA 7 1 9 8 6 ) . The~ u r t 




the time of his arrest for the offenses in question, 
"[t]he prosecutor's reference to Miller's silence at the 
time of his arrest ... . violated his constitutional right 
to a fair trial." Id., at 442. The court further held 
that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
under Chapman v. California, supra, because "[t]he 
evidence against Miller was not overwhelming, his story 
was not implausible, and the trial court's cautionary 
instruction was insufficient to cure the error." Id., at 
447. Three judges dissented, concluding that under the 
harmless error standard, "this fifteen-second colloquy, 
alleviated by the trial judge's immediately sustaining the 
defendant's objection and instructing the jury to ignore 
the prosecutor's improper question and by a threshold jury 
instruction to disregard questions to which objections 
8 • 
were sustained, did _not affect the verdict." Id., at 448 
(Cummings, J., joined by Wood and Coffey, JJ., dissenting) 
(footnotes and record reference omitted). Judge 
· Easterbrook also dissented. In his view, the "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt" ·standard of Chapman is too 
stringent to be applied to this case for a number of 
reasons: the rule of Doyle is prophylactic rather than 
innocence-protecting; review is sought on collateral, 
<flA.-
rather than direct 
~ 
review; the error i n t h i s c ase could 
J. 
~ ~ • ~ CJ.1 ,r r' r. l r r r /' 
v"""" ~ ,- have been p rot e etedcmore fully r,.by- counsel
1 
at trial; and 
.j.,a-- ·--~s •' 'f""'7 ~- the violation should be viewed as prosecutorial misconduct 
2-~ ? 
~ - that requires reversal only if it rendered the trial 
fundamentally unfair. Id., at 448-457. 
We granted -certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' 
determination that the prosecutor's question respecting 
9 • 
the criminal defendant's postarrest silence requires 
hJ-L~~~~cA 
,;.)' 
reversal of the conviction in this case. 3/( we. now reverse. ~ 
II 
The rule at issue in this case stems from Doyle v. 
Ohio, supra. The petitioners in Doyle were arrested for 
selling marijuana. They were given Miranda warnings and 
made no postarrest statements about their involvement in 
3The question presented for review in the petition for 
certiorari was: "Whether, when considering violations of 
Doyle v. Ohio in federal habeas corpus proceedings, the 
standard of review should be whether the error 
substantially affected the course of the trial rather than 
whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Pet. for Cert. i. Throughout their briefs and argument, 
the parties rather loosely refer to "Doyle violations." 
But the State presents extensive argument as to the proper 
standard for assessing a Doyle violation, Brief for 
Petitioner 24-37, stating at the beginning of its brief 
that the "effort to impeach respondent with his prior 
silence constituted an attempted violation of [Doyle]." 
Id., at 16 (emphasis added). Miller responds to this 
argument. Brief for Respondent 24-37. We thus find the 
question of whether a Doyle violation occurred at all 
under the facts . of this case to be "fairly included" in 
the question presented for review. See this Court's Rule 
21.l(a). 
10. 
the crime. They contended at trial that they had been 
framed by the government informant. As part of his cross-
examination, the prosecutor asked petitioners repeated 
· questions about why, if they were innocent, they did not 
give their current explanation to the police at the time 
of their arrest. 4 Defense counsels' timely objections to 
4The questions by the prosecutor and the defendants' 
answers in these trials included: 
"Q. [I)f that is all you had to do with this and 
you are innocent, when [the agent) arrived on 
the scene why didn't you tell him?" Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 614 (1976). 
"Q .... You are innocent? 
"A. I am innocent. Yes Sir. 
"Q. That's why you told the police department 




I didn't tell them about my innocence. 
Id., at 614-615, n. 5. 
"Q. [Y)ou said instead of protesting your 
innocence, .as you do today, you said in response 
to a question of [the agent], -- 'I don't know 
what you are talking about.' 




this line of questi~hing ~ere overrul~d. , Also : over timely 
objections, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to 
argue petitioners' postarrest silence to the jury. 426 
U.S., at 613-615, and n. 5. On review, this Court found 
that the Miranda decision "compel[led] rejection" of the 
~ 
contention that such questioning and argument -i-s-. proper 
~ 
means of impeachment. Id., at 617. The Court noted that 
~ postarrest silence may not be particularly probative 
of guilt. It next found that because Miranda warnings 
contain an implicit assurance "that silence will carry no 
(Footnote 4 continued from previous page) 
"Q. All right, -- But you didn't protest your 
innocence at that time?" ,! 
"A. Not until I knew what was going on." 
at 615, n . . 5. 
Id. , 
12. 
penalty," id., at ql8, "'it does not comport with due 
process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call 
attention to [the defendant's] silence at the time of 
· arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about 
the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need 
not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the 
truth of his trial testimony,'" id., at 619 (quoting 
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (WHITE, J., 
concurring in judgment)). Because this occurred in the 
two cases at issue in Doyle, the Court held that "the use 
for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the 
time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id., at 619. 











-~ ~ J . 
 ~) 
13. 
number of subsequen~ cases. These later holdings confirm 
that "Doyle rests on 'the fundamental unfairness of 
implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be 
· used against him and then using his silence to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial.'" Wainwright 
v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634, 639 (1986) (quoting South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1983)). Thus, "[i)~ 
-t.A.e absen~
3
of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied 
,, 
in the Miranda warnings, 
,:A 
I'\) .C (rt 
. . ....-i-t-hi 
..,. r' 
e 
r r CC 'f -· · · · f' {J --' it .e C 
p.rocess of Law-f.or -a- Stat .to ermit cross-examination as 
-to (; ~-- 0 ~ . )\- 1 . \ . 
_gostar r est_ s.ilence -whe-n- a de·fendan·t - chooses- to- take the 
s-ta-nd. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982). See 
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 213, 240 (1980) ("[N]o 
~~f 
~~silent before ~k~., 
governmental action induced [the defendant] to remain 
arrest") (emphasis added); Anderson v. 
? 
14. 
Charles, 447 U.S. 4Q4, 408 (1980) (cross-examination 
respecting inconsistent postarrest statements "makes no 
unfair use of silence, . because a defendant who voluntarily 
speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been 
induced to remain silent"). 
There is no question that Miller received the 
"implicit assurance" of Miranda warnings in this case. 
W-fJ/1-
Thus, the prerequisite for a Doyle violation j-s' met. But 
? the holding of Doyle is that the Due Process Clause bars 
"the use for impeachment purposes" of a defendarit's 
postarrest silence. 426 U.S., at 619 (emphasis , added). 
Specifically, "the unfairness occurs when the . prosecution, 
in the presence of the jury, is allowed . to undertake 
impeachment on the basis of [the defendant's silence]." 
Id., at 619, n. 10 (emphasis added). In Doyle, the Court 
15. 
noted that "it does _not comport with due process to permit 
the prosecution during trial to call attention to [the 
defendant's silence]." . Id., at 619 (quoting United States 
· v. Hale, supra, at 183 (WHITE, J., concurring in 
judgment)) (emphasis added). In each of the cases in 





~ F o+ "" · """ -...,--...; --,i:!• ... al~ 
permitted >,inquiry ~e. ~ meh t respecting the ~. 
defendant's pos} -Miranda silence. See Jenkins v. 
Anderson, supra, at 233-234 (extended questioning and 
closing argument reference); Anderson v. Charles, supra, 
at 405-406 (questioning); Fletcher v. Weir, supra, at 603-
604 (questioning); South Dakota v. Neville, supra, at 564 
(admission of refusal to take blood-alcohol test); 
Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra, at 636 (closing 
argument). In contrast to all of the cases that this 
16. 
Court has examined 'l:lnder Doyle, the trial 1 court · in this 
case did not permit the inquiry that Doyle forbids. 
Instead, the court explicitly sustained an • obdection to 
the first question that touched upon Miller's postarrest 
silence. 
Wl;/t_ ,k, 
No further questioning or argument respect.illllll: ✓ I\ ,..,,, 
Miller's silence occurred, and the court , specifically 
advised the jury that it should disregard any questions to 
which an objection was sustained. 
l~-~ 
Jrr-:;_v 
It i s aif f1c u l c-
J-1,,.,--~~a ..noyl e --.ri- o 1 at 1 on ~ occur red -:--' This is not a case "in which 
~ •• _J~ 
pf-' the prosecutor's remarks . so prejudiced a specific right, 
"1 . ~.fl>., VY"" 11,_,,_ 'if tfV\, f ,~. 
~~ such as the privilege against · compulsory self-
lJ~  
~ 
incrimination, as to amount to a denial bf that right." 
 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) .,,,,,-:--
r~rJJ-
~ 1 ~ (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). In 
wtfo--p,/ - p,1-~ 
.J ff,~ C ~ 
~ ~l kl#'\ 
w ..,L-,- (A/14~ ~~fa-








Griffin, the Court ~eld that a state statute permitting 
prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to testify 
at trial directly violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment 
· right to remain silent. 
~,k,<,...L. 
The comment was "a penalty 
~ 
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional 
privilege." 380 U.S., at 614. In contrast, this Court 
has made clear that the "fundamental unfairness" that 7 
underlies a Doyle violation does not occur because of a 
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See 
Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra, at 639, n. 7. While "the 
right to silence underlying the Miranda warnings is one of 
constitutional dimension," South Dakota v. Neville, supra, 
at 565, the implicit assurance of the warnings as to the 
burden that the ·State will put on that right is not. 
Thus, absent the implicit assurance of Miranda warnings, 
18. 
~- "the Fifth Amendment is not violated when a defendant who 
testifies in his own defense is impeached with his prior 
silence." Jenkins v. Anderson, supra, at 235 (citing 
· Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)). An error 
rises to constitutional dimension under Doyle only when 
the implicit promise of Miranda -- that "silence will 
carry no penalty" -- is breached. See Doyle, 426 U.S., at 
618. / 
( 7 Here, ~o penalty could silence 
be c ause the 
7 
·v 
prosecu t or's ques1~1/( 1he 
-
to undertake impeachment on," or "permit[ted] ... to call 
u 
attention to," Miller's silence. Id., at 619, and n. 10. 
The fact of Miller's postarrest silence was not submiU eA -
to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw 
v ~Lu,.. : !) ~~Jo 19. 
-- ~ ~ £),-/f.J ~4) 
~ ~ ..... 4t.../-~ 
-H.--c ~f-~. /sJ~ 
--- ~ d .. ,.,k,,J... 1 PA,.-yf m-~ ~ ----- F-~ . r:n--r _4 ~ ~~. ~ . ~ -...-'k.c., ....._ .------., 
permissible infere~ Because the fact of his ~ .... ~ 
t:,.;,c:z.6 1 ,.-
Miranda silence legally could not be, and 
was not, used as evidence against Miller, the fundamental 




Although no Doyle violation ~ in this 
. ~ ~.iC,::;;;a_;..;; 
case, the fact remains that the prosecutor attempted to 
~ 
violate the rule of Doyle j""f't~.=.~ 
,~ :!::;:.:::t ";-~ l;: .-:-;: -~~ • il • n c e >-
This Court has recognized that prosecutorial misconduct, 
even though not directed at a specific constitutional 
right of the accused, may "so infec[t] the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, supra, at 643. 
. Lf- IA,-
20. 
To constitute a due _process violation, the prosecutorial 
misconduct must be "'of sufficient significance to result 
in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial . '" 
United states v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, (1985) (quoting 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)). 
~~~ a..~ ~4tA.-
The Illinois Supreme Court found the p rQ se el.l-t-e-ri al 
A 
~I 1 ~He..,,._~~~~~~~~ 
m~c oodust i o~ harmless beyona a reasonabl! doubt. 96 
Ill . 2d, at 396, 450 N.E. 2d, at 327 . We thus have no 
doubt that it would find no due process violation under 
the facts of this case.
5 
When a defen~ o= ~ 
~s a~~ 
5The Federal strict Court a irmed stat{ Supreme 
Court. App. Pet. for Cer . C. Becaus the1 harmless 
error standar more dem ding than the "fundamental 
fairness" inq iry of the Due Process Clase, we a r e 
d,L.A,/r' "co~ tha the Distri t Court also would f+m:t no due 
process viola ion , u · . Although 
the Court of ppeals- di not ~ s specifically ~ the due 
process ques ion, it a alyzed the facts of this ase fully 
and in detai . See 7 F. 2d 438, 445-447 (CA7 986). We 
find the fa ts as eveloped J and reviewed the five 
decisions blow t...a,;....-J;i~ ufficient for us determine 






prosecutor's questiqn rendered his trial ,, fundamentally 
unfair, it is important "as an initial matter to place 
th[e] remar[k] in context." Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. 
· ct. 2464, 2471 (1986) . See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 
supra, at 639 (determining whether "remarks, in the 
context of the entire trial, were sufficiently prejudicial 
-~ 
to violate respondent's due process right ;;;•J:, \ The / 
Illinois Supreme Court noted that the question at issui 
"was but a single, isolated reference to defendant's post-
arrest silence made during the course -of a lengthy trial." 
~"'-"'-~~ 
96 Ill. 2d, at 396, 450 N.E. 2d, at 327. defense counsel 
~ I 
promptly objected to the question, and the objection was 
sustained. Miller was not required to answer the 
question, and no further questioning along this line 





c,u-r-a-t+ v e - i ns t -ru c t i on-: 
0 
7 he 
'I' ~ f ~llA. ttiY<;, .(1 \-' 




immediately instructed the jury to ignore the question. 
Although the trial judge indicated that his ruling on the 
· admissibility of this type of evidence was "for the time 
being," App. 32, he later told counsel at a bench 
conference his determination that "[i]t's not proper for 
the State to develop on cross examination of a witness who 
U remained silent during interrogation that he had not told 
police about matters he testified to during trial." Id., 
at 43. Defense counsel did not request a clarifying 
curative instruction at this time. Nor did defense 
counsel request that this type of instruction be given to 
the jury before its deliberations. Nevertheless, the jury 
was instructed that it should "disregard questions ... to 







~ is enti.re sequence -or evenf s - indicateG tha"t the 
I'> 
single question at issue did not~ render Miller's ·trial 
fundamentally unfair . . The jury was twice instructed to 
23. 
· di s re g-a-r-e-t:-h ue·sti.on. ~ We normally presume that a jury 
will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible 
evin~~ce inadvertently presented to it, unless the effect 
of such evidence on the defendant is "devastating." See 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). Far 
from being "devastating," the fact of Miller's postarrest 
silence was at most "insolubably ambiguous." Doyle, 426 
U~ Moreover, Miller's trial counsel bore 
primary responsibility for ensuring that the error was 
cured in the manner most advantageous to his client. Once 
it became apparent that the judge was not going to grant a 
mistrial, it was the duty of counsel to determine what 
\ev-
1,Ll J.. le v 
~ 
t,.. u 






strategy was in his .client's best interest. ~ouns e l :l:,,d--
; 
h-a t-err1 wo-u-1-Ei- ove r lo-ok 
the le reference, or that focusing its attention on 
Miller's poXtarrest silence with a later instruction might 
Such a decision is well within 
counsel's strategic d ~ retion. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 
U.S. 7456, 751 (1983). ailure of counsel to request 
any more specific curative instruc or for the court 
to give it, did not render Miller's trial, fundamentally 
unfa0 
~ finding the pYos·ecutot 's quest-r on liannre-s-s ,- the 
Illinois Supreme Court ~u~tb~ r relied on the substantial 
I 
6counsel also may have qet f rmined that his best strategy 
would be not to ·attempt t ~ cure the improper reference and 
to preserve the error fo,r appeal. See Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (197y ). If this was his strategy, 
it has failed. 
25 . 




Evaluation of the weight of the evidence is a primary ~ 
responsibility of the state court, and there was, indeed, 
· a large body of physical and testimonial evidence that 
corroborated the government witness' testimony. We thus 
also rely on the state court's determination that the 
properly admitted evidence "was sufficient to prove 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," 96 Ill. 2d, 
at 396, 450 N.E. 2d, at 327, in finding that the 
prosecutor's question did not render Miller's trial 
fundamentally unfair. ) 
----- - ------
IV 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit and remand fo r proceedings consistent 
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RIDER23 SALLY-POW 
'-1,,\..,, ~ c~ 
{' - The entire sequence of event; , as stated in ~arts 
I and II hereof, clearly indicate/ that respondent's due 
process rights were not prejudiced.* 
prosecutor's question harmless, 
'5" .J..L.{) 
the I 11 inoi s Supreme Court Eu & .b.e r ,r:,e-14ee-on- the 
?-
,-
stantial ev ~dence 90.J:,.robo i:.a ting the story of 
government's witness. (Cite?) There was --------------------~---
a o d 1-1 o f pl I v s i c a i-al'td-t--&S-t-i.m-0-11-L e_v..i,,d e-rH3e- t -h·a t 
( <!/4/<, ? ) 
-e.o r-r.o.ho_r_a t__e.d_ the t.e st i mo n y. wi t·ness .A we- may- re-3:y 
on ~be determination ~ 1+e-aS~t a.t e. that the properly 
(}.,( ft t1 
admitted evidenc* was sufficient to ~ efendant•s 
guilt beyond a ~easonable doubt," 96 Ill. 2d, at 
t 
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· *We reemphasize that the jury in this case was twice 
instructed to disregard the prosecutor's question. We 
normally presume that a jury follows an instruction to 
disregard inadmissible evidence unless the effect of such 
evidence on the defendant's case is "devastating". See 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). 
Moreover, as we have indicated~Miller's trial counsel bore 
considerable responsibility for his own conduct. When it 
became apparent that the court was not going to grant a 
mistrial, it was the duty of counsel to determine what 
strategy was in his client's best interest. He chose not 
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SUPREME COURT OF fflE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-270 
SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC. AND 
THOMAS F. WADDELL, PETITIONERS v. UNITED 
STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND INTER-
NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1987] 
In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of 
a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-396 (1982), that authorizes the United States Olympic 
Committee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional 
uses of the word "Olympic." 
I 
Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SF AA) is 
a nonprofit California corporation.' The SF AA originally 
sought to incorporate under the name "Golden Gate Olympic 
Association," but was told by the California Department of 
Corporations that the word "Olympic" could not appear in a 
corporate title. App. 95. After its incorporation in 1981, 
the SF AA nevertheless began to promote the "Gay Olympic 
· Games," using those words on its letterheads and mailings 
and in local newspapers. Ibid. The Games were to be a 9-
day event to begin in August, 1982, in San Francisco, Califor-
nia. The SF AA expected athletes from hundreds of cities in 
this country and from cities all over the world. Id. , at 402. 
The Games were to open with a ceremony "which will rival 
the traditional Olympic Games." Id., at 354. See id., at 




2 SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0. C. 
402, 406, 425. A relay of over 2,000 runners would carry a 
torch from New York City across the country to Kezar Sta-
dium in San Francisco. Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The final 
runner would enter the stadium with the "Gay Olympic 
Torch" and light the "Gay Olympic Flame." . Id., at 357. 
The ceremony would continue with the athletes marching in 
uniform into the stadium behind their respective city flags. 
Id., at 354, 357, 402, 404, 414. Competition was to occur in 
18 different contests, with the winners receiving gold, silver, 
and bronze medals. Id., at 354-355, 359, 407, 410. To 
cover the cost of the planned Games, the SF AA sold T-shirts, 
buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." Id., at 67, 94, 107, 113-114, 
167, 360, 362, 427-428. 2 
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act (Act), 36 U. S. C. 
§ 380, grants respondent United States Olympic Committee 
(USOC) 3 the right to prohibit certain commercial and promo-
tional uses of the word "Olympic" and various Olympic sym-
bols. 4 In late December 1981, the executive director of the 
2 The 1982 athletic event ultimately was held under the name "Gay 
Games I." App. 473. A total of 1,300 men and women from 12 countries, 
27 States, and 179 cities participated. Id. , at 475. The "Gay Games 11" 
were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating from 17 
countries. Brief for Respondent 8. The 1990 "Gay Games" are scheduled 
to occur in Vancouver, B. C. Ibid. 
3 The International Olympic Committee is also a respondent. 
'Section 110 of the Act provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the pur-
pose of trade, to induce the sale of any good~ or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
"(!) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 5 
interlocking rings; 
"(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a 
blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 5 
interlocking rings displayed on the chief; 
"(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely repre-
senting association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic 
Committee or the [USOC]; or 
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USOC wrote to the SF AA, informing it of the existence of 
the Amateur Sports Act, and requesting that the SF AA im-
mediately terminate use of the word "Olympic" in its descrip-
tion of the planned Games. The SF AA at first agreed to 
substitute the word "Athletic" for the word "Olympic," but, 
one month later, resumed use ofthe term. The USOC be-
came aware that the SF AA was still advertising its Games as 
"Olympic" through a newspaper article in May, 1982. In Au-
gust, the USOC brought suit in the Federal District Court 
"(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius Altius Fortius", or any 
combination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mis-
take, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies pro-
vided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the 
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) (15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. ]. How-
ever, any person who actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this 
section, or the words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same pur-
pose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who ac-
tually used, or whose assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade 
name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950 shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same pur-
pose and for the same goods or services. 
"(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods and 
services to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, 
symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of 
the [USOC] in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were 
donated, supplied, or furnished to or for the use of, approved, selected, or 
used by the [USOC] or the United States Olympic or Pan-American team 
or team members. 
"(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name 'United States 
Olympic Committee'; the symbol described in subsection (a)(l) of this sec-
tion; the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any combination 
thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this 
section." 36 U. S. C. § 380. 
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for the Northern District of California to enjoin the SF AA's 
use of the word "Olympic." The District Court granted a 
temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunc-
tion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
After further proceedings, the District Court granted the 
USOC summary judgment and a permanent injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court. 781 F. 2d 733 (1986). It found that the Act granted 
the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without re-
quiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use was 
confusing and without regard to the defenses available to an 
entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. (1982). It did not reach the 
SF AA's contention that the USOC enforced its rights in a 
discriminatory manner, because the court found that the 
USOC is not a state actor bound by the constraints of the 
Constitution. The court also found that the USOC's "prop-
erty righ[t] [in the word 'Olympic' and its associated symbols 
and slogans] can be protected without violating the First 
Amendment." 781 F. 2d, at 737. The court denied the 
SF AA's petition for rehearing en bane. Three judges dis-
sented, finding that the panel's interpretation of the Act 
raised serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 1319, 
1326 (1986). 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided 
by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. 
II 
The SF AA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in in-
terpreting the Act as granting the USOC anything more than 
a normal trademark in the word "Olympic." "The starting 
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the 
language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring). Section 
110 of the Act provides: 
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"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who 
uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any 
goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhi-
bition, athletic performance, or competition-
. "(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius 
Fortius', or any combination or simulation thereof tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or 
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] 
for the remedies provided in the [Lanham] Act." 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a). 
The SF AA argues that the clause "tending to cause confu-
sion" is properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." But 
because there is no comma after "thereof," the more natural 
reading of the section is that "tending to cause confusion" 
modifies only "any combination or simulation thereof." Nev-
ertheless, we do not regard this language as conclusive. We 
therefore examine the legislative history of this section. 
Before Congress passed § 110 of the Act, unauthorized use 
of the word "Olympic" was punishable criminally. The rele-
vant statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be 
confusing. Instead, it made it a crime for: 
"any person ... other than [the USOC] ... for the pur-
poses of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic perform-
ance, and competition or as an advertisement to induce 
the sale of any article whatsoever or attendance at any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and compe-
tition or for any business or charitable purpose to use 
... the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius 
Fortius' or any combination of these words." 36 
U. S. C. § 379 (1976) (emphasis added). 
The House Judiciary Committee drafted the language of§ 110 
that was ultimately adopted. The committee explained that 
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the previous "criminal penalty has been found to be 
unworkable as it requires the proof of a criminal intent." 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 15 (1978) (House Report). The 
changes from the criminal statute "were made in response to 
a letter from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Depart-
ment of Commerce," ibid., that the committee appended to 
the end of its report. This letter explained: 
"Section 110(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', and 
any combination thereof, but also any simulation or con-
fusingly similar derivation thereof tending to cause con-
fusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely sug-
gest a connection with the [USOCJ or any Olympic 
activity . ... 
"Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from 
the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new 
prohibitions, e.g. words described in section (a)(4) tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive 
with respect to the [USOC] or any Olympic activity. " 
Id., at 38 (emphasis added). 
This legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended 
to provide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the 
word "Olympic" without regard to whether an unauthorized 
use of the word tends to cause confusion. 
The SFAA further argues that the reference in § 110 to 
Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the 
traditional trademark defenses as well. See 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1115(b). 5 This argument ignores the clear language of the 
section. Also, this shorthand reference to remedies replaced 
an earlier draft's specific list of remedies typically available 
for trademark infringement, e. g., injunctive relief, recovery 
5 Specifically, the SF AA argues that the USOC should not be able to 
prohibit its use of the word "Olympic" because its use "is descriptive of and 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or serv-
ices." 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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of profits, damages, costs and attorney's fees. See Lanham 
Act §§34, 35, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1116, 1117. This list contained 
no reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12865, 
12866 (May 8, 1978) (proposed § ll0(c)). Moreover, the 
USOC already held a trademark in the word "Olympic." 
App. 378-382. Under the SF AA's interpretation, the Act 
would be largely superfluous. In sum, the language and leg-
islative history of § 110 indicate clearly that Congress in-
tended to grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olym-
pic" without regard to whether use of the word tends to cause 
confusion, and that § 110 does not incorporate defenses avail-
able under the Lanham Act. 
III 
This Court has recognized that "[n]ational protection of 
trademarks is desirable . . . because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N Fly, 
Inc . v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985). 
In the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., Congress es-
tablished a system for protecting such trademarks. Section 
45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods 
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by oth-
ers." 15 U. S. C. § 1127. Under § 32 of the Lanham Act, 
the owner of a trademark is protected from unauthorized 
uses that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive." § 1114(1)(a). Section 33 of the Lanham Act 
grants several statutory defenses to an alleged trademark 
infringer. § 1115. 
The protection granted to the USOC's use of the Olympic 
words and symbols differs from the normal trademark pro-
tection in two respects: the USOC need not prove that a con-
tested use is likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized 
user of the word does not have available the normal statutory 
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defenses. 6 The SF AA argues, in effect, that the differences 
between the Lanham Act and § 110 are of constitutional di-
mension. First, the SF AA contends that the word "Olym-
pic" is a generic 7 word that could not gain trademark protec-
tion under the Lanham Act. The SF AA argues that this 
prohibition is constitutionally required and thus that the 
First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trade-
mark in the word "Olympic." Second, the SF AA argues 
that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting 
exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the author-
ized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause 
confusion. We address these contentions in turn. 
A 
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungi-
ble, and that the suppression of particular words "run[s] a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen 
v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971). The SF AA argues 
that this principle prohibits Congress from granting the 
USOC exclusive control of uses of the word "Olympic," a 
word that the SF AA views as generic. Yet this recognition 
always has been balanced against the principle that when a 
word acquires value "as a result of organization and the ex-
penditure of labor, skill, and money" by an entity, that entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the 
word. International New Service v. Associated Press , 248 
U. S. 215, 239 (1918). See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 
92 (1879). 
There is no need in this case to decide whether Congress 
ever could grant a private entity exclusive use of a generic 
6 The user may, however, raise traditional equitable defenses , such as 
laches. See Brief for Respondents 20, n. 17. 
7 A common descriptive name of a product or service is generic. Be-
cause a generic name by definition does not distinguish the identity of a 
particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark under the 
Lanham Act. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(c). See also 1 J . 
McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1, p. 520 (1984). 
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word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the com-
mercial and promotional value of the word "Olympic" was the 
product of the USOC's "own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense." Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 575 (1977). 
The USOC, together with respondent International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), have used the word "Olympic" at least 
since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games began. App. 
358. Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France, acting pursuant 
to a government commission, then proposed the revival of 
the ancient Olympic Games to promote international under-
standing. D. Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook 13 
(1975). Coubertin sought to identify the "spirit" of the an-
cient Olympic Games that had been corrupted by the influ-
ence of money and politics. See M. I. Finley & H. W. 
Pleket, The Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 4 
(1976). 8 Coubertin thus formed the IOC, that has estab-
lished elaborate rules and procedures for the conduct of the 
modern Olympics. See Olympic Charter §§ 26-69. In addi-
tion, these rules direct every national committee to protect 
the use of the Olympic flag, symbol, flame, and motto from 
unauthorized use. Id., By-laws to Rules 6 and 53. 9 Under 
8 The ancient Olympic Games were held from 776 B. C. until 393 A. D., 
when they were abolished by the Roman emperor Theodosius I. The 
Olympic Games were the most important in a "circuit" of sporting festivals. 
The "circuit" also included the Pythian Games at Delphi, the N emean 
Games at Nemea, and the Isthmian Games at Corinth. As these sporting 
festivals grew in importance, athletes turned from amateurs to true profes-
sionals, training all year and receiving substantial gifts and money from in-
dividuals and from their home cities. See M. I. Finley & H. W. Pleket, 
The Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 68-82 (1976); 25 Encyc. 
Brit. 198 (1984). 
' The Olympic flag was presented by Baron de Coubertin at the Con-
gress of Paris in 1914. It has a white background with five interlocking 
rings in the center. The rings with the colors blue, yellow, black, green 
and red, in that order, "symbolize the union of the five continents and the 
meeting of athletes from all over the world at the Olympic Games in a spirit 
of fair and frank competition and good friendship, the ideal preached by 
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the IOC Charter, the USOC is the national olympic commit-
tee for the United States with the sole authority to represent 
the United States at the Olympic Games. 10 Pursuant to this 
authority, the USOC has used the Olympic words and sym-
bols extensively in this country to fulfill its object under the 
Olympic Charter of "ensur[ing] the development and safe-
guarding of the Olympic Movement and sport." Id., § 24. 
The history of the origins and associations of the word 
"Olympic" demonstrates the meritlessness of the SF AA's 
contention that Congress simply plucked a generic word out 
of the English vocabulary and granted its exclusive use to the 
USOC. Congress reasonably could find that since 1896, the 
word "Olympic" has acquired what in trademark law is 
known as a secondary meaning-it "has become distinctive of 
[the USOC's] goods in commerce." Lanham Act, § 2(f), 15 
U. S. C. § 1052(f). See Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 
469 U. S., at 194. The right to adopt and use such a word 
"to distinguish the goods or property [of] the person whose 
mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has 
been long recognized." Trade-Mark Cases, supra, at 92. 
Because Congress reasonably could conclude that the USOC 
has distinguished the word "Olympic" through its own ef-
forts, Congress' decision to grant the USOC a limited prop-
Baron de Coubertin." Olympic Charter§ 6. The Olympic rings alone are 
the Olympic symbol. Ibid. The Olympic flame is formally lit in Olympia 
under the auspices of the roe. The Olympic motto is "Citius, Altius , For-
tius," meaning "Faster, Higher, Stronger" and "expresses the aspirations 
of the Olympic movement." Ibid. The motto originated at an interna-
tional conference on the principles of amateurism in sports organized by 
Coubertin and held in 1894 at the Sorbonne in Paris. A French delegate , 
Pere Henri-Martin Didon suggested as a motto the words engraved on the 
entrance to his lycee (school) , Albert le Grand. Shortly thereafter, 
Coubertin founded the roe, which adopted this motto. A. Guttmann, The 
Games Must Go On 13-14 (1984). 
10 The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing the more infor-
mally-organized American Olympic Committee. The USOC received its 
first corporate charter in 1950. 
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erty right in the word "Olympic" falls within the scope of 
trademark law protections, and thus certainly within con-
stitutional bounds. 
B 
Congress also acted reasonably when it concluded that the 
USOC should not be required to prove that an unauthorized 
use of the word "Olympic" is likely to confuse the public. 11 
To the extent that § 110 applies to uses "for the purpose of 
trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services," 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a), its application is to commercial speech. 
Commercial speech "receives a limited form of First Amend-
ment protection." Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986); 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). Section 110 also al-
lows the USOC to prohibit the use of "Olympic" for promo-
tion of theatrical and athletic events. Although many of 
these promotional uses will be commercial speech, some uses 
may go beyond the "strictly business" context. See 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). In this case, 
the SF AA claims that its use of the word "Olympic" was in-
tended to convey a political statement about the status of ho-
mosexuals in society. 12 Thus, the SF AA claims that in this 
case § 110 suppresses political speech. 
11 To the extent that § 110 regulates confusing uses, it is within normal 
trademark bounds. The government constitutionally may regulate "de-
ceptive or misleading" commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); Friedman v. Rog-
ers, 440 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1979). 
12 According to the SF AA's president, the Gay Olympic Games would 
have offered three "very important opportunities. 
"1) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed 
minority. 
"2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable charac-
terization of gay men and women. 
"3) To attempt, through athletics, to bring about a positive and gradual 
assimilation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays , and to 
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By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, 
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SF AA 
from conveying its message. The SF AA held its athletic 
event in its planned format under the name "Gay Games I" 
and "Gay Games 11" in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See 
n. 2, supra. Nor is it clear that § 110 restricts purely ex-
pressive uses of the word "Olympic." 13 Section 110 restricts 
only the manner in which the SF AA may convey its message. 
The restrictions on expressive speech properly are character-
ized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of en-
couraging and rewarding the USOC's activities. The appro-
priate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions on 
First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to 
further a substantial governmental interest. United States 
v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). 14 
diminish the ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communi-
ties regardless of sexual orientation." App. 93. 
His expectations "were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to 
the event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of 'serious fun' 
would create a climate of friendship and cooperation ... false images and 
misconceptions about gay people would decline as a result of a particpatory 
[sic] educational process, and benefit ALL communities." Id., at 93-94. 
He thought "[t]he term 'Olympic' best describe[d] [the SF AA's] undertak-
ing" because it embodied the concepts of "peace, friendship and positive 
social interaction." Id., at 99. 
13 One court has found that § ll0 does not prohibit the use of the Olympic 
logo of five interlocking rings and the Olympic torch on a poster expressing 
opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, 
New York, into a prison. The court found that the use of the symbols did 
not fit the commercial or promotional definition of uses in § ll0. Stop the 
Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. lll2, 
lll8-ll21 (S. D. N. Y. 1980). 
14 A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if 
the government's interest in the restriction is substantial, directly ad-
vances the government's asserted interest, and is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). Both this test, and the 
test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O'Brien require a bal-
ance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of the speech 
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One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive con-
trol of the word "Olympic", as with other trademarks, is to 
ensure that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts 
so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to 
produce a "quality product," that, in turn, benefits the pub-
lic. See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 2:1, pp. 44-47 (1984). But in the special circumstance of 
the USOC, Congress has a broader public interest in promot-
ing, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of 
amateur athletes from the United States in "the great four-
yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games." Olympic Charter 
§ 1. The USOC's goal under the Olympic Charter, § 24(B), is 
to further the Olympic movement, that has as its aims: "to 
promote the development of those physical and moral quali-
ties which are the basis of sport"; "to educate young people 
through sport in a spirit of better understanding between 
each other and of friendship, thereby helping to build a better 
and more peaceful world"; and "to spread the Olympic princi- • 
ples throughout the world, thereby creating international 
goodwill." Id., § l. See also id., § 11 (aims of the IOC). 
Congress' interests in promoting the USOC's activities in-
clude these purposes as well as those specifically enumerated 
in the USOC's charter. 15 Section 110 directly advances these 
restriction. Because their application to these facts is substantially simi-
lar, they will be discussed together. 
15 The objects and purposes of the USOC are to: 
"(1) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encour-
age the attainment of those goals; 
"(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United 
States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, 
so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related 
organizations; 
"(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constit-
uent members of committees, over matters pertaining to the participation 
of the United States in the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games, 
including the representation of the United States in such games, and over 
the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when 
held in the United States; 
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governmental interests by supplying the USOC with the 
means to raise money to support the Olympics and encour-
ages the USOC's activities by ensuring that it will receive the 
benefits of its efforts. 
The restrictions of § 110 are not broader than Congress 
reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further 
these interests. Section 110 primarily applies to all uses of 
"(4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the 
appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur repre-
sentation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and 
of the Pan-American Games; 
"(5) promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the 
United States and foreign nations; 
"(6) promote and encourage physical fitness and public participation in 
amateur athletic activities; 
"(7) assist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the devel-
opment of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes; 
"(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving 
amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organiza-
tions, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, 
manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic 
competition; 
"(9) foster the development of amateur athletic facilities for use by 
amateur athletes and assist in making existing amateur athletic facilities 
available for use by amateur athletes; 
"(10) provide and coordinate technical information on physical training, 
equipment design, coaching, and performance analysis; 
"(11) encourage and support research, development, and dissemination 
of information in the areas of sports medicine and sports safety; 
"(12) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for 
women; 
"(13) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs 
and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible, the 
expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by handicapped in-
dividuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals; 
and 
"(14) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletes of racial and 
ethnic minorities for the purpose of eliciting the participation of such mi-
norities in amateur athletic activities in which they are underrepresented." 
36 U. S. C. § 374. 
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the word "Olympic" to induce the sale of goods or services. 
Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing 
uses, Congress' judgment respecting a certain word is not so 
limited. Congress reasonably could conclude that most com-
mercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to 
be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized 
uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the 
USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commer-
cial value of the marks. See Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) 
(one injury to a trademark owner may be "the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of tqe identity and hold upon the 
public mind of the mark or name" by nonconfusing uses). 
In this case, the SF AA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, 
bumper stickers and other items, all emblazoned with the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." The possibility for confusion as 
to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the 
SF AA sought to exploit the "commercial magnetism," see 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 
316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), of the word given value by the 
USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized use 
could undercut the USOC's efforts to use, and sell the right 
to use, the word in the future, since much of the word's value 
comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the 
USOC's activities is directly contrary to Congress' interest. 
Even though this protection may exceed the traditional 
rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the 
application of the Act to this commercial speech is not 
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congres-
sional interest and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendment. 
Section 110 also extends to promotional uses of the word 
"Olympic," even if the promotion is not to induce the sale of 
goods. Under§ 110, the USOC may prohibit purely promo-
tional uses of the word only when the promotion relates to an 
athletic or theatrical event. The USOC created the value of 
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the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. 
Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other 
entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge 
on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. The 
SF AA's proposed use of the word is an excellent example. 
The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place over a 9-day 
period and were to be held in different locations around the 
world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with 
uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an "Olympic 
anthem" and "Olympic Committee," the award of gold, silver,. 
and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three 
overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the 
modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games that occurred 
in ancient Greece. 16 The image the SF AA sought to invoke 
was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. 
The SFAA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced 
from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it. The 
16 The ancient Olympic Games lasted five days, whereas the modern 
Olympics last for ten days. The ancient Games always took place in Olym-
pia in southern Greece; the modern Olympic Games normally move from 
city to city every four years. (As an effort to reduce nationalism, cities, as 
opposed to countries, host the Olympic Games.) In ancient Greece there 
may have been a burning fire for religious sacrifice, since the Olympic 
Games were part of a religious festival. See the Odes of Pindar 8 
(R. Lattimore, trans., 2d ed. 1976). The torch relay, however, was an in-
novation of the modern Olympic Committee. The closest parallel to the 
modern opening parade is the opening of the ancient Games with the char-
iot race. As the chariots entered the arena and passed the judges, a her-
ald called out the names of the owner, his father, and his city. See Finley 
& Pleket, supra n. 9, at 27. There was no general parade of athletes by 
locality, as in the modern Games, and the athletes were naked, not uni-
formed. Athletes were eligible only if they were male, freeborn Greeks. 
There is no indication that the ancient Olympics included an "Olympic an-
them" or were organized by an entity called an "Olympic Committee." 
The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of wild olive, rather than the 
gold, silver, and bronze medals presented at the modern Olympics. The 
logo of overlapping rings was created by the International Olympic Com-
mittee. See supra, n. 8. See generally The Olympics: A Book of Lists 
10-13 (1984); Finley & Pleket, supra n. 9; 25 Encyc. Brit. 197-201 (1984). 
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mere fact that the SF AA claims an expressive, as opposed to 
a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amend-
ment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those who 
have sown." International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U. S., at 239-240. 11 The USOC's right to prohibit 
use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events 
is at the core of its legitimate property right. 18 
IV 
The SF AA argues that even if the exclusive use granted by 
§ 110 does not violate the First Amendment, the USOC's en-
forcement of that right is discriminatory in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 19 The fundamental inquiry is whether 
11 The SF AA claims a superior right to the use of the word "Olympic" 
because it is a nonprofit corporation and its athletic event was not orga-
nized for the primary purpose of commercial gain. But when the question 
is the scope of a legitimate property right in a word, the SF AA's distinc-
tion is inapposite. As this Court has noted in the analogous context of 
"fair use" under the Copyright Act: 
"The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the [protected] material without paying the customary 
price." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 
539, 562 (1985). 
Here, the SF AA's proposed use of the word "Olympic" was a clear attempt 
to exploit the imagery and goodwill created by the USOC. 
18 Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the pri-
mary use of the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress rea-
sonably could have found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote 
such a production, it would implicate the value given to the word by the 
usoc. 
19 The SF AA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its discriminatory 
enforcement claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a 
State. The claimed association in this case is between the USOC and the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply to the Federal Gov-
ernment and contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe , 
347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to equal protec-
tion claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesen-
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the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions 
of the Constitution apply. 20 The USOC is a "private corpora-
tio[n] established under Federal law." 36 U. S. C. 
§ 1101(46). 21 In the Act, Congress granted the USOC a cor-
porate charter, § 371, imposed certain requirements on the 
USOC, 22 and provided for USOC funding through exclusive 
use of the Olympic words and symbols, § 380, and through di-
rect grants. 23 
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does 
not render the USOC a government agent. All corporations 
feld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 
(1976) (per curi am). The SF AA raised the issue of discriminatory en-
forcement in its petition for certiorari, and both parties have briefed the 
issue fully. Accordingly, we address the claim as one under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
20 Because we find no governmental action, we need not address the mer-
its of the SF AA's discriminatory enforcement claim. We note that the 
SF AA's evidence of discriminatory enforcement is far from compelling. 
As of 1982 when this suit began, the USOC had brought 22 oppositions to 
trademark applications and one petition to cancel. App. 61. For exam-
ple, the USOC successfully prohibited registration of the mark "Golden 
Age Olympics." Id., at 383. The USOC also litigated numerous suits 
prior to bringing this action, prohibiting use of the Olympic words and sym-
bols by such entities as the National Amateur Sports Foundation, id., at 
392, a shoe company, id. , at 395, the International Federation of Body 
Builders, id. , at 443, and a bus company, id., at 439. Since 1982, the 
USOC has brought a number of addition suits against various companies 
and the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, id., at 437, and Brief 
for Respondents 41, n. 58. 
21 As such, the USOC is listed with 69 other federally-created private 
corporations such as the American Legion, Big Brothers of America, 
Daughters of the American Revolution, and the National Ski Patrol Sys-
tem, Inc. 36 U. S. C. § 1101. 
22 For example, the USOC may amend its constitution only after provid-
ing an opportunity for notice and hearing, § 375(b); the USOC must allow 
for reasonable representation in its membership of certain groups, § 376(b); 
the USOC must remain nonpolitical, § 377; and the USOC must report on 
its operations and expenditures of grant monies to Congress each year, 
§382a. 
23 The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce for yearly grants 
not to exceed a total of $16,000,000. § 384(a). 
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act under charters granted by a government, usually by a 
State. They do not thereby lose their essentially private 
character. Even extensive regulation by the government 
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into 
those of the government. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974). Nor is the fact that Congress 
has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" 
dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are cre-
ated by some governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute 
or the common law. The actions of the trademark owners 
nevertheless remain private. One of the purposes of the 
grant to the USOC was to help it acquire funding. The Gov-
ernment may subsidize private entities without assuming 
constitutional responsibility for their actions. Blum v. 
Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
457 u. s. 830, 840 (1982). 
This Court also has found action to be governmental action 
when the challenged entity performs functions that have 
been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of the Federal 
Government. Id., at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., supra, at 353; quoted in Blum v. Yaretsky, 
supra, at 1011)) (emphasis added by Rendell-Baker Court). 
Certainly the activities performed by the USOC serve a na-
tional interest, as its objects and purposes of incorporation 
indicate. See n. 15, supra. The fact "[t]hat a private entity 
performs a function which serves the public does not make its 
acts [governmental] action." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
supra, at 842. The Amateur Sports Act was enacted "to cor-
rect the disorganization and the serious factional disputes 
that seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States." 
House Report 8. See Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 
F . 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-770, pp. 2-3 
(1978)). The Act merely authorized the USOC to coordinate 
activities that always have been performed by private enti-
ties. 24 Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur 
24 The Commission that recommended the current the USOC powers 
"made it clear that it did not want the Federal Government directing ama-
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sports has been a traditional governmental function. 
Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government 
"normally can be held responsible for a private decision only 
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]." Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No . 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 
163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 
170 (1970). The USOC's choice of how to enforce its exclu-
sive right to use the word "Olympic" simply is not a govern-
mental decision. 25 There is no evidence that the Federal 
Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise 
of its right. At most, the Federal Government, by failing to 
supervise the USOC's use of its rights, can be said to exercise 
"[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives" of the 
USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky , supra, at 1004-1005. This is 
not enough to make the USOC's actions those of the Govern-
ment. Ibid. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 
164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 357. 
Because the USOC is not a governmental actor, the SF AA's 
claim that the USOC has enforced its rights in a discrimina-
tory manner must fail. 26 
teur athletics in this country. " H. R. Rep. 95-1627, p. 9 (1978). 
25 In fact, the Olympic Charter provides that the USOC "must be autono-
mous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a 
political, religious or economic nature." § 24. 
26 In its petition for certiorari, the SF AA argued only that because the 
USOC is a "state actor" it is prohibited from "selecting among diverse po-
tential users of the word 'Olympic", based upon speech-suppressing and in-
vidiously discriminatory motives." Pet. for Cert. i. The SFAA now ar-
gues that under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), the District 
Court's entry of the injunction prohibiting the SF AA's USE:! of the word 
'Olympic" constitutes governmental action sufficient to require a constitu-
tional inquiry into the USOC's motivation in seeking the injunction. This 
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V 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
new theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed within the 
questions presented and thus is not properly before the Court. See U. S. 
Sup. Ct. Rule 21.l(a). In any event, Shelley was based upon an applica-
tion of civil rights legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Its applicability to the situation in this case 
is highly questionable. 
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SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC. AND 
THOMAS F. WADDELL, PETITIONER$ v. UNITED 
STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND INTER-
NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1987) 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of 
a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-396, that authorizes the United States Olympic Com-
mittee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of 
the word "Olympic." 
I 
Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SF AA) is 
a nonprofit California corporation. 1 The SF AA originally 
sought to incorporate under the name "Golden Gate Olympic 
Association," but was told by the California Department of 
Corporations that the word "Olympic" could not appear in a 
corporate title. App. 95. After its incorporation in 1981, 
the SF AA nevertheless began to promote the "Gay Olympic 
Games," using those words on its letterheads and mailings 
and in local newspapers. Ibid. The Games were to be a 9-
day event to begin in August 1982, in San Francisco, Califor-
nia. The SF AA expected athletes from hundreds of cities in 
this country and from cities all over the world. Id., at 402. 
The Games were to open with a ceremony "which will rival 
the traditional Olympic Games." Id., at 354. See id., at 
' The SF AA's president, Dr. Thomas F. Waddell, is also a petitioner. 
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402, 406, 425. A relay of over 2,000 runners would carry 
a torch from New York City across the country to Kezar 
Stadium in San Francisco. Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The 
final runner would enter the stadium with the "Gay Olympic 
Torch" and light the "Gay Olympic Flame." Id., at 357. 
The ceremony would continue with the athletes marching in 
uniform into the stadium behind their respective city flags. 
Id., at 354, 357, 402, 404, 414. Competition was to occur in 
18 different contests, with the winners receiving gold, silver, 
and bronze medals. Id., at 354-355, 359, 407, 410. To 
cover the cost of the planned Games, the SF AA sold T-shirts, 
buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." Id., at 67, 94, 107, 113-114, 
167, 360, 362, 427-428. 2 
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act (Act), 92 Stat. 3048, 
36 U. S. C. § 380, grants respondent United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) 3 the right to prohibit certain commercial 
and promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and various 
Olympic symbols. 4 In late December 1981, the executive 
2 The 1982 athletic event ultimately was held under the name "Gay 
Games I." App. 473. A total of 1,300 men and women from 12 countries, 
27 States, and 179 cities participated. Id. , at 475. The "Gay Games II" 
were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating from 17 
countries. Brief for Respondent 8. The 1990 "Gay Games" are scheduled 
to occur in Vancouver, B. C. Ibid. 
3 The International Olympic Committee is also a respondent. 
' Section llO of the Act, as set forth in 36 U. S. C. § 380, provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the pur-
pose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
"(1) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 
5 interlocking rings; 
"(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a 
blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 
5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief; 
"(3) any trademark, trade name, 1;,ign, symbol, or insignia falsely repre-
senting association with , or authorization by, the International Olympic 
Committee or the [USOC]; or 
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director of the USOC wrote to the SF AA, informing it of the 
existence of the Amateur Sports Act, and requesting that the 
SF AA immediately terminate use of the word "Olympic" in 
its description of the planned Games. The SF AA at first 
agreed to substitute the word "Athletic" for the word "Olym-
pic," but, one month later, resumed use of the term. The 
USOC became aware that the SF AA was still advertising its 
Games as "Olympic" through a newspaper article in May 
1982. In August, the USOC brought suit in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California to en-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', or any com-
bination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, 
to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies 
provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the 
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) [15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq.]. How-
ever, any person who actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this 
section, or the words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who 
actually used, or whose assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade 
name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950 shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. 
"(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or 
services to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, 
symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of 
the [USOC] in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were 
donated, supplied, or furnished to or for the use of, approved, selected, or 
used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic or Pan-American team or 
team members. 
"(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name 'United 
States Olympic Committee'; the symbol described in subsection (a)(l) of 
this section; the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and 
the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any combination 
thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this 
section." 
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join the SF AA's use of the word "Olympic." The District 
Court granted a temporary restraining order and then a pre-
liminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. After further proceedings, the District 
Court granted the USOC summary judgment and a perma-
nent injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court. 781 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1986). It found that the Act 
granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" with-
out requiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use 
was confusing and without regard to the defenses available to 
an entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham 
Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. It 
did not reach the SF AA's contention that the USOC enforced 
its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court 
found that the USOC is not a state actor bound by the con-
straints of the Constitution. The court also found that the 
USOC's "property righ[t] [in the word 'Olympic' and its asso-
ciated symbols and slogans] can be protected without violat-
ing the First Amendment." 781 F. 2d, at 737. The court 
denied the SF AA's petition for rehearing en bane. Three 
judges dissented, finding that the panel's interpretation of 
the Act raised serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 
1319, 1326 (CA9 1986). 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. - - (1986), to review the 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided 
by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. 
II 
The SF AA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting the Act as granting the USOC anything more 
than a normal trademark in the word "Olympic." "The 
starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). Section 110 of the Act provides: 
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"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who 
uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any 
goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibi-
tion, athletic performance, or competition-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius · Altius 
Fortius', or any combination or simulation thereof tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or 
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] 
for the remedies provided in the [Lanham] Act." 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a). 
The SF AA argues that the clause "tending to cause confu-
sion" is properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." But 
because there is no comma after "thereof," the more natural 
reading of the section is that "tending to cause confusion" 
modifies only "any combination or simulation thereof." Nev-
ertheless, we do not regard this language as conclusive. We 
therefore examine the legislative history of this section. 
Before Congress passed § 110 of the Act, unauthorized use 
of the word "Olympic" was punishable criminally. The rele-
vant statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be 
confusing. Instead, it made it a crime for: 
"any person ... other than [the USOC] ... for the pur-
pose of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic perform-
ance, and competition or as an advertisement to induce 
the sale of any article whatsoever or attendance at any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and compe-
tition or for any business or charitable purpose to use 
... the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius 
Fortius' or any combination of these words." 64 Stat. 
901, as amended, 36 U. S. C. § 379 (1976 ed.) (emphasis 
added). 
86-270-0PINION 
6 SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0 . C. 
The House Judiciary Committee drafted the language of§ 110 
that was ultimately adopted. The committee explained that 
the previous "criminal penalty has been found to be un-
workable as it requires the proof of a criminal intent." 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 15 (1978) (House Report). The 
changes from the criminal statute "were made in response to 
a letter from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Depart-
ment of Commerce," ibid., that the committee appended to 
the end of its report. This letter explained: 
"Section 110(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', and 
any combination thereof, but also any simulation . or 
confusingly similar derivation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely 
suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic 
activity . . .. 
"Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from 
the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new 
prohibitions, e. g. words described in section (a)(4) tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive 
with respect to the [USOC] or any Olympic activity." 
Id., at 38 (emphasis added). 
This legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended 
to provide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the 
word "Olympic" without regard to whether an unauthorized 
use of the word tends to cause confusion. 
The SF AA further argues that the reference in § 110 to 
Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the 
traditional trademark defenses as well. See 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1115(b). 5 This argument ignores the clear language of the 
section. Also, this shorthand reference to remedies replaced 
5 Specifically, the SF AA argues that the USOC should not be able to 
prohibit its use of the word "Olympic" because its use "is descriptive of and 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or serv-
ices." 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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an earlier draft's specific list of remedies typically available 
for trademark infringement, e. g., injunctive relief, recovery 
of profits, damages, costs and attorney's fees. See Lanham 
Act §§34, 35, 15 U.S. C. §§ 1116, 1117. This list co11:tained 
no reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12865, 
12866 (1978) (proposed § ll0(c)). Moreover, the USOC al-
ready held a trademark in the word "Olympic." App. 378-
382. Under the SFAA's interpretation, the Act would be 
largely superfluous. In sum, the language and legislative 
history of § 110 indicate clearly that Congress intended to 
grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without 
regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion, 
and that § 110 does not incorporate defenses available under 
the Lanham Act. 
III 
This Court has recognized that "[n]ational protection of 
trademarks is desirable ... because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N Fly , 
Inc . v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. , 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985). 
In the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., Congress es-
tablished a system for protecting such trademarks. Section 
45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods 
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by 
others." 15 U.S. C. § 1127. Under§ 32 of the Lanham Act, 
the owner of a trademark is protected from unauthorized 
uses that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive." § 1114(1)(a). Section 33 of the Lanham Act 
grants several statutory defenses to an alleged trademark 
infringer. § 1115. 
The protection granted to the USOC's use of the Olympic 
words and symbols differs from the normal trademark pro-
tection in two respects: the USOC need not prove that a con-
tested use is likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized 
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user of the word does not have available the normal statutory 
defenses. 6 The SF AA argues, in effect, that the differences 
between the Lanham Act and § 110 are of constitutional di-
mension. First, the SF AA contends that the word "Olym-
pic" is a generic i word that could not gain trademark protec-
tion under the Lanham Act. The SF AA argues that this 
prohibition is constitutionally required and thus . that the 
First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trade-
mark in the word "Olympic." Second, the SF AA argues 
that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting 
exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the author-
ized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause 
confusion. We address these contentions in turn. 
A 
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungi-
ble, and that the suppression of particular words "run[s] a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen 
v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971). The SFAA argues 
that this principle prohibits Congress from granting the 
USOC exclusive control of uses of the word "Olympic," a 
word that the SF AA views as generic. Yet this recognition 
always has been balanced against the principle that when a 
word acquires value "as the result of organization and the ex-
penditure of labor, skill, and money" by an entity, that entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the 
word. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 
U. S. 215, 239 (1918). See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 
92 (1879). 
6 The user may, however, raise traditional equitable defenses, such as 
!aches. See Brief for Respondents 20, n. 17. 
1 A common descriptive name of a product or service is generic. Be-
cause a generic name by definition does not distinguish the identity of 
a particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark under the 
Lanham Act. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(c). See also 1 
J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1, p. 520 (1984). 
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There is no need in this case to decide whether Congress 
ever could grant a private entity exclusive use of a generic 
word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the com-
mercial and promotional value of the word "Olympic" was the 
product of the USOC's "own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense." Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562,575 (1977). 
The USOC, together with respondent International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), have used the word "Olympic" at least 
since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games began. App. 
348. Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France, acting pursuant 
to a government commission, then proposed the revival of 
the ancient Olympic Games to promote international under-
standing. D. Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook 13 
(1975). Coubertin sought to identify the "spirit" of the 
ancient Olympic Games that had been corrupted by the influ-
ence of money and politics. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 4 (1976). 8 Cou-
bertin thus formed the IOC, that has established elaborate 
rules and procedures for the conduct of the modern Olympics. 
See Olympic Charter, Rules 26-69 (1985). In addition, these 
rules direct every national committee to protect the use of 
the Olympic flag, symbol, flame, and motto from unauthor-
ized use. Id., Bye-laws to Rules 6 and 53. 9 Under the IOC 
8 The ancient Olympic Games were held from 776 B. C. until 393 A. D., 
when they were abolished by the Roman emperor Theodosius I. The 
Olympic Games were the most important in a "circuit" of sporting festivals. 
The "circuit" also included the Pythian Games at Delphi, the Nemean 
Games at Nemea, and the Isthmian Games at Corinth. As these sporting 
festivals grew in importance, athletes turned from amateurs to true profes-
sionals, training all year and receiving substantial gifts and money from 
individuals and from their home cities. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: ·The First Thousand Years 68-82 (1976); 25 Encyc. Brit. 
198 (15th ed. 1984). 
9 The Olympic flag was presented by Baron de Coubertin at the Con-
gress of Paris in 1914. It has a white background with five interlocking 
rings in the center. The rings with the colors blue, yellow, black, green 
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Charter, the USOC is the national olympic committee for the 
United States with the sole authority to represent the United 
.States at the Olympic Games. 10 Pursuant to this authority, 
the USOC has used the Olympic words and symbols exten-
sively in this country to fulfill its object under the Olympic 
Charter of "ensur[ing] the development and safeguarding of 
the Olympic Movement and sport." Id., Rule 24. 
The history of the origins and associations of the word 
"Olympic" demonstrates the meritlessness of the SF AA's 
contention that Congress simply plucked a generic word out 
of the English vocabulary and granted its exclusive use to the 
USOC. Congress reasonably could find that since 1896, the 
word "Olympic" has acquired what in trademark law is 
known as a secondary meaning- it "has become distinctive of 
[the USOC's] goods in commerce." Lanham Act, § 2(f), 15 
U. S. C. § 1052(£). See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S., at 194. The right to adopt and use 
such a word "to distinguish the goods or property [ of] the 
person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other 
persons, has been long recognized." Trade-Mark Cases, 
supra, at 92. Because Congress reasonably could conclude 
and red, in that order, "symbolize the union of the five continents and the 
meeting of athletes from all over the world at the Olympic Games in a spirit 
of fair and frank competition and good friendship , the ideal preached by 
Baron de Coubertin. " Olympic Charter, Rule 6 (1985). The Olympic 
rings alone are the Olympic symbol. Ibid. The Olympic flame is formally 
lit in Olympia under the auspices of the roe. The Olympic motto is 
"Citius, Altius, Fortius," meaning "Faster, Higher, Stronger" and "ex-
presses the aspirations of the Olympic Movement. " Ibid. The motto 
originated at an international conference on the principles of amateurism in 
sports organized by Coubertin and held in 1894 at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
A French delegate, Pere Henri-Martin Didon suggested as a motto the 
words engraved on the entrance to his lycee (school), Albert le Grand. 
Shortly thereafter, Coubertin founded the roe, which adopted this motto. 
A. Guttmann, The Games Must Go On 13-14 (1984). 
10 The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing the more infor-
mally-organized American Olympic Committee. The USOC received its 
first corporate charter in 1950. 
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that the USOC has distinguished the word "Olympic" 
through its own efforts, Congress' decision to grant the 
USOC a limited property right in the word "Olympic" falls 
within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus cer-
tainly within constitutional bounds. 
B 
Congress also acted reasonably when it concluded that the 
USOC should not be required to prove that an unauthorized 
use of the word "Olympic" is likely to confuse the public. 11 
To the extent that § 110 applies to uses "for the purpose of 
trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services," 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a), its application is to commercial speech. 
Commercial speech "receives a limited form of First Amend-
ment protection." Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986); 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). Sec-
tion 110 also allows the USOC to prohibit the use of "Olym-
pic" for promotion of theatrical and athletic events. Al-
though many of these promotional uses will be commercial 
speech, some uses may go beyond the "strictly business" con-
text. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). In 
this case, the SF AA claims that its use of the word "Olympic" 
was intended to convey a political statement about the status 
of homosexuals in society. 12 Thus, the SF AA claims that in 
this case § 110 suppresses political speech. 
11 To the extent that § 110 regulates confusing uses, it is within normal 
trademark bounds. The Government constitutionally may regulate "de-
ceptive or misleading" commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); 
Friedman v. Rogers , 440 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1979). 
12 According to the SF AA's president, the Gay Olympic Games would 
have offered three "very important opportunities": 
"1) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed 
minority. 
"2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable charac-
terization of gay men and women. 
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By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, 
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SF AA 
from conveying its message. The SF AA held its athletic 
event in its planned format under the name "Gay Games I" 
and "Gay Games II" in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See 
n. 2, supra. Nor is it clear that § 110 restricts purely ex-
pressive uses of the word "Olympic." 13 Section 110 restricts 
only the manner in which the SF AA may convey its message. 
The restrictions on expressive speech properly are character-
ized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of en-
couraging and rewarding the USOC's activities. The appro-
priate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions on 
First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to 
further a substantial governmental interest. United States 
v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). 14 
"3) To attempt, through athletics, to bring about a positive and gradual 
assimilation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays, and to 
diminish the ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communi-
ties regardless of sexual orientation." App. 93. 
His expectations "were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to 
the event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of 'serious fun' 
would create a climate of friendship and co-operation [,] false images and 
misconceptions about gay people would decline as a result of a participa-
tory [sic} educational process, and benefit ALL communities." Id. , at 
93-94. He thought "[t]he term 'Olympic' best describe[d] [the SF AA's] 
undertaking" because it embodied the concepts of "peace, friendship and 
positive social interaction." / d., at 99. 
13 One court has found that § ll0 does not prohibit the use of the Olympic 
logo of five interlocking rings and the Olympic torch on a poster expressing 
opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, 
New York, into a prison. The court found that the use of the symbols did 
not fit the commercial or promotional definition of uses in § ll0. Stop the 
Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. lll2, 
lll8-ll21 (SDNY 1980). 
14 A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if 
the government's interest in the restriction is substantial, directly ad-
vances the government's asserted interest, and is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). Both this 
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One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive con-
trol of the word "Olympic", as with other trademarks, is to 
ensure that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts 
so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to pro-
duce a "quality product," that, in turn, benefits the public. 
See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 2:1, pp. 44- 47 (1984). But in the special circumstance of 
the USOC, Congress has a broader public interest in promot-
ing, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of 
amateur athletes from the United States in "the great four-
yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games." Olympic Char-
ter, Rule 1 (1985). The USOC's goal under the Olympic 
Charter, Rule 24(B), is to further the Olympic movement, 
that has as its aims: "to promote the development of those 
physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sport"; "to 
educate young people through sport in a spirit of better un-
derstanding between each other and of friendship, thereby 
helping to build a better and more peaceful world"; and "to 
spread the Olympic .principles throughout the world, thereby 
creating international goodwill." Id., Rule 1. See also id., 
Rule 11 (aims of the IOC). Congress' interests in promoting 
the USOC's activities include these purposes as well as those 
specifically enumerated in the USOC's charter. 15 Section 
test, and the test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O'Brien 
require a balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of 
the speech restriction. Because their application to these facts is substan-
tially similar, they will be discussed together. 
15 The objects and purposes of the USOC are to: 
"(1) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encour-
age the attainment of those goals; 
"(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United 
States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, 
so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related 
organizations; 
"(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constit-
uent members of committees, over matters pertaining to the participation 
of the United States in the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games, 
including the representation of the United States in such games, and over 
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110 directly advances these governmental interests by sup-
plying the USOC with the means to raise money to support 
the Olympics and encourages the USOC's activities by ensur-
ing that it will receive the benefits of its efforts. 
The restrictions of § 110 are not broader than Congress 
reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further 
the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when 
held in the United States; 
"(4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the 
appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur repre-
sentation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and 
of the Pan-American Games; 
"(5) promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the 
United States and foreign nations; 
"(6) promote and encourage physical fitness and public participation in 
amateur athletic activities; 
"(7) assist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the devel-
opment of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes; 
"(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involvillg 
amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organiza-
tions, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, 
manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic 
competition; 
"(9) foster the development of amateur athletic facilities for use by 
amateur athletes and assist in making existing amateur athletic facilities 
available for use by amateur athletes; 
"(10) provide and coordinate technical information on physical training, 
equipment design, coaching, and performance analysis; 
"(11) encourage and support research, development, and dissemination 
of information in the areas of sports medicine and sports safety; 
"(12) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for 
women; 
"(13) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs 
and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible, the 
expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by handicapped in-
dividuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals; 
and 
"(14) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletes of racial and 
ethnic minorities for the purpose of eliciting the participation of such mi-
norities in amateur athletic activities in which they are underrepresented." 
36 U. S. C. § 374. 
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these interests. Section 110 primarily applies to all uses of 
the word "Olympic" to induce the sale of goods or services. 
Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing 
uses, Congress' judgment respecting a certain word is not so 
limited. Congress reasonably could conclude that ·most com-
mercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to 
be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized 
uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the 
USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commer-
cial value of the marks. See Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) 
(one injury to a trademark owner may be "the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon- the 
public mind of the mark or name" by nonconfusing uses). 
In this case, the SF AA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, 
bumper stickers and other items, all emblazoned with the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." The possibility for confusion as 
to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the 
SF AA sought to exploit the "commercial magnetism," see 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 
316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), of the word given value by the 
USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized use 
could undercut the USOC's efforts to use, and sell the right 
to use, the word in the future, since much of the word's value 
comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the 
USOC's activities is directly contrary to Congress' interest. 
Even though this protection may exceed the traditional 
rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the 
application of the Act to this commercial speech is not 
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congres-
sional interest and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendment. 
Section 110 also extends to promotional uses of the word 
"Olympic," even if the promotion is not to induce the sale of 
goods. Under§ 110, the USOC may prohibit purely promo-
tional uses of the word only when the promotion relates to an 
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athletic or theatrical event. The USOC created the value of 
the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. 
Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other 
entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge 
on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. The 
SF AA's proposed use of the word is an excellent example. 
The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place over a 9-day 
period and were to be held in different locations around the 
world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with 
uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an "Olympic 
anthem" and "Olympic Committee," the award of gold, silver, 
and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three 
overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the 
modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games that occurred 
in ancient Greece. 16 The image the SF AA sought to invoke 
was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. 
16 The ancient Olympic Games lasted five days, whereas the modern 
Olympics last for 10 days. The ancient Games always took place in Olym-
pia in southern Greece; the modern Olympic Games normally move from 
city to city every four years. (As an effort to reduce nationalism, cities, as 
opposed to countries, host the Olympic Games. ) In ancient Greece there 
may have been a burning fire for religious sacrifice, since the Olympic 
Games were part of a religious festival. See The Odes of Pindar 8, P. 25 
(R. Lattimore trans ., 2d ed. 1976). The torch relay, however, was an in-
novation of the modern Olympic Committee. The closest parallel to the 
modern opening parade is the opening of the ancient Games with the char-
iot race. As the chariots entered the arena and passed the judges, a her-
ald called out the names of the owner, his father , and his city. See Finley 
& Pleket, supra n. 8, at 27. There was no general parade of athletes by 
locality, as in the modern Games, and the athletes were naked, not uni-
formed. Athletes were eligible only if they were male , freeborn Greeks. 
There is no indication that the ancient Olympics included an "Olympic an-
them" or were organized by an entity called an "Olympic Committee." 
The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of wild olive, rather than the 
gold, silver, and bronze medals presented at the modern Olympics. The 
logo of overlapping rings was created by the International Olympic Com-
mittee. See n. 8, supra. See generally The Olympics: A Book of Lists 
10- 13 (J. Beilenson & N. Beilenson eds. 1984); Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8; 
25 Encyc. Brit. 197-201 (1984). 
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The SF AA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced 
from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it. The 
mere fact that the SF AA claims an expressive, as opposed to 
a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amend-
ment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those 
who have sown." International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U. S., at 239- 240. 17 The USOC's right to prohibit 
use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events 
is at the core of its legitimate property right. 18 
IV 
The SF AA argues that even if the exclusive use granted by 
§ 110 does not violate the First Amendment, the USOC's en-
forcement of that right is discriminatory in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 19 The fundamental inquiry is whether 
17 The SF AA claims a superior right to the use of the word "Olympic" 
because it is a nonprofit corporation and its athletic event was not orga-
nized for the primary purpose of commercial gain. But when the question 
is the scope of a legitimate property right in a word, the SF AA's distinc-
tion is inapposite. As this Court has noted in the analogous context of 
"fair use" under the Copyright Act: 
"The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the [protected] material without paying the customary 
price." Harper & Row Pu blishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 
539, 562 (1985). 
Here, the SF AA's proposed use of the word "Olympic" was a clear attempt 
to exploit the imagery and goodwill created by the USOC. 
18 Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the pri-
mary use of the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress rea-
sonably could have found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote 
such a production, it would implicate the value given to the word by the 
usoc. 
1
• The SF_AA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its discriminatory 
enforcement claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a 
State. The claimed association in this case is between the USOC and the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply to the Federal Gov-
ernment and contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 
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the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions 
of the Constitution apply. 20 The USOC is a "private cor-
poratio[n] established under Federal law." 36 U. S. C. 
§ 1101(46). 21 In the Act, Congress granted the USOC a cor-
porate charter, § 371, imposed certain requirements on the 
USOC, 22 and provided for USOC funding through exclusive 
347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claims has ... been precisely the same as to equal protec-
tion claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 
(1976) (per curiam). The SF AA raised the issue of discriminatory en-
forcement in its petition for certiorari, and both parties have briefed the 
issue fully. Accordingly, we address the claim as one under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
20 Because we find no governmental action, we need not address the mer-
its of the SF AA's discriminatory enforcement claim. We note that the 
SF AA's evidence of discriminatory enforcement is far from compelling. 
As of 1982 when this suit began, the USOC had brought 22 oppositions to 
trademark applications and one petition to cancel. App. 61. For exam-
ple, the USOC successfully prohibited registration of the mark "Golden 
Age Olympics." Id., at 383. The USOC also litigated numerous suits 
prior to bringing this action, prohibiting use of the Olympic words and sym-
bols by such entities as the National Amateur Sports Foundation, id., at 
392, a shoe company, id., at 395, the International Federation of Body 
Builders, id. , at 443, and a bus company, id. , at 439. Since 1982, the 
USOC has brought a number of addition suits against various companies 
and the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, i d. , at 437, and Brief 
for Respondents 41, n. 58. The USOC has authorized the use of the word 
"Olympic" to organizations which sponsor athletic competitions and events 
for handicapped persons ("Special Olympics") and for youth ("Junior Olym-
pics" and "Explorer Olympics"). App. 33, 181. Both of these uses di-
rectly relate to a purpose of the USOC established by its charter. See 36 
U. S. C. § 374(7), (13), reprinted ante, at--, n. 15. The USOC has not 
consented to any other uses of the word in connection with athletic compe-
titions or events. App. 33. 
21 As such, the USOC is listed with 69 other federally-created private 
corporations such as the American Legion, Big Brothers of America, 
Daughters of the American Revolution, and the National Ski Patrol Sys-
tem, Inc. 36 U. S. C. § 1101. 
22 For example, the USOC may amend its constitution only after provid-
ing an opportunity for notice and hearing, § 375(b); the USOC must allow 
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use of the Olympic words and symbols, § 380, and through 
direct grants. 23 · 
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does 
not render the USOC a government agent. All corporations 
act under charters granted by a government, usually by a 
State. They do not thereby lose their essentially private 
character. Even extensive regulation by the government 
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into 
those of the government. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974). Nor is the fact that Congress 
has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" 
dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are cre-
ated by s_ome governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute 
or the common law. The actions of the trademark owners 
nevertheless remain private. One of the purposes of the 
grant to the USOC was to help it acquire funding. The Gov-
ernment may subsidize private entities without assuming 
constitutional responsibility for their actions. Blum v. 
Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
457 u. s. 830, 840 (1982). 
This Court also has found action to be governmental action 
when the challenged entity performs functions that have 
been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of the Federal 
Government. Id., at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., supra, at 353; quoted in Blum v. Yaretsky, 
supra, at 1011)) (emphasis added by Rendell-Baker Court). 
Certainly the activities performed by the USOC serve a na-
tional interest, as its objects and purposes of incorporation 
indicate. Seen. 15, supra. The fact "[t]hat a private entity 
performs a function which serves the public does not make 
for reasonable representation in its membership of certain groups, § 376(b); 
the USOC must remain nonpolitical, § 377; and the USOC must report on 
its operations and expenditures of grant monies to Congress each year, 
§ 382a. 
23 The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce for yearly grants 
not to exceed a total of $16,000,000. § 384(a). 
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its acts [governmental] action." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
supra, at 842. The Amateur Sports Act was enacted "to cor-
rect the disorganization and the serious factional disputes 
that seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States." 
House Report, at 8. See Old.field v. Athletic Congress, 779 
F. 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-770, pp. 2-3 
(1978)). The Act merely authorized the USOC to coordinate 
activities that always have been performed by private enti-
ties. 24 Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur 
sports has been a traditional governmental function. 
Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government 
"normally can be held responsible for a private decision only 
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]." Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros ., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 
163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 
170 (1970). The USOC's choice of how to enforce its exclu-
sive right to use the word "Olympic" simply is not a govern-
mental decision. 25 There is no evidence that the Federal 
Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise 
of its right. At most, the Federal Government, by failing to 
supervise the USOC's use of its rights, can be said to exercise 
"[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives" of the 
USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at 1004-1005. This is 
not enough to make the USOC's actions those of the Govern-
ment. Ibid. See Flagg Bros ., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 
24 The Commission that recommended the current the USOC powers 
"made it clear that it did not want the Federal Government directing ama-
teur athletics in this country." House Report, at 9. 
25 In fact, the Olympic Charter provides that the USOC "must be autono-
mous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a 
political, religious or economic nature." Rule 24. 
~ 
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164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 357. 
Because the USOC is not a governmental actor, the SF AA's 
claim that the USOC has enforced its rights in a discrimina-
tory manner must fail. 26 
V 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
26 In its petition for certiorari, the SF AA argued only that because the 
USOC is a "state actor" it is prohibited from "selecting among diverse 
potential users of the word 'Olympic' , based upon speech-suppressing and 
invidiously discriminatory motives. " Pet. for Cert. i. The SF AA now 
argues that under Shelley v. Kraemer , 334 U. S. 1 (1948), the District 
Court's entry of the injunction prohibiting the SF AA's use of the word 
'Olympic" constitutes governmental action sufficient to require a constitu-
tional inquiry into the USOC's motivation in seeking the injunction. This 
new theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed within the 
questions presented and thus is not properly before the Court. See this 
Court's Rule 21.l(a). In any event, Shelley was based upon an application 
of civil rights legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Its applicability to the situation in this case is 
highly questionable. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-270 
SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC. AND 
THOMAS F. WADDELL, PETITIONERS v. UNITED 
STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND INTER-
NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of 
a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-396, that authorizes the United States Olympic Com-
mittee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of 
the word "Olympic." 
I 
Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SF AA) is 
a nonprofit California corporation. 1 The SF AA originally 
sought to incorporate under the name "Golden Gate Olympic 
Association," but was told by the California Department of 
Corporations that the word "Olympic" could not appear in a 
corporate title. App. 95. After its incorporation in 1981, 
the SF AA nevertheless began to promote the "Gay Olympic 
Games," using those words on its letterheads and mailings 
and in local newspapers. Ibid. The Games were to be a 9-
day event to begin in August 1982, in San Francisco, Califor-
nia. The SF AA expected athletes from hundreds of cities in 
this country and from cities all over the world. Id., at 402. 
The Games were to open with a ceremony "which will rival 
the traditional Olympic Games." Id., at 354. See id., at 
1 The SF AA's president, Dr. Thomas F . Waddell , is also a petitioner. 
86-270-OPINION 
2 SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0. C. 
402, 406, 425. A relay of over 2,000 runners would carry 
a torch from New York City across the country to Kezar 
Stadium in San Francisco. Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The 
final runner would enter the stadium with the "Gay Olympic 
Torch" and light the "Gay Olympic Flame." Id., at 357. 
The ceremony would continue with the athletes marching in 
uniform into the stadium behind their respective city flags. 
Id., at 354, 357, 402, 404, 414. Competition was to occur in 
18 different contests, with the winners receiving gold, silver, 
and bronze medals. Id., at 354-355, 359, 407, 410. To 
cover the cost of the planned Games, the SF AA sold T-shirts, 
buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." Id., at 67, 94, 107, 113-114, 
167, 360, 362, 427-428. 2 
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act (Act), 92 Stat. 3048, 
36 U. S. C. § 380, grants respondent United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) 3 the right to prohibit certain commercial 
and promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and various 
Olympic symbols. 4 In late December 1981, the executive 
2 The 1982 athletic event ultimately was held under the name "Gay 
Games I." App. 473. A total of 1,300 men and women from 12 countries, 
27 States, and 179 cities participated. Id. , at 475. The "Gay Games 11" 
were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating from 17 
countries. Brief for Respondent 8. The 1990 "Gay Games" are scheduled 
to occur in Vancouver, B. C. Ibid. 
3 The International Olympic Committee is also a respondent. 
' Section 110 of the Act, as set forth in 36 U. S. C. § 380, provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the pur-
pose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any -
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
"(!) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 
5 interlocking rings; 
"(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a 
blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 
5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief; 
"(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely repre-
senting association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic 
Committee or the [USOC]; or 
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director of the USOC wrote to the SF AA, informing it of the 
existence of the Amateur Sports Act, and requesting that the 
SFAA immediately terminate use of the word "Olympic" in 
its description of the planned Games. The SF AA at first 
agreed to substitute the word "Athletic" for the word "Olym-
pic," but, one month later, resumed use of the term. The 
USOC became aware that the SF AA was still advertising its 
Games as "Olympic" through a newspaper article in May 
1982. In August, the USOC brought suit in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California to en-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', or any com-
bination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, 
to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies 
provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the 
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) [15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq.]. How-
ever, any person who actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this 
section, or the words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who 
actually used, or whose assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade 
name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950 shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. 
"(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or 
services to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, 
symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of 
the [USOC] in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were 
donated, supplied, or furnished to or for the use of, approved, selected, or 
used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic or Pan-American team or 
team members. 
"(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name 'United 
States Olympic Committee'; the symbol described in subsection (a)(l) of 
this section; the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and 
the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any combination 
thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this 
section." 
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join the SFAA's use of the word "Olympic." The District 
Court granted a temporary restraining order and then a pre-
liminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. After further proceedings, the District 
Court granted the USOC summary judgment and a perma-
nent injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court. 781 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1986). It found that the Act 
granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" with-
out requiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use 
was confusing and without regard to the defenses available to 
an entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham 
Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. It 
did not reach the SF AA's contention that the USOC enforced 
its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court 
found that the USOC is not a state actor bound by the con-
straints of the Constitution. The court also found that the 
USOC's "property righ[t] [in the word 'Olympic' and its asso-
ciated symbols and slogans] can be protected without violat-
ing the First Amendment." 781 F. 2d, at 737. The court 
denied the SF AA's petition for rehearing en bane. Three 
judges dissented, finding that the panel's interpretation of 
the Act raised serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 
1319, 1326 (CA9 1986). 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided 
by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. 
II 
The SF AA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting the Act as granting the USOC anything more 
than a normal trademark in the word "Olympic." "The 
starting point in every case involving construction of a stat- I 
ute is the language itself." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 
--, -- (1986) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
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Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring)). 
Section 110 of the Act provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who 
uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any 
goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibi-
tion, athletic performance, or competition-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius 
Fortius', or any combination or simulation thereof tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or 
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] 
for the remedies provided in the [Lanham] Act." 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a). 
The SF AA argues that the clause "tending to cause confu-
sion" is properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." But 
because there is no comma after "thereof," the more natural 
reading of the section is that "tending to cause confusion" 
modifies only "any combination or simulation thereof." Nev-
ertheless, we do not regard this language as conclusive. We 
therefore examine the legislative history of this section. 
Before Congress passed § 110 of the Act, unauthorized use 
of the word "Olympic" was punishable criminally. The rele-
vant statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be 
confusing. Instead, it made it a crime for: 
"any person . .. other than [the USOC] ... for the pur-
pose of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic perform-
ance, and competition or as an advertisement to induce 
the sale of any article whatsoever or attendance at any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and compe-
tition or for any business or charitable purpose to use 
... the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius 
Fortius' or any combination of these words." 64 Stat. 
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901, as amended, 36 U. S. C. § 379 (1976 ed.) (emphasis 
added). 
The House Judiciary Committee drafted the language of§ 110 
that was ultimately adopted. The committee explained that 
the previous "criminal penalty has been found to be un-
workable as it requires the proof of a criminal intent." 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 15 (1978) (House Report). The 
changes from the criminal statute "were made in response to 
a letter from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Depart-
ment of Commerce," ibid., that the committee appended to 
the end of its report. This letter explained: 
"Section 110(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', and 
any combination thereof, but also any simulation or 
confusingly similar derivation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely 
suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic 
activity .... 
"Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from 
the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new 
prohibitions, e. g. words described in section ( a)( 4) tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive 
with respect to the [USOC] or any Olympic activity." 
Id., at 38 (emphasis added). 
This legislative history demonstrates th_at Congress intended 
to provide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the 
word "Olympic" without regard to whether an unauthorized 
use of the word tends to cause confusion. 
The SF AA further argues that the reference in § 110 to 
Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the 
traditional trademark defenses as well. See 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1115(b). 5 This argument ignores the clear language of the 
5 Specifically, the SF AA argues that the USOC should not be able to 
prohibit its use of the word "Olympic" because its use "is descriptive of and 
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section. Also, this shorthand reference to remedies replaced 
an earlier draft's specific list of remedies typically available 
for trademark infringement, e. g., injunctive relief, recovery 
of profits, damages, costs and attorney's fees. See Lanham 
Act §§ 34, 35, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1116, 1117. This list contained 
no reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12865, 
12866 (1978) (proposed § ll0(c)). Moreover, the USOC al-
ready held a trademark in the word "Olympic." App. 378-
382. Under the SF AA's interpretation, the Act would be 
largely superfluous. In sum, the language and legislative 
history of § 110 indicate clearly that Congress intended to 
grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without 
regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion, 
and that § 110 does not incorporate defenses available under 
the Lanham Act. 
III 
This Court has recognized that "[n]ational protection of 
trademarks is desirable . . . because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N Fly, 
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985). 
In the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., Congress es-
tablished a system for protecting such trademarks. Section 
45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods 
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by 
others." 15 U.S. C. § 1127. Under §32 of the Lanham Act, 
the owner of a trademark is protected from unauthorized 
uses that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive." § 1114(1)(a). Section 33 of the Lanham Act 
grants several statutory defenses to an alleged trademark 
infringer. § 1115. 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or serv-
ices." 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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The protection granted to the USOC's use of the Olympic 
words and symbols differs from the normal trademark pro-
tection in two respects: the USOC need not prove that a con-
tested use is likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized 
user of the word does not have available the normal statutory 
defenses. 6 The SF AA argues, in effect, that the differences 
between the Lanham Act and § 110 are of constitutional di-
mension. First, the SF AA contends that the word "Olym-
pic" is a generic 7 word that could not gain trademark protec-
tion under the Lanham Act. The SF AA argues that this 
prohibition is constitutionally required and thus that the 
First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trade-
mark in the word "Olympic." Second, the SF AA argues 
that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting 
exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the author-
ized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause 
confusion. We address these contentions in turn. 
A 
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungi-
ble, and that the suppression of particular words "run[s] a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen 
v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971). The SFAA argues 
that this principle prohibits Congress from granting the 
USOC exclusive control of uses of the word "Olympic," a 
word that the SF AA views as generic. Yet this recognition 
always has been balanced against the principle that when a 
word acquires value "as the result of organization and the ex-
penditure of labor, skill, and money" by an entity, that entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the 
6 The user may, however, raise traditional equitable defenses, such as 
!aches. See Brief for Respondents 20, n. 17. 
1 A common descriptive name of a product or service is generic. Be-
cause a generic. name by definition does not distinguish the identity of 
a particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark under the 
Lanham Act. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(c). See also 1 
J . McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1, p. 520 (1984). 
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word. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 
U. S. 215, 239 (1918). See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 
92 (1879). 
There is no need in this case to decide whether Congress 
ever could grant a private entity exclusive use of a generic 
word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the com-
mercial and promotional value of the word "Olympic" was the 
product of the USOC's "own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense." Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 575 (1977). 
The USOC, together with respondent International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), have used the word "Olympic" at least 
since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games began. App. 
348. Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France, acting pursuant 
to a government commission, then proposed the revival of 
the ancient Olympic Games to promote international under-
standing. D. Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook 13 
(1975). Coubertin sought to identify the "spirit" of the 
ancient Olympic Games that had been corrupted by the influ-
ence of money and politics. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 4 (1976). 8 Cou-
bertin thus formed the IOC, that has established elaborate 
rules and procedures for the conduct of the modern Olympics. 
See Olympic Charter, Rules 26-69 (1985). In addition, these 
rules direct every national committee to protect the use of 
the Olympic flag, symbol, flame, and motto from unauthor-
8 The ancient Olympic Games were held from 776 B. C. until 393 A. D. , 
when they were abolished by the Roman emperor Theodosius I. The 
Olympic Games were the most important in a "circuit" of sporting festivals. 
The "circuit" also included the Pythian Games at Delphi, the Nemean 
Games at Nemea, and the Isthmian Games at Corinth. As these sporting 
festivals grew in importance, athletes turned from amateurs to true profes-
sionals, training all year and receiving substantial gifts and money from 
individuals and from their home cities. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 68-82 (1976); 25 Encyc. Brit. 
198 (15th ed. 1984). 
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ized use. Id., Bye-laws to Rules 6 and 53. 9 Under the IOC 
Charter, the USOC is the national olympic committee for the 
United States with the sole authority to represent the United 
States at the Olympic Games. 10 Pursuant to this authority, 
the USOC has used the Olympic words and symbols exten-
sively in this country to fulfill its object under the Olympic 
Charter of "ensur[ing] the development and safeguarding of 
the Olympic Movement and sport." Id., Rule 24. 
The history of the origins and associations of the word 
"Olympic" demonstrates the meritlessness of the SF AA's 
contention that Congress simply plucked a generic word out 
of the English vocabulary and granted its exclusive use to the 
USOC. Congress reasonably could find that since 1896, the 
word "Olympic" has acquired what in trademark law is 
known as a secondary meaning-it "has become distinctive of 
[the USOC's] goods in commerce." Lanham Act, § 2(f), 15 
U. S. C. § 1052(f). See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S., at 194. The right to adopt and use 
9 The Olympic flag was presented by Baron de Coubertin at the Con-
gress of Paris in 1914. It has a white background with five interlocking 
rings in the center. The rings with the colors blue, yellow, black, green 
and red, in that ord~r, "symbolize the union of the five continents and the 
meeting of athletes from all over the world at the Olympic Games in a spirit 
of fair and frank competition and good friendship, the ideal preached by 
Baron de Coubertin. " Olympic Charter, Rule 6 (1985). The Olympic 
rings alone are the Olympic symbol. Ibid. The Olympic flame is formally 
lit in Olympia under the auspices of the roe. The Olympic motto is 
"Citius, Altius, Fortius," meaning "Faster, Higher, Stronger" and "ex-
presses the aspirations of the Olympic Movement." Ibid. The motto 
originated at an international conference on the principles of amateurism in 
sports organized by Coubertin and held in 1894 at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
A French delegate, Pere Henri-Martin Didon suggested as a motto the 
words engraved on the entrance to his lycee (school) , Albert le Grand. 
Shortly thereafter, Coubertin founded the roe, which adopted this motto. 
A. Guttmann, The Games Must Go On 13-14 (1984). 
'° The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing the more infor-
mally-organized American Olympic Committee. The USOC received its 
first corporate charter in 1950. 
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such a word "to distinguish the goods or property [of] the 
person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other 
persons, has been long recognized." Trade-Mark Cases, 
supra, at 92. Because Congress reasonably could conclude 
that the USOC has distinguished the word "Olympic" 
through its own efforts, Congress' decision to grant the 
USOC a limited property right in the word "Olympic" falls 
within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus cer-
tainly within constitutional bounds. 
B 
Congress also acted reasonably when it concluded that the 
USOC should not be required to prove that an unauthorized 
use of the word "Olympic" is likely to confuse the public. 11 
To the extent that § 110 applies to uses "for the purpose of 
trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services," 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a), its application is to commercial speech. 
Commercial speech "receives a limited form of First Amend-
ment protection." Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986); 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). Sec-
tion 110 also allows the USOC to prohibit the use of "Olym-
pic" for promotion of theatrical and athletic events. Al-
though many of these promotional uses will be commercial 
speech, some uses may go beyond the "strictly business" con-
text. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). In 
this case, the SF AA claims that its use of the word "Olympic" 
was intended to convey a political statement about the status 
11 To the extent that § 110 regulates confusing uses, it is within normal 
trademark bounds. The Government constitutionally may regulate "de-
ceptive or misleading" commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc ., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1979). 
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of homosexuals in society. 12 Thus, the SFAA claims that in 
this case § 110 suppresses political speech. 
By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, 
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SF AA 
from conveying its message. The SF AA held its athletic 
event in its planned format under the name "Gay Games I" 
and "Gay Games II" in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See 
n. 2, supra. Nor is it clear that § 110 restricts purely ex-
pressive uses of the word "Olympic." 13 Section 110 restricts 
only the manner in which the SF AA may convey its message. 
The restrictions on expressive speech properly are character-
ized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of en-
couraging and rewarding the USOC's activities. The appro-
priate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions on 
12 According to the SF AA's president, the Gay Olympic Games would 
have offered three "very important opportunities": 
"l) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed 
minority. 
"2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable charac-
terization of gay men and women. 
"3) To attempt, through athletics, to bring about a positive and gradual 
assimilation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays, and to 
diminish the ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communi-
ties regardless of sexual orientation." App. 93. 
His expectations "were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to 
the event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of 'serious fun' 
would create a climate of friendship and co-operation [,] false images and 
misconceptions about gay people would decline as a result of a participa-
tory [sic] educational process, and benefit ALL communities." Id., at 
93-94. He thought "[t]he term 'Olympic' best describe[d] [the SF AA'-s] 
undertaking" because it embodied the concepts of "peace, friendship and 
positive social interaction." Id., at 99. 
13 One court has found that § 110 does not prohibit the use of the Olympic 
logo of five interlocking rings and the Olympic torch on a poster expressing 
opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, 
New York, into a prison. The court found that the use of the symbols did 
not fit the commercial or promotional definition of uses in § 110. Stap the 
Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. 1112, 
1118-1121 (SDNY 1980). 
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First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to 
further a substantial governmental interest. United States 
v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). 14 
One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive con-
trol of the word "Olympic", as with other trademarks, is to 
ensure that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts 
so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to pro-
duce a "quality product," that, in turn, benefits the public. 
See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 2:1, pp. 44-47 (1984). But in the special circumstance of 
the USOC, Congress has a broader public interest in promot-
ing, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of 
amateur athletes from the United States in "the great four-
yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games." Olympic Char-
ter, Rule 1 (1985). The USOC's goal under the Olympic 
Charter, Rule 24(B), is to further the Olympic movement, 
that has as its aims: "to promote the development of those 
physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sport"; "to 
educate young people through sport in a spirit of better un-
derstanding between each other and of friendship, thereby 
helping to build a better and more peaceful world"; and "to 
spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby 
creating international goodwill." Id. , Rule 1. See also id., 
Rule 11 (aims of the IOC). Congress' interests in promoting 
the USOC's activities include these purposes as well as those 
specifically enumerated in the USOC's charter. 15 Section 
14 A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified ·if 
the government's interest in the restriction is substantial, directly ad-
vances the government's asserted interest, and is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Pu blic Service Comm'n of New York , 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). Both this 
test , and the test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O'Brien 
require a balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of 
the speech restriction. Because their application to these facts is substan-
tially similar, they will be discussed together. 
15 The objects and purposes of the USOC are to: 
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110 directly advances these governmental interests by sup-
plying the USOC with the means to raise money to support 
the Olympics and encourages the USOC's activities by ensur-
ing that it will receive the benefits of its efforts. 
"(l) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encour-
age the attainment of those goals; 
"(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United 
States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, 
so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related 
organizations; 
"(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constit-
uent members of committees, over matters pertaining to the participation 
of the United States in the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games, 
including the representation of the United States in such games, and over 
the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when 
held in the United States; 
"(4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the 
appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur repre-
sentation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and 
of the Pan-American Games; 
"(5) promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the 
United States and foreign nations; 
"(6) promote and encourage physical fitness and public participation in 
amateur athletic activities; 
"(7) assist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the devel-
opment of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes; 
"(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving 
amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organiza-
tions, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete , coach, trainer, 
manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic 
competition; 
"(9) foster the development of amateur athletic facilities for use by 
amateur athletes and assist in making existing amateur athletic facilities 
available for use by amateur athletes; 
"(10) provide and coordinate technical information on physical training, 
equipment design, coaching, and performance analysis; 
"(11) encourage and support research, development, and dissemination 
of information in the areas of sports medicine and sports safety; 
"(12) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for 
women; 
"(13) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs 
and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible , the 
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The restrictions of § 110 are not broader than Congress 
reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further 
these interests. Section 110 primarily applies to all uses of 
the word "Olympic" to induce the sale of goods or services. 
Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing 
uses, Congress' judgment respecting a certain word is not so 
limited. Congress reasonably could conclude that most com-
mercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to 
be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized 
uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the 
USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commer-
cial value of the marks. See Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) 
(one injury to a trademark owner may be "the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the 
public mind of the mark or name" by nonconfusing uses). 
In this case, the SF AA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, 
bumper stickers and other items, all emblazoned with the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." The possibility for confusion as 
to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the 
SF AA sought to exploit the "commercial magnetism," see 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 
316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), of the word given value by the 
USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized use 
could undercut the USOC's efforts to use, and sell the right 
to use, the word in the future, since much of the word's value 
comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the 
USOC's activities is directly contrary to Congress' interest. 
Even though this protection may exceed the traditional 
rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the 
expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by handicapped in-
dividuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals; 
and 
"(14) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletes of racial and 
ethnic minorities for the purpose of eliciting the participation of such mi-
norities in amateur athletic activities in which they are underrepresented." 
36 U. S. C. § 374. 
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application of the Act to this commercial speech is not 
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congres-
sional interest and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendment. 
Section 110 also extends to promotional uses of the word 
"Olympic," even if the promotion is not to induce the sale of 
goods. Under§ 110, the USOC may prohibit purely promo-
tional uses of the word only when the promotion relates to an 
athletic or theatrical event. The USOC created the value of 
the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. 
Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other 
entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge 
on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. The 
SF AA's proposed use of the word is an excellent example. 
The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place over a 9-day 
period and were to be held in different locations around the 
world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with 
uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an "Olympic 
anthem" and "Olympic Committee," the award of gold, silver, 
and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three 
overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the 
modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games that occurred 
in ancient Greece. 16 The image the SF AA sought to invoke 
16 The ancient Olympic Games lasted five days, whereas the modern 
Olympics last for 10 days. The ancient Games always took place in Olym-
pia in southern Greece; the modern Olympic Games normally move from 
city to city every four years. (As an effort to reduce nationalism, cities, as 
opposed to countries, host the modern Olympic Games.) In ancient 
Greece there may have been a burning fire for religious sacrifice, since the 
Olympic Games were part of a religious festival. See The Odes of Pindar 
Olympia 8, II. 1-9, p. 25 (R. Lattimore trans., 2d ed. 1976). The torch re-
lay, however, was an innovation of the modern Olympic Committee. The 
closest parallel to the modern opening parade is the opening of the ancient 
Games with the chariot race. As the chariots entered the arena and 
passed the judges, a herald called out the names of the owner, his father, 
and his city. See Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8, at 27. There was no gen-
eral parade of athletes by locality, as in the modern Games, and the ath-
letes were naked, not uniformed. Athletes were eligible only if they were 
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was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. 
The SF AA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced 
from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it. The 
mere fact that the SF AA claims an expressive, as opposed to 
a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amend-
ment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those 
who have sown." International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U. S., at 239-240.17 The USOC's right to prohibit 
use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events 
is at the core of its legitimate property right. 18 
IV 
The SF AA argues that even if the exclusive use granted by 
§ 110 does not violate the First Amendment, the USOC's en-
male, freeborn Greeks. There is no indication that the ancient Olympics 
included an "Olympic anthem" or were organized by an entity called an 
"Olympic Committee." The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of 
wild olive, rather than the gold, silver, and bronze medals presented at the 
modern Olympics. The logo of overlapping rings was created by the In-
ternational Olympic Committee. See n. 8, supra. See generally The 
Olympics: A Book of Lists 10-13 (J. Beilenson & N. Beilenson eds. 1984); 
Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8; 25 Encyc. Brit. 197-201 (15th ed. 1984). 
17 The SF AA claims a superior right to the use of the word "Olympic" 
because it is a nonprofit corporation and its athletic event was not orga-
nized for the primary purpose of commercial gain. But when the question 
is the scope of a legitimate property right in a word, the SF AA's distinc-
tion is inapposite. As this Court has noted in the analogous context of 
"fair use" under the Copyright Act: 
"The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the [protected] material without paying the customary 
price." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises , 471 U. S. 
539, 562 (1985). 
Here, the SF AA's proposed use of the word "Olympic" was a clear attempt 
to exploit the imagery and goodwill created by the USOC. 
18 Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the pri-
mary use of the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress rea-
sonably could have found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote 
such a production, it would implicate the value given to the word by the 
usoc. 
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forcement of that right is discriminatory in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 19 The fundamental inquiry is whether 
the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions 
of the Constitution apply. 20 The USOC is a "private cor-
19 The SF AA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its discriminatory 
enforcement claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a 
State. The claimed association in this case is between the USOC and the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply to the Federal Gov-
ernment and contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claims has .. . been precisely the same as to equal protec-
tion claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 
(1976) (per curiam). The SF AA raised the issue of discriminatory en-
forcement in its petition for certiorari, and both parties have briefed the 
issue fully . Accordingly, we address the claim as one under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
20 Because we find no governmental action, we need not address the mer-
its of the SF AA's discriminatory enforcement claim. We note, however, 
that the SF AA's claim of discriminatory enforcement is far from compel-
ling. As of 1982 when this suit began, the USOC had brought 22 opposi-
tions to trademark applications and one petition to cancel. App. 61. For 
example, the USOC successfully prohibited registration of the mark 
"Golden Age Olympics." Id., at 383. The USOC also litigated numerous 
suits prior to bringing this action, prohibiting use of the Olympic words and 
symbols by such entities as the National Amateur Sports Foundation, id., 
at 392, a shoe company, id., at 395, the International Federation of Body 
Builders, id., at 443, and a bus company, id., at 439. Since 1982, the 
USOC has brought a number of additional suits against various companies 
and the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, id., at 437, and Brief 
for Respondents 41, n. 58. The USOC has authorized the use of the word 
"Olympic" to organizations that sponsor athletic competitions and events 
for handicapped persons ("Special Olympics") and for youth ("Junior Olym-
pics" and "Explorer Olympics"). App. 33, 181. Both of these uses di-
rectly relate to a purpose of the USOC established by its charter. See 36 
U. S. C. § 374(7), (13), reprinted ante, at--, n. 15. The USOC has not 
consented to any other uses of the word in connection with athletic compe-
titions or events. App. 33. 
The USOC necessarily has discretion as to when and against whom it . 
files opposition to trademark applications, and when and against whom it 
.. 
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poratio[n] established under Federal law." 36 U. S. C. 
§ 1101(46). 21 In the Act, Congress granted the USOC a cor-
porate charter, § 371, imposed certain requirements on the 
USOC, 22 and provided for USOC funding through exclusive 
use of the Olympic words and symbols, § 380, and through 
direct grants. 23 
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does 
not render the USOC a government agent. All corporations 
act under charters granted by a government, usually by a 
State. They do not thereby lose their essentially private 
character. Even extensive regulation by the government 
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into 
those of the government. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974). Nor is the fact that Congress 
has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" 
dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are ere-
institutes suits. The record before us strongly indicates that the USOC \ 
has acted strictly in accord with its charter and that there has been no ac-
tionable discrimination. 
21 As such, the USOC is listed with 69 other federally-created private 
corporations such as the American Legion, Big Brothers-Big Sisters of 
America, Daughters of the American Revolution, Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the United States, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Na-
tional Ski Patrol System, Inc. 36 U. S. C. § 1101. It hardly need be said 
that if federally created private corporations were to be viewed as govern-
mental rather than private actors, the consequences would be far-reaching. 
Apart from subjecting these private entities to suits under the equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, pre-
sumably-by analogy-similar types of nonprofit corporations established 
under state law could be viewed as governmental actors subject to such 
suits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
22 For example, the USOC may amend its constitution only after provid-
ing an opportunity for notice and hearing, § 375(b); the USOC must allow 
for reasonable representation in its membership of certain groups, § 376(b); 
the USOC must remain nonpolitical, § 377; and the USOC must report on 
its operations and expenditures of grant monies to Congress each year, 
§382a. 
23 The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce for yearly grants 
not to exceed a total of $16,000,000. § 384(a). 
86-270-0PINION 
20 SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0. C. 
ated by some governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute 
or the common law. The actions of the trademark owners I 
nevertheless remain private. Moreover, the intent on the 
part of Congress to help the USOC obtain funding does not 
change the analysis. The Government may subsidize private 
entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for 
their actions. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982); 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 840 (1982). 
This Court also has found action to be governmental action 
when the challenged entity performs functions that have 
been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of the Federal 
Government. Id., at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., supra, at 353; quoted in Blum v. Yaretsky, 
supra, at 1011)) (emphasis added by Rendell-Baker Court). 
Certainly the activities performed by the USOC serve a na-
tional interest, as its objects and purposes of incorporation 
indicate. See n. 15, supra. The fact "[t]hat a private entity 
performs a function which serves the public does not make 
its acts [governmental] action." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
supra, at 842. The Amateur Sports Act was enacted "to cor-
rect the disorganization and the serious factional disputes 
that seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States." 
House Report, at 8. See Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 
F . 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-770, pp. 2-3 
(1978)). The Act merely authorized the USOC to coordinate 
activities that always have been performed by private enti-
ties. 24 Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur 
sports has been a traditional governmental function. 
Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government 
"normally can be held responsible for a private decision only 
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]." Blum v. Yaretsky , supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker 
24 The Commission that recommended the current USOC powers "made 
it clear that it did not want the Federal Government directing amateur ath-
letics in this country." House Report, at 9. 
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v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 
163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 
170 (1970). The USOC's choice of how to enforce its exclu-
sive right to use the word "Olympic" simply is not a govern-
mental decision. 25 There is no evidence that the Federal 
Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise 
of its right. At most, the Federal Government, by failing to 
supervise the USOC's use of its rights, can be said to exercise 
"[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives" of the 
USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at 1004-1005. This is 
not enough to make the USOC's actions those of the Govern-
ment. Ibid. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 
164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 357. 
Because the USOC is not a governmental actor, the SF AA's 
claim that the USOC has enforced its rights in a discrimina-
tory manner must fail. 26 
V 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
25 In fact, the Olympic Charter provides that the USOC "must be autono-
mous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a 
political, religious or economic nature." Rule 24. 
26 In its petition for certiorari, the SF AA argued only that because the 
USOC is a "state actor" it is prohibited from "selecting among diverse 
potential users of the word 'Olympic', based upon speech-suppressing and 
invidiously discriminatory motives." Pet. for Cert. i. The SF AA now 
argues that under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), the District 
Court's entry of the injunction prohibiting the SF AA's use of the word 
'Olympic" constitutes governmental action sufficient to require a constitu-
tional inquiry into the USOC's motivation in seeking the injunction. This 
new theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed within the 
questions presented and thus is not properly before the Court. See this 
Court's Rule 21.l(a). In any event, Shelley was based upon an application 
of civil rights legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is plainly inapplicable to this case. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of 
a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-396, that authorizes the United States Olympic Com-
mittee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of 
the word "Olympic." 
I 
Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SF AA) is 
a nonprofit California corporation. 1 The SF AA originally 
sought to incorporate under the name "Golden Gate Olympic 
Association," but was told by the California Department of 
Corporations that the word "Olympic" could not appear in a 
corporate title. App. 95. After its incorporation in 1981, 
the SF AA nevertheless began to promote the "Gay Olympic 
Games," using those words on its letterheads and mailings 
and in local newspapers. Ibid. The Games were to be a 9-
day event to begin in August 1982, in San Francisco, Califor-
nia. The SF AA expected athletes from hundreds of cities in 
this country and from cities all over the world. Id., at 402. 
The Games were to open with a ceremony "which will rival 
the traditional Olympic Games." Id., at 354. See id., at 
I The SF AA's president, Dr. Thomas F . Waddell, is also a petitioner. 
lllkl 1 11 tne'7 
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402, 406, 425. A relay of over 2,000 runners would carry 
a torch from New York City across the country to Kezar 
Stadium in San Francisco. Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The 
final runner would enter the stadium with the "Gay Olympic 
Torch" and light the "Gay Olympic Flame." Id., at 357. 
The ceremony would continue with the athletes marching in 
uniform into the stadium behind their respective city flags. 
Id., at 354, 357, 402, 404, 414. Competition was to occur in 
18 different contests, with the winners receiving gold, silver, 
and bronze medals. Id., at 354-355, 359, 407, 410. To 
cover the cost of the planned Games, the SF AA sold T-shirts, 
buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." Id., at 67, 94, 107, 113-114, 
167, 360, 362, 427-428. 2 
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act (Act), 92 Stat. 3048, 
36 U. S. C. § 380, grants respondent United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) 3 the right to prohibit certain commercial 
and promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and various 
Olympic symbols. 4 In late December 1981, the executive 
2 The 1982 athletic event ultimately was held under the name "Gay 
Games I." App. 473. A total of 1,300 men and women from 12 countries, 
27 States, and 179 cities participated. Id., at 475. The "Gay Games II" 
were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating from 17 
countries. Brief for Respondent 8. The 1990 "Gay Games" are scheduled 
to occur in Vancouver, B. C. Ibid. 
3 The International Olympic Committee is also a respondent. 
• Section 110 of the Act, as set forth in 36 U. S. C. § 380, provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the pur-
pose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
"(!) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 
5 interlocking rings; 
"(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a 
blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 
5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief; 
"(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely repre-
senting association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic 
Committee or the [USOC]; or 
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director of the USOC wrote to the SF AA, informing it of the 
existence of the Amateur Sports Act, and requesting that the 
SF AA immediately terminate use of the word "Olympic" in 
its description of the planned Games. The SF AA at first 
agreed to substitute the word "Athletic" for the word "Olym-
pic," but, one month later, resumed use of the term. The 
USOC became aware that the SF AA was still advertising its 
Games as "Olympic" through a newspaper article in May 
1982. In August, the USOC brought suit in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California to en-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad' , 'Citius Altius Fortius', or any com-
bination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, 
to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies 
provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the 
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) [15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq.]. How-
ever, any person who actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this . 
section, or the words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who 
actually used, or whose assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade 
name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21 , 1950 shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. 
"(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or 
· services to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, 
symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of 
the [USOC] in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were 
donated, supplied, or furnished to or for the use of, approved, selected , or 
used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic or Pan-American team or 
team members. 
"(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name 'United 
States Olympic Committee'; the symbol described in subsection (a)(l) of 
this section; the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this ·section; and 
the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad' , 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any combination 
thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this 
section." 
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join the SF AA's use of the word "Olympic. " The District 
Court granted a temporary restraining order and then a pre-
liminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. After further proceedings, the District 
Court granted the USOC summary judgment and a perma-
nent injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court. 781 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1986). It found that the Act 
granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" with-
out requiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use 
was confusing and without regard to the defenses available to 
an entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham 
Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. It 
did not reach the SF AA's contention that the USOC enforced 
its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court 
found that the USOC is not a state actor bound by the con-
straints of the Constitution. The court also found that the 
USOC's "property righ[t] [in the word 'Olympic' and its asso-
ciated symbols and slogans] can be protected without violat-
ing the First Amendment." 781 F. 2d, at 737. The court 
denied the SF AA's petition for rehearing en bane. Three 
judges dissented, finding that the panel's interpretation of 
the Act raised serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 
1319, 1326 (CA9 1986). 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided 
by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. 
II 
The SF AA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting the Act as granting the USOC anything more 
than a normal trademark in the word "Olympic.-" "The 
starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 
--, -- (1986) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
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Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring)). 
Section 110 of the Act provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who 
uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any 
goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibi-
tion, athletic performance, or competition-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius 
Forti us', or any combination or simulation thereof tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or 
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] 
for the remedies provided in the [Lanham] Act." 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a). 
The SF AA argues that the clause "tending to cause confu-
sion" is properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." But 
because there is no comma after "thereof," the more natural 
reading of the section is that "tending to cause confusion" 
modifies only "any combination or simulation thereof." Nev-
ertheless, we do not regard this language as conclusive. We 
therefore examine the legislative history of this section. 
Before Congress passed § 110 of the Act, unauthorized use 
of the word "Olympic" was punishable criminally. The rele-
vant statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be 
confusing. Instead, it made it a crime for: 
"any person . .. other than [the USOC] ... for the pur-
pose of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic perform-
ance, and competition or as an advertisement to induce 
the sale of any article whatsoever or attendance at any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and compe-
tition or for any business or charitable purpose to use 
... the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius 
Fortius' or any combination of these words." 64 Stat. 
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901, as amended, 36 U. S. C. § 379 (1976 ed.) (emphasis 
added). 
The House Judiciary Committee drafted the language of§ 110 
that was ultimately adopted. The committee explained that 
the previous "criminal penalty has been found to be un-
workable as it requires the proof of a criminal intent." 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 15 (1978) (House Report). The 
changes from the criminal statute "were made in response to 
a letter from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Depart-
ment of Commerce," ibid., that the committee appended to 
the end of its report. This letter explained: 
"Section ll.0(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', and 
any combination thereof, but also any simulation or 
confusingly similar derivation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely 
suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic 
activity .... 
"Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from 
the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new 
prohibitions, e. g. words described in section ( a)( 4) tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive 
with respect to the [USOC] or any Olympic activity." 
Id., at 38 (emphasis added). 
This legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended 
to provide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the 
word "Olympic" without regard to whether an unauthorized 
use of the word tends to cause confusion. 
The SF AA further argues that the reference in § 110 to 
Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the 
traditional trademark defenses as well. See 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1115(b). 5 This argument ignores the clear language of the 
'Specifically, the SF AA argues that the USOC should not be able to 
prohibit its use of the word "Olympic" because its use "is descriptive of and 
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section. Also, this shorthand reference to remedies replaced 
an earlier draft's specific list of remedies typically available 
for trademark infringement, e. g., injunctive relief, recovery 
of profits, damages, costs and attorney's fees. See Lanham 
Act §§34, 35, 15 U.S. C. §§1116, 1117. This list contained 
no reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12865, 
12866 (1978) (proposed § ll0(c)). Moreover, the USOC al-
ready held a trademark in the word "Olympic." App. 378-
382. Under the SF AA's interpretation, the Act would be 
largely superfluous. In sum, the language and legislative 
history of § 110 indicate clearly that Congress intended to 
grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without 
regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion, 
and that § 110 does not incorporate defenses available under 
the Lanham Act. 
III 
This Court has recognized that "[n]ational protection of 
trademarks is desirable . . . because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N Fly , 
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985). 
In the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., Congress es-
tablished a system for protecting such trademarks. Section 
45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify _his goods 
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by 
others." 15 U.S. C. § 1127. Under§ 32 of the Lanham Act, 
the owner of a trademark is protected from unauthorized 
uses that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, . 
or to deceive." § 1114(1)(a). Section 33 of the Lanham Act 
grants several statutory defenses to -an alleged trademark 
infringer. § 1115. 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or serv-
ices." 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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The protection granted to the USOC's use of the Olympic 
words and symbols differs from the normal trademark pro-
tection in two respects: the USOC need not prove that a con-
tested use is likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized 
user of the word does not have available the normal statutory 
defenses. 6 The SF AA argues, in effect, that the differences 
between the Lanham Act and § 110 are of constitutional di-
mension. First, the SF AA contends that the word "Olym-
pic" is a generic 7 word that could not gain trademark protec-
tion under the Lanham Act. The SF AA argues that this 
prohibition is constitutionally required and thus that the 
First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trade-
mark in the word "Olympic." Second, the SF AA argues 
that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting 
exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the author-
ized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause 
confusion. We address these contentions in turn. 
A 
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungi-
ble, and that the suppression of particular words "run[s] a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen 
v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971). The SFAA argues 
that this principle prohibits Congress from granting the 
USOC exclusive control of uses of the word "Olympic," a 
word that the SF AA views as generic. Yet this recognition 
always has been balanced against the principle that when a 
word acquires value "as the result of organization and the ex-
penditure of labor, skill, and money" by an entity, that entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the 
6 The user may, however, raise traditional equitable defenses, such as 
!aches. See Brief for Respondents 20, n. 17. 
1 A common descriptive n~me of a product or service is generic. Be-
cause a generic name by definition does not distinguish the identity of 
a particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark under the 
Lanham Act. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(c). See also 1 
J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1, p. 520 (1984). 
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word. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 
U. S. 215, 239 (1918). See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 
92 (1879). 
There is no need in this case to decide whether Congress 
ever could grant a private entity exclusive use of a generic 
word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the com-
mercial and promotional value of the word "Olympic" was the 
product of the USOC's "own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense." Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,575 (1977). 
The USOC, together with respondent International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), have used the word "Olympic" at least 
since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games began. App. 
348. Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France, acting pursuant 
to a government commission, then proposed the revival of 
the ancient Olympic Games to promote international under-
standing. D. Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook 13 
(1975). Coubertin sought to identify the "spirit" of the 
ancient Olympic Games that had been corrupted by the influ-
ence of money and politics. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 4 (1976). 8 Cou-
bertin thus formed the IOC, that has established elaborate 
rules and procedures for the conduct of the modern Olympics. 
See Olympic Charter, Rules 26-69 (1985). In addition, these 
rules direct every national committee to protect the use of 
the Olympic flag, symbol, flame, and motto from unauthor-
8 The ancient Olympic Games were held from 776 B. C. until 393 A. D., 
when they were abolished by the Roman emperor Theodosius I. The 
Olympic Games were the most important in a "circuit" of sporting festivals. 
The "circuit" also included the Pythian Games at Delphi, the Nemean 
Games at Nemea, and the Isthmian Games at Corinth. As these sporting 
festivals grew in importance, athletes turned from amateurs to true profes-
sionals, training all year and receiving substantial gifts and money from 
individuals and from their home cities. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 68-82 (1976); 25 Encyc. Brit. 
198 (15th ed. 1984). 
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ized use. Id., Bye-laws to Rules 6 and 53. 9 Under the IOC 
Charter, the USOC is the national olympic committee for the 
United States with the sole authority to represent the United 
States at the Olympic Games. 10 Pursuant to this authority, 
the USOC has used the Olympic words and symbols exten-
sively in this country to fulfill its object under the Olympic 
Charter of "ensur[ing] the development and safeguarding of 
the Olympic Movement and sport." Id., Rule 24. 
The history of the origins and associations of the word 
"Olympic" demonstrates the meritlessness of the SF AA's 
contention that Congress simply plucked a generic word out 
of the English vocabulary and granted its exclusive use to the 
USOC. Congress reasonably could find that since 1896, the 
word "Olympic" has acquired what in trademark law is 
kno"\\-'TI as a secondary meaning-it "has become distinctive of 
[the USOC's] goods in commerce." Lanham Act, § 2(f), 15 
U. S. C. § 1052(f). See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S., at 194. The right to adopt and use 
• The Olympic flag was presented by Baron de Coubertin at the Con-
gress of Paris in 1914. It has a white background with five interlocking 
rings in the center. The rings with the colors blue, yellow, black, green 
and red, in that order, "symbolize the union of the five continents and the 
meeting of athletes from all over the world at the Olympic Games in a spirit 
of fair and frank competition and good friendship, the ideal preached by 
Baron de Coubertin." Olympic Charter, Rule 6 (1985). The Olympic 
rings alone are the Olympic symbol. Ibid. The Olympic flame is formally 
lit in Olympia under the auspices of the IOC. The Olympic motto is 
"Citius, Altius, Fortius," meaning "Faster, Higher, Stronger" and "ex-
presses the aspirations of the Olympic Movement." Ibid. The motto 
originated at an international conference on the principles of amateurism in 
sports organized by Coubertin and held in 1894 at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
A French delegate, Pere Henri-Martin Didon suggested as a motto the 
words engraved on the entrance to his lycee (school), Albert le Grand. 
Shortly thereafter, Coubertin founded the IOC, which adopted this motto. 
A. Guttmann, The Games Must Go On 13-14 (1984). 
'°The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing the more infor-
mally-organized American Olympic Committee. The USOC received its 
first corporate charter in 1950. 
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such a word "to distinguish the goods or property [ of] the 
person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other 
persons, has been long recognized." Trade-Mark Cases, 
supra, at 92. Because Congress reasonably could conclude 
that the USOC has distinguished the word "Olympic" 
through its own efforts, Congress' decision to grant the 
USOC a limited property right in the word "Olympic" falls 
within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus cer-
tainly within constitutional bounds. 
B 
Congress also acted reasonably when it concluded that the 
USOC should not be required to prove that an unauthorized 
use of the word "Olympic" is likely to confuse the public. 11 
To the extent that § 110 applies to uses "for the purpose of 
trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services," 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a), its application is to commercial speech. 
Commercial speech "receives a limited form of First Amend-
ment protection." Posadas de Puerto R ico Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Company of Puerto R ico, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986); 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n of New York , 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). Sec-
tion 110 also allows the USOC to prohibit the use of "Olym-
pic" for promotion of theatrical and athletic events. Al-
though many of these promotional uses will be commercial 
speech, some uses may go beyond the "strictly business" con-
text. See Friedman v. Rogers , 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). In 
this case, the SF AA claims that its use of the word "Olympic" 
was intended to convey a political statement about the status 
11 To the extent that § 110 regulates confusing uses, it is within normal 
trademark bounds. The Government constitutionally may regulate "de-
ceptive or misleading" commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc ., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1979). 
86-270-OPINION 
12 SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0. C. 
of homosexuals in society. 12 Thus, the SF AA claims that in 
this case § 110 suppresses political speech. 
By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, 
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SF AA 
from conveying its message. The SF AA held its athletic 
event in its planned format under the name "Gay Games I" 
and "Gay Games 11" in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See 
n. 2, supra. Nor is it clear that § 110 restricts purely ex-
pressive uses of the word "Olympic." 13 Section 110 restricts 
only the manner in which the SF AA may convey its message. 
The restrictions on expressive speech properly are character-
ized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of en-
couraging and rewarding the USOC's activities. 14 The ap-
12 According to the SF AA's president, the Gay Olympic Games would 
have offered three "very important opportunities": 
"1) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed 
minority. 
"2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable charac-
terization of gay men and women. 
"3) To attempt, through athletics , to bring about a positive and gradual 
assimilation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays, and to 
diminish the ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communi-
ties regardless of sexual orientation." App. 93. 
His expectations "were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to 
the event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of 'serious fun' 
would create a climate of friendship and co-operation [,] false images and 
misconceptions about gay people would decline as a result of a particpatory 
[ sic] educational process, and benefit ALL communities." Id. , at 93-94. 
He thought "[t]he term 'Olympic' best describe[d] [the SF AA's] undertak-
ing" because it embodied the concepts of "peace, friendship and positive 
social interaction." Id., at 99. 
13 One court has found that § 110 does not prohibit the use of the Olympic 
logo of five interlocking rings and the Olympic torch on a poster expressing 
opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, 
New York, into a prison. The court found that the use of the symbols did 
not fit the commercial or promotional definition of uses in § 110. Stop the 
Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. 1112, 
1118-1121 (SDNY 1980). 
"JUSTICE BRENNAN finds the Act unconstitutionally overbroad. But \ 
on its face , it applies primarily to commercial speech, to which the applica-
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propriate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions 
on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to 
further a substantial governmental interest. United States 
v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). 15 
One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive con-
trol of the word "Olympic", as with other trademarks, is to 
ensure that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts 
so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to pro-
duce a "quality product," that, in turn, benefits the public. 
See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 2:1, pp. 44-47 (1984). But in the special circumstance of 
the USOC, Congress has a broader public interest in promot-
ing, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of 
amateur athletes from the United States in "the great four-
yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games." Olympic Char-
ter, Rule 1 (1985). The USOC's goal under the Olympic 
Charter, Rule 24(B), is to further the Olympic movement, 
that has as its aims: "to promote the development of those 
physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sport"; "to 
tion of the overbreadth doctrine is highly questionable. See Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 462, n. 20 (citing Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380 (1977)). There is no basis in the record to be-
lieve that the Act will be interpreted or applied to infringe significantly on 
noncommercial speech rights. The application of the Act to the SF AA is 
well within constitutional bounds, and the extent to which the Act may be 
read to apply to noncommercial speech is limited. We find no "realistic 
danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized 
First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court." City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 (1984). Accord-
ingly, we decline to apply the overbreadth doctrine to this case. 
15 A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if 
the government's interest in the restriction is substantial, directly ad-
vances the government's asserted interest, and is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Comm'n of New York , 447 U.S. 557,566 (1980). Both this 
test, and the test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O'Brien 
require a balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of 
the speech restriction. Because their application to these facts is substan-
tially similar, they will be discussed together. 
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educate young people through sport in a spirit of better un-
derstanding between each other and of friendship, thereby 
helping to build a better and more peaceful world"; and "to 
spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby 
creating international goodwill." Id., Rule 1. See also id., 
Rule 11 (aims of the IOC). Congress' interests in promoting 
the USOC's activities include these purposes as well as those 
specifically enumerated in the USOC's charter. 16 Section 
110 directly advances these governmental interests by sup-
16 The objects and purposes of the USOC are to: 
"(1) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encour-
age the attainment of those goals; 
"(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United 
States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, 
so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related 
organizations; 
"(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constit-
uent members of committees, over matters pertaining to the participation 
of the United States in the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games, 
including the representation of the United States in such games, and over 
the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when 
held in the United States; 
"(4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the 
appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur repre-
sentation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and 
of the Pan-American Games; 
"(5) promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the 
United States and foreign nations; 
"(6) promote and encourage physical fitness and public participation in 
amateur athletic activities; 
"(7) assist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the devel-
opment of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes; 
"(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving 
amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organiza-
tions, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, 
manager, administrator, or- official to participate in amateur athletic 
competition; 
"(9) foster the development of amateur athletic facilities for use by 
amateur athletes and assist in making existing amateur athletic facilities 
available for use by amateur athletes; 
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plying the USOC with the means to raise money to support 
the Olympics and encourages the USOC's activities by ensur-
ing that it will receive the benefits of its efforts. 
The restrictions of § 110 are not broader than Congress 
reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further 
these interests. Section 110 primarily applies to all uses of 
the word "Olympic" to induce the sale of goods or services. 
Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing 
uses, Congress' judgment respecting a certain word is not so 
limited. Congress reasonably could conclude that most com-
mercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to 
be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized 
uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the 
USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commer-
cial value of the marks. See Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) 
(one injury to a trademark owner may be "the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the 
public mind of the mark or name" by nonconfusing uses). 
In this case, the SFAA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, 
bumper stickers and other items, all emblazoned with the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." The possibility for confusion as 
"(10) provide and coordinate technical information on physical training, 
equipment design, coaching, and performance analysis; 
"(11) encourage and support research, development, and dissemination 
of information in the areas of sports medicine and sports safety; 
"(12) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for 
women; 
"(13) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs 
and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible , the 
expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by handicapped in-
dividuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals; 
and 
"(14) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletes of racial and 
ethnic minorities for the purpose of eliciting the participation of such mi-
norities in amateur athletic activities in which they are underrepresented. " 
36 U. S. C. § 374. 
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to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the 
SF AA sought to exploit the "commercial magnetism," see 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 
316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), of the word given value by the 
USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized use 
could undercut the USOC's efforts to use, and sell the right 
to use, the word in the future, since much of the word's value 
comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the 
USOC's activities is directly contrary to Congress' interest. 
Even though this protection may exceed the traditional 
rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the 
application of the Act to this commercial speech is not 
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congres-
sional interest and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendment. 
Section 110 also extends to promotional uses of the word 
"Olympic," even if the promotion is not to induce the sale of 
goods. Under§ 110, the USOC may prohibit purely promo-
tional uses of the word only when the promotion relates to an 
athletic or theatrical event. The USOC created the value of 
the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. 
Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other 
entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge 
on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. The 
SF AA's proposed use of the word is an excellent example. 
The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place over a 9-day 
period and were to be held in different locations around the 
world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with 
uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an "Olympic 
anthem" and "Olympic Committee," the award of gold, silver, 
and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three 
overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the . 
modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games that occurred 
in ancient Greece. 11 The image the SF AA sought to invoke 
11 The ancient Olympic Games lasted five days, whereas the modern 
Olympics last for 10 days. The ancient Games always took place in Olym-
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was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. 
The SF AA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced 
from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it. The 
mere fact that the SF AA claims an expressive, as opposed to 
a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amend-
ment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those 
who have sown." International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U. S., at 239-240. 18 The USOC's right to prohibit 
pia in southern Greece; the modern Olympic Games normally move from 
city to city every four years. (As an effort to reduce nationalism, cities, as 
opposed to countries, host the modern Olympic Games. ) In ancient 
Greece there may have been a burning fire for religious sacrifice, since the 
Olympic Games were part of a religious festival. See The Odes of Pindar 
Olympia 8, II. 1-9, p. 25 (R. Lattimore trans., 2d ed. 1976). The torch re-
lay, however, was an innovation of the modern Olympic Committee. The 
closest parallel to the modern opening parade is the opening of the ancient 
Games with the chariot race. As the chariots entered the arena and 
passed the judges, a herald called out the names of the owner, his father , 
and his city. See Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8, at 27. There was no gen-
eral parade of athletes by locality, as in the modern Games, and the ath-
letes were naked, not uniformed. Athletes were eligible only if they were 
male, freeborn Greeks. There is no indication that the ancient Olympics 
included an "Olympic anthem" or were organized by an entity called an 
"Olympic Committee." The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of 
wild olive, rather than the gold, silver, and bronze medals presented at the 
modern Olympics. The logo of overlapping rings was created by the In-
ternational Olympic Committee. See n. 8, supra. See generally The 
Olympics: A Book of Lists 10-13 (J. Beilenson & N. Beilenson eds. 1984); 
Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8; 25 Encyc. Brit. 197-201 (15th ed. 1984). 
18 The SF AA claims a superior right to the use of the word "Olympic" 
because it is a nonprofit corporation and its athletic event was not orga-
nized for the primary purpose of commercial gain. But when the question 
is the scope of a legitimate property right in a word, the SF AA's distinc-
tion is inapposite. As this Court has noted in the analogous context of 
"fair use" under the Copyright Act: 
"The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the [protected] material without paying the customary 
price." Harper & Row Publislters , Inc. v. Nation Enterprises , 471 U. S. 
539, 562 (1985). 
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use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events 
is at the core of its legitimate property right. 19 
IV 
The SF AA argues that even if the exclusive use granted by 
§ 110 does not violate the First Amendment, the USOC's en-
forcement of that right is discriminatory in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 20 The fundamental inquiry is whether 
the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions 
of the Constitution apply. 21 The USOC is a "private cor-
Here, the SF AA's proposed use of the word "Olympic" was a clear attempt 
to exploit the imagery and goodwill created by the USOC. 
19 Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the pri-
mary use of the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress rea-
sonably could have found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote 
such a production, it would implicate the value given to the word by the 
usoc. 
00 The SF AA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its discriminatory 
enforcement claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a 
State. The claimed association in this case is between the USOC and the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply to the Federal Gov-
ernment and contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claims has ... been precisely the same as to equal protec-
tion claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld , 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 
(1976) (per curiam). The SF AA raised the issue of discriminatory en-
forcement in its petition for certiorari, and both parties have briefed the 
issue fully . Accordingly, we address the claim as one under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
21 Because we find no governmental action, we need not address the mer-
its of the SF AA's discriminatory enforcement claim. We note , however, 
that the SF AA's claim of discriminatory enforcement is far from compel-
ling. As of 1982 when this suit began, the USOC had brought 22 opposi-
tions to trademark applications and one petition to cancel. App. 61. For 
example, the USOC successfully prohibited registration of the mark 
"Golden Age Olympics." Id., at 383. The USOC also litigated numerous 
suits prior to bringing this action, prohibiting use of the Olympic words and 
symbols by such entities as the National Amateur Sports Foundation, id. , 
at 392, a shoe company, id. , at 395, the International Federation of Body 
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poratio[n] established under Federal law." 36 U. S. C. 
§ 1101(46). 22 In the Act, Congress granted the USOC a cor-
porate charter, § 371, imposed certain requirements on the 
USOC, 23 and provided for some USOC funding through exclu-
sive use of the Olympic words and symbols, § 380, and 
through direct grants. 24 
Builders, id., at 443, and a bus company, id. , at 439. Since 1982, the 
USOC has brought a number of additional suits against various companies 
and the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, id., at 437, and Brief 
for Respondents 41, n. 58. The USOC has authorized the use of the word 
"Olympic" to organizations that sponsor athletic competitions and events 
for handicapped persons ("Special Olympics") and for youth ("Junior Olym-
pics" and "Explorer Olympics"). App. 33, 181. Both of these uses di-
rectly relate to a purpose of the USOC established by its charter. See 36 
U. S. C. § 374(7), (13), reprinted ante, at--, n. 15. The USOC has not 
consented to any other uses of the word in connection with athletic compe-
titions or events. App. 33. 
The USOC necessarily has discretion as to when and against whom it 
files opposition to trademark applications, and when and against whom it 
institutes suits. The record before us strongly indicates that the USOC 
has acted strictly in accord with its charter and that there has been no ac-
tionable discrimination. 
22 As such, the USOC is listed with 69 other federally-created private 
corporations such as the American Legion, Big Brothers-Big Sisters of 
America, Daughters of the American Revolution, Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the United States, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Na-
tional Ski Patrol System, Inc. 36 U. S. C. § 1101. It hardly need be said 
that if federally created private corporations were to be viewed as govern-
mental rather than private actors, the consequences would be far-reaching. 
Apart from subjecting these private entities to suits under the equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, pre-
sumably-by analogy-similar types of nonprofit corporations established 
under state Jaw could be viewed as governmental actors subject to such 
suits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
23 For example, the USOC may amend its constitution only after provid-
ing an opportunity for notice and hearing, § 375(b); the USOC must allow 
for reasonable representation in its membership of certain groups, § 376(b); 
the USOC must remain nonpolitical, § 377; and the USOC must report on 
its operations and expenditures of grant monies to Congress each year, 
§382a. 
:u The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce for yearly grants 
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The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does 
not render the USOC a government agent. All corporations 
act under charters granted by a government, usually by a 
State. They do not thereby lose their essentially private 
character. Even extensive regulation by the government 
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into 
those of the government. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974). Nor is the fact that Congress 
has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" 
dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are cre-
ated by some governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute 
or the common law. The actions of the trademark owners 
nevertheless remain private. Moreover, the intent on the 
part of Congress to help the USOC obtain funding does not 
change the analysis. The Government may subsidize private 
entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for 
their actions. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982); 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 840 (1982). 
This Court also has found action to be governmental action 
when the challenged entity performs functions that have 
been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of the Federal 
Government. Id., at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., supra, at 353; quoted in Blum v. Yaretsky, 
supra, at 1011)) (emphasis added by Rendell-Baker Court). 
Certainly the activities performed by the USOC serve a na-
tional interest, as its objects and purposes of incorporation 
indicate. Seen. 15, supra. The fact "[t]hat a private entity 
performs a function which serves the public does not make 
its acts [governmental] action." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
supra, at 842. The Amateur Sports Act was enacted "to cor-
not to exceed a total of $16,000,000, § 384(a), but it has never done so. See 
Brief for Respondent 46. The only direct federal funding that the USOC 
has received is a $10 million grant in 1980, characterized by Congress as "a 
form of disaster payment" to help the USOC recover from the losses result-
ing from the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. See S. Rep. No. 96-829, 
p. 241 (1980); Act of July 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 857, 898. 
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rect the disorganization and the serious factional disputes 
that seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States." 
House Report, at 8. See Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 
F. 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-770, pp. 2-3 
(1978)). The Act merely authorized the USOC to coordinate 
activities that always have been performed by private enti-
ties. 25 Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur 
sports has been a traditional governmental function. 26 
25 The Commission that recommended the current USOC powers "made 
it clear that it did not want the Federal Government directing amateur ath-
letics in this country." House Report, at 9. 
26 The dissent does not rely on the fact that the USOC is chartered by 
Congress to find governmental action in this case. Post, at --. Jus-
TICE BRENNAN attempts to distinguish the USOC from other private cor-
porations that are chartered by Congress on the ground that the USOC 
performs the "distinctive, traditional governmental function" of "repr~-
sent[ing] this Nation to the world community." Post , at--. But ab-
sent the additional element of governmental control, this representational 
function can hardly be called traditionally governmental. All sorts of pri-
vate organizations send "national representatives" to participate in world 
competitions. Although many are of interest only to a select group, oth-
ers, like the Davis Cup Competition, the America's Cup, and the Miss Uni-
verse Pageant, are widely viewed as involving representation of our coun-
try. The organizations that sponsor United States participation in these 
events all perform "national . . . representational," as well as "adminis-
trative [and] adjudicative role(s] ," see post, at--, in selecting and pre-
senting the national representatives. 
As with the corporate charter, the dissent acknowledges that the repre-
sentational role of the USOC is not dispositive. Post , at--. According 
to the dissent, the Olympic Games are "unique [because] at stake are sig-
nificant national interests that stem not only from pageantry but from poli-
tics. " Jbi,d. The dissent then relies primarily on the sequence of events 
preceding the USOC's decision not to send athletes to the 1980 summer 
Olympics as demonstrating "the impact and interrelationship of USOC de-
cisions on the definition and pursuit of the national interest." Post, at 
--. But the governmental influence on that particular decision of the 
USOC is hardly representative in view of the absence of such influence on 
the vast majority of USOC decisions. Moreover, even the unique se-
quence of events in 1980 confirms that the USOC cannot properly be con-
sidered a governmental agency. Although the President and Congress in-
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Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government 
"normally can be held responsible for a private decision only 
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]." Blum v. Yaretsky , supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. /rvis, 407 U. S. 
dicated their view that United States athletes should not go to the Moscow 
Olympics, this was not the end of the matter. The President thought it 
would be necessary to take "legal actions ... [if] necessary" to prevent the 
USOC from sending a team to Moscow. See 1 Public Papers of the Presi-
dents , Jimmy Carter 1980-1981, at 636 (1981). Previously, the Attorney 
General had indicated that the President believed that he had the power 
under the Emergency Powers Act, 50 U. S. C. § 1701, to bar travel to an 
area that he considered to pose a threat of national emergency. See 
Washington Post, April 11, 1980, p. Al. The President's statement indi-
cated a clear recognition that neither he nor Congress could control the 
USOC's actions directly. A district court, confronted with the question of 
whether the decision not to send athletes to the 1980 Olympics was state 
action, noted: 
"The USOC is an independent body, and nothing in its chartering statute 
gives the federal government the right to control that body or its officers. 
Furthermore, the facts here do not indicate that the federal government 
was able to exercise any type of "de facto" control over the USOC. The 
USOC decided by a secret ballot of its House of Delegates. The federal 
government may have had the power to prevent the athletes from partici-
pating in the Olympics even if the USOC had voted to allow them to par-
ticipate, but it did not have the power to make them vote in a certain way. 
All it had was the power of persuasion. We cannot equate this with con-
trol. To do so in cases of this type would be to open the door and usher the 
courts into what we believe is a largely nonjusticiable realm, where they 
would find themselves in the untenable position of determining whether a 
certain level, intensity, or type of 'Presidential' or 'Administrative' or 'po-
litical' pressure amounts to sufficient control over a private entity so as to 
invoke federal jurisdiction." DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Com-
mittee, 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D DC), affd. mem., 701 F. 2d 221 (CADC 1980). 
In sum, we remain unconvinced that the functions that the USOC per-
forms can be viewed as "governmental" action. 
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163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 
170 (1970). The USOC's choice of how to enforce its exclu-
sive right to use the word "Olympic" simply is not a govern-
mental decision. 'Z7 There is no evidence that the Federal 
Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise 
of its right. At most, the Federal Government, by failing to 
supervise the USOC's use of its rights, can be said to exercise 
"[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives" of the 
USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at 1004-1005. This is 
not enough to make the USOC's actions those of the Govern-
ment. Ibid. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 
164-165; Jackson v. Metrcrpolitan Edison Co., supra, at 
357. 28 Because the USOC is not a governmental actor, the 
SF AA's claim that the USOC has enforced its rights in a dis-
criminatory manner must fail. 29 
Z7 In fact, the Olympic Charter provides that the USOC "must be autono-
mous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a 
political, religious or economic nature." Rule 24. 
28 For all of the same reasons indicated above, we reject the SF AA's ar-
gument that the United States Government should be viewed as a "joint 
participant" in the SF AA's efforts to enforce its right to use the word 
"Olympic." See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority , 365 U. S. 715, 
725 (1961). The SF AA has failed to demonstrate that the Federal Govern-
ment can or does exert any influence over the exercise of the USOC's en-
forcement decisions. Absent proof of this type of "close nexus between 
the [Government] and the challenged action of the [USOCJ," the challenged 
action may not be "fairly treated as that of the [Government] itself. " 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 351 (1974). 
29 In its petition for certiorari, the SF AA argued only that because the 
USOC is a "state actor" it is prohibited from "selecting among diverse 
potential users of the word 'Olympic', based upon speech-suppressing and 
invidiously discriminatory motives." Pet. for Cert. i. The SF AA now 
argues that under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) , the District 
Court's entry of the injunction prohibiting the SF AA's use of the word 
'Olympic" constitutes governmental action sufficient to require a constitu-
tional inquiry into the USOC's motivation in seeking the injunction. This 
new theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed within the 
questions presented and thus is not properly before the Court. See this I 
Court's Rule 21. l(a). l 0 W- is 4 CV--
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V 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. _ 
It is so ordered. 
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In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of 
a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-396, that authorizes the United States Olympic Com-
mittee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of 
the word "Olympic." 
I 
Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SF AA) is 
a nonprofit California corporation. 1 The SF AA originally 
sought to incorporate under the name "Golden Gate Olympic 
Association," but was told by the California Department of 
Corporations that the word "Olympic" could not appear in a 
corporate title. App. 95. After its incorporation in 1981, 
the SF AA nevertheless began to promote the "Gay Olympic 
Games," using those words on its letterheads and mailings 
and in local newspapers. Ibid. The Games were to be a 9-
day event to begin in August 1982, in San Francisco, Califor-
nia. The SF AA expected athletes from hundreds of cities in 
this country and from cities all over the world. Id., at 402. 
The Games were to open with a ceremony "which will rival 
the traditional Olympic Games." Id., at 354. See id., at 
1 The SFAA's president, Dr. Thomas F. Waddell, is also a petitioner. 
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402, 406, 425. A relay of over 2,000 runners would carry 
a torch from New York City across the country to Kezar 
Stadium in San Francisco. Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The 
final runner would enter the stadium with the "Gay Olympic 
Torch" and light the "Gay Olympic Flame." Id., at 357. 
The ceremony would continue with the athletes marching in 
uniform into the stadium behind their respective city flags. 
Id., at 354, 357, 402, 404, 414. Competition was to occur in 
18 different contests, with the winners receiving gold, silver, 
and bronze medals. Id., at 354-355, 359, 407, 410. To 
cover the cost of the planned Games, the SF AA sold T-shirts, 
buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." Id., at 67, 94, 107, 113-114, 
167, 360, 362, 427-428. 2 
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act (Act), 92 Stat. 3048, 
36 U. S. C. § 380, grants respondent United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) 3 the right to prohibit certain commercial 
and promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and various 
Olympic symbols. 4 In late December 1981, the executive 
2 The 1982 athletic event ultimately was held under the name "Gay 
Games I. " App. 473. A total of 1,300 men and women from 12 countries, 
27 States, and 179 cities participated. Id. , at 475. The "Gay Games II" 
were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating from 17 
countries. Brief for Respondent 8. The 1990 "Gay Games" are scheduled 
to occur in Vancouver, B. C. Ibid. 
3 The International Olympic Committee is also a respondent. 
'Section 110 of the Act, as set forth in 36 U. S. C. § 380, provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the pur-
pose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
"(!) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 
5 interlocking rings; 
"(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a 
blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 
5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief; 
"(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely repre-
senting association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic 
Committee or the [USOC]; or 
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director of the USOC wrote to the SF AA, informing it of the 
existence of the Amateur Sports Act, and requesting that the 
SF AA immediately terminate use of the word "Olympic" in 
its description of the planned Games. The SF AA at first 
agreed to substitute the word "Athletic" for the word "Olym-
pic," but, one month later, resumed use of the term. The 
USOC became aware that the SF AA was still advertising its 
Games as "Olympic" through a newspaper article in May 
1982. In August, the USOC brought suit in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California to en-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', or any com-
bination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, 
to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies 
provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the 
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) [15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq.]. How-
ever, any person who actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this 
section, or the words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who 
actually used, or whose assignor actually used , any other trademark, trade 
name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21 , 1950 shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. 
"(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or 
services to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, 
symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of 
the [USOC] in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were 
donated, supplied, or furnished to or for the use of, approved, selected, or 
used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic or Pan-American team or 
team members. 
"(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name 'United 
States Olympic Committee'; the symbol described in subsection (a)( l ) of 
this section; the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and 
the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any combination 
thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this 
section." 
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join the SF AA's use of the word "Olympic." The District 
Court granted a temporary restraining order and then a pre-
liminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. After further proceedings, the District 
Court granted the USOC summary judgment and a perma-
nent injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court. 781 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1986). It found that the Act 
granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" with-
out requiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use 
was confusing and without regard to the defenses available to 
an entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham 
Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. It 
did not reach the SF AA's contention that the USOC enforced 
its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court 
found that the USOC is not a state actor bound by the con-
straints of the Constitution. The court also found that the 
USOC's "property righ[t] [in the word 'Olympic' and its asso-
ciated symbols and slogans] can be protected without violat-
ing the First Amendment." 781 F. 2d, at 737. The court 
denied the SF AA's petition for rehearing en bane. Three 
judges dissented, finding that the panel's interpretation of 
the Act raised serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 
1319, 1326 (CA9 1986). 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided 
by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. 
II 
The SF AA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting the Act as granting the USOC anything more 
than a normal trademark in the word "Olympic." "The 
starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 
--, -- (1986) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
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Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring)). 
Section 110 of the Act provides: · 
''Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who 
uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any 
goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibi-
tion, athletic performance, or competition-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius 
Fortius', or any combination or simulation thereof tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or 
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] 
for the remedies provided in the [Lanham] Act." 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a). 
The SF AA argues that the clause "tending to cause confu-
sion" is properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." But 
because there is no comma after "thereof," the more natural 
reading of the section is that "tending to cause confusion" 
modifies only "any combination or simulation thereof." Nev-
ertheless, we do not regard this language as conclusive. We 
therefore examine the legislative history of this section. 
Before Congress passed § 110 of the Act, unauthorized use 
of the word "Olympic" was punishable criminally. The rele-
vant statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be 
confusing. Instead, it made it a crime for: 
"any person . .. other than [the USOC] ... for the pur-
pose of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic perform-
ance, and competition or as an advertisement to induce 
the sale of any article whatsoever or attendance at any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and compe-
tition or for any business or charitable purpose to use 
... the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius 
Fortius' or any combination of these words." 64 Stat. 
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901, as amended, 36 U. S. C. §379 (1976 ed.) (emphasis 
added). 
The House Judiciary Committee drafted the language of§ 110 
that was ultimately adopted. The committee explained that 
the previous "criminal penalty has been found to be un-
workable as it requires the proof of a criminal intent." 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 15 (1978) (House Report). The 
chang~s from the criminal statute "were made in response to 
a letter from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Depart-
ment of Commerce," ibid., that the committee appended to 
the end of its report. This letter explained: 
"Section 110(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', and 
any combination thereof, but also any simulation or 
confusingly similar derivation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely 
suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic 
activity .... 
"Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from 
the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new 
prohibitions, e. g. words described in section ( a)( 4) tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive 
with respect to the [USOC] or any Olympic activity." 
Id., at 38 (emphasis added). 
This legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended 
to provide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the 
word "Olympic" without regard to whether an unauthorized 
use of the word tends to cause confusion. 
The SF AA further argues that the reference in § 110 to 
Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the . 
traditional trademark defenses as well. See 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1115(b). 5 This argument ignores the clear language of the 
5 Specifically, the SF AA argues that the USOC should not be able to 
prohibit its use of the word "Olympic" because its use "is descriptive of and 
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section. Also, this shorthand reference to remedies replaced 
an earlier draft's specific list of remedies typically available 
for trademark infringement, e. g., injunctive relief, recovery 
of profits, damages, costs and attorney's fees. See Lanham 
Act §§ 34, 35, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1116, 1117. This list contained 
no reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12865, 
12866 (1978) (proposed § 110(c)). Moreover, the USOC al-
ready held a trademark in the word "Olympic." App. 378-
382. Under the SF AA's interpretation, the Act would be 
largely superfluous. In sum, the language and legislative 
history of § 110 indicate clearly that Congress intended to 
grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without 
regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion, 
and that § 110 does not incorporate defenses available under 
the Lanham Act. 
III 
This Court has recognized that "[n]ational protect~on of 
trademarks is desirable . . . because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N Fly , 
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985). 
In the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., Congress es-
tablished a system for protecting such trademarks. Section 
45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods 
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by 
others." 15 U.S. C. § 1127. Under §32 of the Lanham Act, 
the owner of a trademark is protected from unauthorized 
uses that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or ·to deceive." § 1114(1)(a). Section 33 of the Lanham Act 
grants several statutory defenses to an alleged trademark 
infringer. § 1115. 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or serv-
ices." 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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The protection granted to the USOC's use of the Olympic 
words and symbols differs from the normal· trademark pro-
tection in two respects: the USOC need not prove that a con-
tested use is likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized 
user of the word does not have available the normal statutory 
defenses. 6 The SF AA argues, in effect, that the differences 
between the Lanham Act and § 110 are of constitutional di-
mension. First, the SF AA contends that the word "Olym-
pic" is a generic 7 word that could not gain trademark protec-
tion under the Lanham Act. The SF AA argues that this 
prohibition is constitutionally required and thus that the 
First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trade-
mark in the word "Olympic." Second, the SF AA argues 
that the Fil'st Amendment prohibits Congress from granting 
exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the author-
ized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause 
confusion. We address these contentions in turn. 
A 
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungi-
ble, and that the suppression of particular words "run[s] a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen 
v. Californi_a, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). The SFAA argues 
that this principle prohibits Congress from granting the 
USOC exclusive control of uses of the word "Olympic," a 
word that the SF AA views as generic. 8 Yet this recognition 
6 The user may, however, raise traditional equitable defenses, such as 
!aches. See Brief for Respondents 20, n. 17. 
7 A common descriptive name of a product or service is generic. Be-
cause a generic name by definition does not distinguish the identity of 
a particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark under the 
Lanham Act. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(c). See also 1 
J . McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1, p. 520 (1984). 
8 This grant by statute of exclusive use of distinctive words and symbols by 
Congress is not unique. Violation of some of these statutes may result in 
criminal penalties. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 705 (veterans' organizations); 
§ 706 (American National Red Cross); § 707 (4-H Club); § 711 ("Smokey 
Bear"); § 711a ("Woodsy Owl"). See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
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always has been balanced against the principle that when a 
word acquires value "as the result of organization and the ex-
penditure oflabor, skill, and money" by an entity, that entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the 
word. Interriational News Service v. Associated Press , 248 
U. S. 215, 239 (1918). See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 
92 (1879). 
There is no need in this case to decide whether Congress 
ever could grant a private entity exclusive use of a generic 
word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the com-
mercial and promotional value of the word "Olympic" was the 
product of the USOC's "own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense." Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,575 (1977). 
The USOC, together with respondent International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), have used the word "Olympic" at least 
since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games began. App. 
348. Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France, acting pursuant 
to a government commission, then proposed the revival of 
the ancient Olympic Games to promote international under-
standing. D. Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook 13 
(1975). Coubertin sought to identify the "spirit" of the 
ancient Olympic Games that had been corrupted by the influ-
ence of money and politics. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 4 (1976). 9 Cou-
A.P.W. Paper Co., Inc ., 328 U. S. 193 (1946) (reviewing application of ( 
Red Cross statute). Others, like the USOC statute, provide for civil en-
forcement . See, e. g., 36 U. S. C. § 18c (Daughters of the American 
Revolution); § 27 (Boy Scouts); § 36 (Girl Scouts); § 1086 (Little League 
Baseball); § 3305 (American National Theater and Academy). 
'The ancient Olympic Games were held from 776 B. C. until 393 A. D., 
when they were abolished by the Roman emperor Theodosius I. The 
Olympic Games were the most important in a "circuit" of sporting festivals. 
The "circuit" also included the Pythian Games at Delphi, the N emean 
Games at Nemea, and the Isthmian Games at Corinth. As these sporting 
festivals grew in importance, athletes turned from amateurs to true profes-
sionals, training all year and receiving substantial gifts and money from 
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bertin thus formed the IOC, that has established elaborate 
rules and procedures for the conduct of the modern Olympics. 
See Olympic Charter, Rules 26-69 (1985). In addition, these 
rules direct every national committee to protect the use of 
the Olympic flag, symbol, flame, and motto from unauthor-
ized use. Id., Bye-laws to Rules 6 and 53. 10 Under the IOC 
Charter, the USOC is the national olympic committee for the 
United States with the sole authority to represent the United 
States at the Olympic Games. 11 Pursuant to this authority, 
the USOC has used the Olympic words and symbols exten-
sively in this country to fulfill its object under the Olympic 
Charter of "ensur[ing] the development and safeguarding of 
the Olympic Movement and sport." Id., Rule 24. 
The history of the origins and associations of the word 
"Olympic" demonstrates the meritlessness of the SF AA's 
contention that Congress simply plucked a generic word out 
individuals and from their home cities. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 68-82 (1976); 25 Encyc. Brit. 
198 (15th ed. 1984). 
10 The Olympic flag was presented by Baron de Coubertin at the Con-
gress of Paris in 1914. It has a white background with five interlocking 
rings in the center. The rings with the colors blue, yellow, black, green 
and red, in that order, "symbolize the union of the five continents and the 
meeting of athletes from all over the world at the Olympic Games in a spirit 
of fair and frank competition and good friendship , the ideal preached by 
Baron de Coubertin." Olympic Charter, Rule 6 (1985). The Olympic 
rings alone are the Olympic symbol. Ibid. The Olympic flame is formally 
lit in Olympia under the auspices of the IOC. The Olympic motto is 
"Citius, Altius, Fortius," meaning "Faster, Higher, Stronger" and "ex-
presses the aspirations of the Olympic Movement." Ibid. The motto 
originated at an international conference on the principles of amateurism in 
sports organized by Coubertin and held in 1894 at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
A French delegate, Pere Henri-Martin Didon suggested as a motto the 
words engraved on the entrance to his lycee (school), Albert le Grand. 
Shortly thereafter, Coubertin founded the IOC, which adopted this motto. 
A. Guttmann, The Games Must Go On 13-14 (1984). 
11 The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing the more 
informally-organized American Olympic Committee. The USOC received 
its first corporate charter in 1950. 
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of the English vocabulary and granted its exclusive use to the 
USOC. Congress reasonably could find that since 1896, the 
word "Olympic" has acquired what in trademark law is 
lrnown as a secondary meaning-it "has become distinctive of 
[the USOC's] goods in commerce." Lanham Act, § 2(f), 15 
U. S. C. § 1052(f). See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S., at 194. The right to adopt and use 
such a word "to distinguish the goods or property [ of] the 
person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other 
persons, has been long recognized." Trade-Mark Cases, 
supra, at 92. Because Congress reasonably could conclude 
that the USOC has distinguished the word "Olympic" 
through its own efforts, Congress' decision to grant the 
USOC a limited property right in the word "Olympic" falls 
within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus cer-
tainly within constitutional bounds. 
B 
Congress also acted reasonably when it concluded that the 
USOC should not be required to prove that an unauthorized 
use of the word "Olympic" is likely to confuse the public. 12 
To the extent that § 110 applies to uses "for the purpose of 
trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services," 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a), its application is to commercial speech. 
Commercial speech "receives a limited form of First Amend-
ment protection." Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986); 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). Sec-
tion 110 also allows the USOC to prohibit the use of "Olym-
pic" for promotion of theatrical and athletic events. Al-
12 To the extent that § 110 regulates confusing uses, it is within normal 
trademark bounds. The Government constitutionally may regulate "de-
ceptive or misleading" commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1979). 
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though many of these promotional uses will be commercial 
speech, some uses may go beyond the "strictly business" con-
text. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). In 
this case, the SF AA claims that its use of the word "Olympic" 
was intended to convey a political statement about the status 
of homosexuals in society. 13 Thus, the SF AA claims that in 
this case § 110 suppresses political speech. 
By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, 
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SF AA 
from conveying its message. The SF AA held its athletic 
event in its planned format under the name "Gay Games I" 
and "Gay Games II" in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See 
n. 2, supra. Nor is it clear that § 110 restricts purely ex-
pressive uses of the word "Olympic." 14 Section 110 restricts 
13 According to the SF AA's president, the Gay Olympic Games would 
have offered three "very important opportunities": 
"1) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed 
minority. 
"2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable charac-
terization of gay men and women. 
"3) To attempt, through athletics , to bring about a positive and gradual 
assimilation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays , and to 
diminish the ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communi-
ties regardless of sexual orientation." App. 93. 
His expectations "were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to 
the event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of 'serious fun' 
would create a climate of friendship and co-operation [,] false images and 
misconceptions about gay people would decline as a result of a particpatory 
[ sic} educational process, and benefit ALL communities. " Id. , at 93-94. 
He thought "[t]he term 'Olympic' best describe[d] [the SF AA's] undertak-
ing" because it embodied the concepts of "peace, friendship and positive 
social interaction." Id., at 99. 
,. One court has found that § 110 does not prohibit the use of the Olympic 
logo of five interlocking rings and the Olympic torch on a poster expressing 
opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, 
New York, into a prison. The court found that the use of the symbols did 
not fit the commercial or promotional definition of uses in § 110. Stop the 
Olympic Prison v. United St,ates Olympic Committee , 489 F . Supp. 1112, 
1118-1121 (SDNY 1980). 
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only the manner in which the SF AA may convey its message. 
The restrictions on expressive speech properly are character-
ized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of en-
couraging and rewarding the USOC's activities. 15 The ap-
propriate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions 
on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to 
further a substantial governmental interest. United States 
v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). 16 
One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive con-
trol of the word "Olympic", as with other trademarks, is to 
ensure that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts 
so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to pro-
duce a "quality product," that, in turn, benefits the public. 
See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§2:1, pp. 44-47 (1984). But in the special circumstance of 
the USOC, Congress has a broader public interest in promot-
ing, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of 
16 JUSTICE BRENNAN finds the Act unconstitutionally overbroad. But 
on its face, it applies primarily to commercial speech, to which the applica-
tion of the overbreadth doctrine is highly questionable. See Ohralik v. 
Ohio St,ate Bar Assn ., 436 U. S. 447, 462, n. 20 (citing Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380 (1977)). There is no basis in the record to be-
lieve that the Act will be interpreted or applied to infringe significantly on 
noncommercial speech rights. The application of the Act to the SF AA is 
well within constitutional bounds, and the extent to which the Act may be 
read to apply to noncommercial speech is limited. We find no "realistic 
danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized 
First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court." · City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 (1984). Accord-
ingly, we decline to apply the overbreadth doctrine to this case. 
16 A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if 
the government's interest in the restriction is substantial, directly ad-
vances the government's asserted interest, and is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Servi.ce Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). Both this 
test, and the test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O'Brien 
require a balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of 
the speech restriction. Because their application to these facts is substan-
tially similar, they will be discussed together. 
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amateur athletes from the United States in "the great four-
yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games." Olympic Char-
ter, Rule 1 (1985). The USOC's goal under the Olympic 
Charter, Rule 24(B), is to further the Olympic movement, 
that has as its aims: "to promote the development of those 
physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sport"; "to 
educate young people through sport in a spirit of better un-
derstanding between each other and of friendship, thereby 
helping to build a better and more peaceful world"; and "to 
spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby 
creating international goodwill." Id., Rule 1. See also id., 
Rule 11 (aims of the IOC). Congress' interests in promoting 
the USOC's activities include these purposes as well as those 
specifically enumerated in the USOC's charter. 17 Section 
17 The objects and purposes of the USOC are to: 
"(l) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encour-
age the attainment of those goals; 
"(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United 
States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, 
so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related 
organizations; 
"(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constit -
uent members of committees, over matters pertaining to the participation 
of the United States in the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games, 
including the representation of the United States in such games, and over 
the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when 
held in the United States; 
"(4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the 
appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur repre-
sentation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and 
of the Pan-American Games; 
"(5) promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the 
United States and foreign nations; 
"(6) promote and encourage physical fitness and public participation in 
amateur athletic activities; 
"(7) assist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the devel-
opment of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes; 
"(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving 
amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organiza-
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110 directly advances these governmental interests by sup-
plying the USOC with the means to raise money to support 
the Olympics and encourages the USOC's activities by ensur-
ing that it will receive the benefits of its efforts. 
The restrictions of § 110 are not broader than Congress 
reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further 
these interests. Section 110 primarily applies to all uses of 
the word "Olympic" to induce the sale of goods or services. 
Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing 
uses, Congress' judgment respecting a certain word is not so 
limited. Congress reasonably could conclude that most com-
mercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to 
be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized 
uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the 
USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commer-
cial value of the marks. See Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) 
tions, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, 
manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic 1 
competition; 
"(9) foster the development of amateur athletic facilities for use by 
amateur athletes and assist in making existing amateur athletic facilities 
available for use by amateur athletes; 
"(10) provide and coordinate technical information on physical training, 
equipment design, coaching, and performance analysis; 
"(11) encourage and support research, development, and dissemination 
of information in the areas of sports medicine and sports safety; 
"(12) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for 
women; 
"(13) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs 
and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible , the 
expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by handicapped in-
dividuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals; 
and 
"(14) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletes of racial and 
ethnic minorities for the purpose of eliciting the participation of such mi-
norities in amateur athletic activities in which they are underrepresented." 
36 U. S. C. § 374. 
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(one injury to a trademark owner may be "the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the 
public mind of the mark or name" by nonconfusing uses). 
In this case, the SF AA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, 
bumper stickers and other items, all emblazoned with the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." The possibility for confusion as 
to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the 
SF AA sought to exploit the "commercial magnetism," see 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg . Co. v. S.S . Kresge Co. , 
316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), of the word given value by the 
USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized _use 
could undercut the USOC's efforts to use, and sell the right 
to use, the word in the future, since much of the word's value 
comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the 
USOC's activities is directly contrary to Congress' interest. 
Even though this protection may exceed the traditional 
rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the 
application of the Act to this commercial speech is not 
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congres-
sional interest and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendment. 
Section 110 also extends to promotional uses of the word 
"Olympic," even if the promotion is not to induce the sale of 
goods. Under§ 110, the USOC may prohibit purely promo-
tional uses of the word only when the promotion relates to an 
athletic or theatrical event. The USOC created the value of 
the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. 
Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other 
entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge 
on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. The 
SF AA's proposed_ use of the word is an excellent example. 
The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place over a 9-day 
period and were to be held in different locations around the 
world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with 
uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an "Olympic 
anthem" and "Olympic Committee," the award of gold, silver, 
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and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three 
overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the 
modern-day Olympics,· not the Olympic Games that occurred 
in ancient Greece. 18 The image the SF AA sought to invoke 
was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. 
The SF AA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced 
from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it. The 
mere fact that the SF AA claims an expressive, as opposed to 
a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amend-
ment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those 
who have sown." International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U. S., at 239-240. 19 The USOC's right to prohibit 
18 The ancient Olympic Games lasted five days, whereas the modern 
Olympics last for 10 days. The ancient Games always took place in Olym-
pia in southern Greece; the modern Olympic Games normally move from 
city to city every four years. (As an effort to reduce nationalism, cities, as 
opposed to countries, host the modern Olympic Games.) In ancient 
Greece there may have been a burning fire for religious sacrifice, since the 
Olympic Games were part of a religious festival. See The Odes of Pindar 
Olympia 8, 11. 1-9, p. 25 (R. Lattimore trans. , 2d ed. 1976). The torch re-
lay, however, was an innovation of the modern Olympic Committee. The 
closest parallel to the modern opening parade is the opening of the ancient 
Games with the chariot race. As the chariots entered the arena and 
passed the judges, a herald called out the names of the owner, his father, 
and his city. See Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8, at 27. There was no gen-
eral parade of athletes by locality, as in the modern Games, and the ath-
letes were naked, not uniformed. Athletes were eligible only if they were 
male, freeborn Greeks. There is no indication that the ancient Olympics 
included an "Olympic anthem" or were organized by an entity called an 
"Olympic Committee." The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of 
wild olive, rather than the gold, silver, and bronze medals presented at the 
modern Olympics. The logo of overlapping rings was created by the In-
ternational Olympic Committee. See n. 8, supra. See generally The 
Olympics: A Book of Lists 10-13 (J. Beilenson & N. Beilenson eds. 1984); 
Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8; 25 Encyc. Brit. 197-201 (15th ed. 1984). 
'"The SF AA claims a superior right to the use of the word "Olympic" 
because it is a nonprofit corporation and its athletic event was not orga-
nized for the primary purpose of commercial gain. But when the question 
is the scope of a legitimate property right in a word, the SF AA's distinc-
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use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events 
is at the core of its legitimate property right. 20 
IV 
The SF AA argues that even if the exclusive use granted by 
§ 110 does not violate the First Amendment, the USOC's en-
forcement of that right is discriminatory in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 21 The fundamental inquiry is whether 
the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions 
of the Constitution apply. 22 The USOC is a "private cor-
tion is inapposite. As this Court has noted in the analogous context of 
"fair use" under the Copyright Act: 
"The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the [protected] material without paying the customary 
price." Harper & Row Publishers , Inc. v. Nation E nterprises, 471 U. S. 
539, 562 (1985). 
Here, the SF AA's proposed use of the word "Olympic" was a clear attempt 
to exploit the imagery and goodwill created by the USOC. 
00 Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the pri-
mary use of the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress rea-
sonably could have found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote 
such a production, it would implicate the value given to the word by the 
usoc. 
21 The SF AA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its discriminatory 
enforcement claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a 
State. The claimed association in this case is between the USOC and the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply to the Federal Gov-
ernment and contains an equal protection component. !Jolting v. Sharpe, 
347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to equal protec-
tion claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. " Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld , 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 
(1976) (per curiam). The SF AA raised the issue of discriminatory en-
forcement in its petition for certiorari, and both parties have briefed the 
issue fully. Accordingly, we address the claim as one under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
22 Because we find no governmental action, we need not address the mer-
its of the SF AA's discriminatory enforcement claim. We note, however, 
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poratio[n] established under Federal law." 36 U. S. C. 
§ 1101(46).zi In the Act, Congress granted the USOC a cor-
porate charter, § 371, imposed certain requirements on the 
USOC, 24 and provided for some USOC funding through exclu-
that the SF AA's claim of discriminatory enforcement is far from compel-
ling. As of 1982 when this suit began, the USOC had brought 22 opposi-
tions to trademark applications and one petition to cancel. App. 61. For 
example, the USOC successfully prohibited registration of the mark 
"Golden Age Olympics." Id. , at 383. The USOC also litigated numerous 
suits prior to bringing this action, prohibiting use of the Olympic words and 
symbols by such entities as the National Amateur Sports Foundation, id., 
at 392, a shoe company, id., at 395, the International Federation of Body 
Builders, id. , at 443, and a bus company, id., at 439. Since 1982, the 
USOC has brought a number of additional suits against various companies 
and the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, id. , at 437, and Brief 
for Respondents 41, n. 58. The USOC has authorized the use of the word 
"Olympic" to organizations that sponsor athletic competitions and events 
for handicapped persons ("Special Olympics") and for youth ("Junior Olym-
pics" and "Explorer Olympics"). App. 33, 181. Both of these uses di-
rectly relate to a purpose of the USOC established by its charter. See 36 
U. S. C. § 374(7), (13), reprinted ante, at-, n. 15. The USOC has not 
consented to any other uses of the word in connection with athletic compe-
titions or events. App. 33. 
The USOC necessarily has discretion as to when and against whom it 
files opposition to trademark applications, and when and against whom it 
institutes suits. The record before us strongly indicates that the USOC 
has acted strictly in accord with its charter and that there has been no ac-
tionable discrimination. 
23 As such, the USOC is listed with 69 other federally-created private 
corporations such as the American Legion, Big Brothers-Big Sisters of 
America, Daughters of the American Revolution, Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the United States, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Na-
tional Ski Patrol System, Inc. 36 U. S. C. § 1101. It hardly need be said 
that if federally created private corporations were to be viewed as govern-
mental rather than private actors, the consequences would be far-reaching. 
Apart from subjecting these private entities to suits under the equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, pre-
sumably-by analogy-similar types of nonprofit corporations established 
under state law could be viewed as governmental actors subject to such 
suits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
24 For example, the USOC may amend its constitution only after provid-
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sive use of the Olympic words and symbols, § 380, and 
through direct grants. 25 
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does 
not render the USOC a government agent. All corporations 
act under charters granted by a government, usually by a 
State. They do not thereby lose their essentially private 
character. Even extensive regulation by the government 
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into 
those of the government. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974). Nor is the fact that Congress 
has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" 
dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are cre-
ated by some governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute 
or the common law. The actions of the trademark owners 
nevertheless remain private. Moreover, the intent on the 
part of Congress to help the USOC obtain funding does not 
change the analysis. The Government may subsidize private 
entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for 
their actions. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982); 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 840 (1982). 
This Court also has found action to be governmental action 
when the challenged entity performs functions that have 
been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of the Federal 
Government. Id., at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., supra, at 353; quoted in Blum v. Yaretsky , 
ing an opportunity for notice and hearing, § 375(b); the USOC must allow 
for reasonable representation in its membership of certain groups, § 376(b); 
the USOC must remain nonpolitical, § 377; and the USOC must report on 
its operations and expenditures of grant monies to Congress each year, 
§382a. 
2.S The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce for yearly grants 
not to exceed a total of $16,000,000, § 384(a), but it has never done so. See 
Brief for Respondent 46. The only direct federal funding that the USOC 
has received is a $10 million grant in 1980, characterized by Congress as "a 
form of disaster payment"· to help the USOC recover from the losses result-
ing from the boycoU of the Moscow Olympics. See S. Rep. No. 96-829, 
p. 241 (1980); Act of July 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 857, 898. 
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supra, at 1011)) (emphasis added by Rendell-Baker Court). 
Certainly the activities performed by the USOC serve a na-
tional interest, as its objects and purposes of incorporation 
indicate. See n. 15, supra. The fact "[t]hat a private entity 
performs a function which serves the public does not make 
its acts [governmental] action." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
supra, at 842. The Amateur Sports Act was enacted "to cor-
rect the disorganization and the serious factional disputes 
that seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States." 
House Report, at 8. See Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 
F. 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-770, pp. 2-3 
(1978)). The Act merely authorized the USOC to coordinate 
activities that always have been performed by private enti-
ties. 26 Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur 
sports has been a traditional governmental function. 27 
211 The Commission that recommended the current USOC powers "made 
it clear that it did not want the Federal Government directing amateur ath-
letics in this country. " House Report, at 9. 
'l7 The dissent does not rely on the fact that the USOC is chartered by 
Congress to find governmental action in this case. Post , at --. Jus-
TICE BRENNAN attempts to distinguish the USOC from other private cor-
porations that are chartered by Congress on the ground that the USOC 
performs the "distinctive, traditional governmental function" of "repre-
sent[ing] this Nation to the world community." Post, at--. But ab-
sent the additional element of governmental control, this representational 
function can hardly be called traditionally governmental. All sorts of pri-
vate organizations send "national representatives" to participate in world 
competitions. Although many are of interest only to a select group, oth-
ers, like the Davis Cup Competition, the America's Cup, and the Miss Uni-
verse Pageant, are widely viewed as involving representation of our coun-
try. The organizations that sponsor United States participation in these 
events all perform "national .. . representational," as well as "adminis-
trative [and] adjudicative role[s] ," see post, at--, in selecting and pre-
senting the national representatives. 
As with the corporate charter, the dissent acknowledges that the repre-
sentational role of the USOC is not dispositive. Post, at--. According 
to the dissent, the Olympic Games are ''unique [because] at stake are sig-
nificant national interests that stem not only from pageantry but from poli-
tics. " Ibid. The dissent then relies primarily on the sequence of events 
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Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government 
"normally can be held responsible for a private decision only 
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 
preceding the USOC's decision not to send athletes to the 1980 summer 
Olympics as demonstrating ''the impact and interrelationship of USOC de-
cisions on the definition and pursuit of the national interest." Post, at 
But the governmental influence on that particular decision of the 
USOC is hardly representative in view of the absence of such influence on 
the vast majority of USOC decisions. Moreover, even the unique se-
quence of events in 1980 confirms that the USOC cannot properly be con-
sidered a governmental agency. Although the President and Congress in-
dicated their view that United States athletes should not go to the Moscow 
Olympics, this was not the end of the matter. The President thought it 
would be necessary to take "legal actions ... [if] necessary" to prevent the 
USOC from sending a team to Moscow. See 1 Public Papers of the Presi-
dents , Jimmy Carter 1980-1981, at 636 (1981). Previously, the Attorney 
General had indicated that the President believed that he had the power 
under the Emergency Powers Act, 50 U. S. C. § 1701, to bar travel to an 
area that he considered to pose a threat of national emergency. See 
Washington Post, April 11 , 1980, p. Al. The President's statement indi-
cated a clear recognition that neither he nor Congress could control the 
USOC's actions directly. A district court, confronted with the question of 
whether the decision not to send athletes to the 1980 Olympics was state 
action, noted: 
"The USOC is an independent body, and nothing in its chartering statute 
gives the federal government the right to control that body or its officers. 
Furthermore, the facts here do not indicate that the federal government 
was able to exercise any type of "de facto" control over the USOC. The 
USOC decided by a secret ballot of its House of Delegates. The federal 
government may have had the power to prevent the athletes from partici-
pating in the Olympics even if the USOC had voted to allow them to par-
ticipate, but it did not have the power to make them vote in a certain way. 
All it had was the power of persuasion. We cannot equate this with con-
trol. To do so in cases of this type would be to open the door and usher the 
courts into what we believe is a largely nonjusticiable realm, where they 
would find themselves in the untenable position of determining whether a 
certain level, intensity, or type of 'Presidential' or 'Administrative' or 'po-
litical' pressure amounts to sufficient control over a private entity so as to 
invoke federal juri&diction." DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Com-
mittee, 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D DC), affd. mem., 701 F. 2d 221 (CADC 1980). 
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choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]." Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 
163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 
170 (1970). The USOC's choice of how to enforce its exclu-
sive right to use the word "Olympic" simply is not a govern-
mental decision. 28 There is no evidence that the Federal 
Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise 
of its right. At most, the Federal Government, by failing to 
supervise the USOC's use of its rights, can be said to exercise 
"[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives" of the 
USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at 1004-1005. This is 
not enough to make the USOC's actions those of the Govern-
ment. Ibid. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 
164-165; Jackson v. Metro-politan Edison Co., supra, at 
357. 29 Because the USOC is not a governmental actor, the 
SF AA's claim that the USOC has enforced its rights in a dis-
criminatory manner must fail. 30 
In sum, we remain unconvinced that the functions that the USOC per-
forms can be viewed as "governmental" action. 
28 In fact, the Olympic Charter provides that the USOC "must be autono-
mous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a 
political, religious or economic nature. " Rule 24. 
29 For all of the same reasons indicated above, we reject the SF AA's ar-
gument that the United States Government should be viewed as a "joint 
participant" in the SF AA's efforts to enforce its right to use the word 
"Olympic." See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 
725 (1961). The SF AA has failed to demonstrate that the Federal Govern-
ment can or does exert any influence over the exercise of the USOC's en-
forcement decisions. Absent proof of this type of "close nexus between 
the [Government] and the challenged action of the [USOC]," the challenged 
action may not be "fairly treated as that of the [Government] itself. " 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 351 (1974). 
10 In its petition for certiorari, the SF AA argued only that because the 
USOC is a "state actor" •it is prohibited from "selecting among diverse 
potential users of the word 'Olympic', based upon speech-suppressing and 
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V 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
invidiously discriminatory motives." Pet. for Cert. i. The SF AA now 
argues that under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), the District 
Court's entry of the injunction prohibiting the SF AA's use of the word 
'Olympic" constitutes governmental action sufficient to require a constitu-
tional inquiry into the USOC's motivation in seeking the injunction. This 
new theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed within the 
questions presented and thus is not properly before the Court. See this 
Court's Rule 21.l(a). 
. ' .:..,. 
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In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of 
a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-396, that authorizes the United States Olympic Com-
mittee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of 
the word "Olympic." 
I 
Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SF AA) is 
a nonprofit California corporation. 1 The SF AA originally 
sought to incorporate under the name "Golden Gate Olympic 
Association," but was told by the California Department of 
Corporations that the word "Olympic" could not appear in a 
corporate title. App. 95. After its incorporation in 1981, 
the SF AA nevertheless began to promote the "Gay Olympic 
Games," using those words on its letterheads and mailings 
and in local newspapers. Ibid. The Games were to be a 9-
day event to begin in August 1982, in San Francisco, Califor-
nia. The SF AA expected athletes from hundreds of cities in 
this country and from cities all over the world. Id., at 402. 
The Games were to open with a ceremony "which will rival 
the traditional Olympic Games." Id., at 354. See id., at 
1 The SF AA's president, Dr. Thomas F. Waddell, is also a petitioner. 
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402, 406, 425. A relay of over 2,000 runners would carry 
a torch from New York City across the country to Kezar 
Stadium in San Francisco. Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The 
final runner would enter the stadium with the "Gay Olympic 
Torch" and light the "Gay Olympic Flame." Id., at 357. 
The ceremony would continue with the athletes marching in 
uniform into the stadium behind their respective city flags. 
Id., at 354, 357, 402, 404, 414. Competition was to occur in 
18 different contests, with the winners receiving gold, silver, 
and bronze medals. Id., at 354-355, 359, 407, 410. To 
cover the cost of the planned Games, the SF AA sold T-shirts, 
buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." Id., at 67, 94, 107, 113-114, 
167, 360, 362, 427-428. 2 
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act (Act), 92 Stat. 3048, 
36 U. S. C. §380, grants respondent United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) 3 the right to prohibit certain commercial 
and promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and various 
Olympic symbols. 4 In late December 1981, the executive 
2 The 1982 athletic event ultimately was held under the name "Gay 
Games I." App. 473. A total of 1,300 men and women from 12 countries, 
27 States, and 179 cities participated. Id., at 475. The "Gay Games II" 
were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating from 17 
countries. Brief for Respondent 8. The 1990 "Gay Games" are scheduled 
to occur in Vancouver, B. C. Ibid. 
3 The International Olympic Committee is also a respondent. 
• Section 110 of the Act, as set forth in 36 U. S. C. § 380, provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the pur-
pose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
"(!) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 
5 interlocking rings; 
"(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a 
blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 
5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief; 
"(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely repre-
senting association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic 
Committee or the [USOC]; or 
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director of the USOC wrote to the SF AA, informing it of the 
existence of the Amateur Sports Act, and requesting that the 
SF AA immediately terminate use of the word "Olympic" in 
its description of the planned Games. The SF AA at first 
agreed to substitute the word "Athletic" for the word "Olym-
pic," but, one month later, resumed use of the term. The 
USOC became aware that the SF AA was still advertising its 
Games as "Olympic" through a newspaper article in May 
1982. In August, the USOC brought suit in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California to en-
"(4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', or any com-
bination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, 
to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies 
provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the 
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) [15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq.]. How-
ever, any person who actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this 
section, or the. words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who 
actually used, or whose assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade 
name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of 
this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950 shall not be 
prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same 
purpose and for the same goods or services. 
"(b) . The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or 
services to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, 
symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of 
the [USOC] in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were 
donated, supplied, or furnished to or for the use of, approved, selected, or 
used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic or Pan-American team or 
team members. 
"(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name 'United · 
States Olympic Committee'; the symbol described in subsection (a)(l) of 
this section; the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and 
the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any combination 
thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this 
section." 
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join the SF AA's use of the word "Olympic." The District 
Court granted a temporary restraining order and then a pre-
liminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. After further proceedings, the District 
Court granted the USOC summary judgment and a perma-
nent injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court. 781 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1986). It found that the Act 
granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" with-
o:ut requiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use 
was confusing and without regard to the defenses available to 
an entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham 
Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. It 
did not reach the SF AA's contention that the USOC enforced 
its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court 
found that the USOC is not a state actor bound by the con-
straints of the Constitution. The court also found that the 
USOC's "property righ[t] [in the word 'Olympic' and its asso-
ciated symbols and slogans] can be protected without violat-
ing the First Amendment." 781 F. 2d, at 737. The court 
denied the SF AA's petition for rehearing en bane. Three 
judges dissented, finding that the panel's interpretation of 
the Act raised serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 
1319, 1326 (CA9 1986). 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided 
by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. 
II 
The SF AA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting the Act as granting the USOC anything more 
than a normal trademark in the word "Olympic. " . "The 
starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 
--, -- (1986) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
86-270---0PINION 
SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0 . C. 5 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring)). 
Section 110 of the Act provides: 
"Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who 
uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any 
goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibi-
tion, athletic performance·, or competition-
"( 4) the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius 
Fortius', or any combination or simulation thereof tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or 
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any 
Olympic activity; 
"shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] 
for the remedies provided in the [Lanham] Act." 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a). 
The SF AA argues that the clause "tending to cause confu-
sion" is properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." But 
because there is no comma after "thereof," the more natural 
reading of the section is that "tending to cause confusion" 
modifies only "any combination or simulation thereof." Nev-
ertheless, we do not regard this language as conclusive. We 
therefore examine the legislative history of this section. 
Before Congress passed § 110 of the Act, unauthorized use 
of the word "Olympic" was punishable criminally. The rele-
vant statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be 
confusing. Instead, it made it a crime for: 
"any person ... other than [the USOC] ... for the pur-
pose of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic perform-
ance, and competition or as an advertisement to induce 
the sale of any article whatsoever or attendance at any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and compe-
tition or for any business or charitable purpose to use 
... the words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', or 'Citius Altius 
Fortius' or any combination of these words." 64 Stat. 
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901, as amended, 36 U. S. C. § 379 (1976 ed.) (emphasis 
added). 
The House Judiciary Committee drafted the language of§ 110 
that was ultimately adopted. The committee explained that 
the previous "criminal penalty has been found to be un-
workable as it requires the proof of a criminal intent." 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 15 (1978) (House Report). The 
changes from the criminal statute "were made in response to 
a letter from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Depart-
ment of Commerce," ibid., that the committee appended to 
the end of its report. This letter explained: 
"Section 110(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the 
words 'Olympic', 'Olympiad', 'Citius Altius Fortius', and 
any combination thereof, but also any simulation or 
confusingly similar derivation thereof tending to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely 
suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic 
activity .... 
"Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from 
the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new 
prohibitions, e.g. words described in section (a)(4) tend-
ing to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive 
with respect to the [USOC] or any Olympic activity." 
Id., at 38 (emphasis added). 
This legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended 
to provide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the 
word "Olympic" without regard to whether an unauthorized 
use of the word tends to cause confusion. 
The SFAA further argues that the reference in § 110 to 
Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the 
traditional trademark defenses as well. See 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1115(b). 5 This argument ignores the clear language of the 
• Specifically,- the SF AA argues that the USOC should not be able to 
prohibit its use of the word "Olympic" because its use "is descriptive of and 
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section. Also, this shorthand reference to remedies replaced 
· an earlier draft's specific list of remedies typically available 
for trademark infringement, e.g., injunctive relief, recovery 
of profits, damages, costs and attorney's fees. See Lanham 
Act §§34, 35, 15 U.S. C. §§ 1116, 1117. This list contained 
no reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12865, 
12866 (1978) (proposed· § ll0(c)). Moreover, the USOC al-
ready held a trademark in the word "Olympic." App. 378-
382. Under the SF AA's interpretation, the Act would be 
largely superfluous. In sum, the language and legislative 
history of § 110 indicate clearly that Congress intended to 
grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without 
regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion, 
and that § 110 does not incorporate defenses available under 
the Lanham Act. 
III 
This Court has recognized that "[n]ational protection of 
trademarks is desirable ... because trademarks foster com-
. petition and · the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N Fly, 
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985). 
In the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., Congress es-
tablished a system for protecting such trademarks. Section 
45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify and dis-
tinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others." 15 U. S. C. § 1127 (1982 
ed., Supp. III). Under § 32 of the Lanham Act, the owner of 
a trademark is protected from unauthorized uses that are 
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 
§ 1114(1)(a). Section 33 of the Lanham Act grants several 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or serv-
ices." 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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statutory defenses to an alleged trademark infringer. 
§ 1115. 
The protection granted to the USOC's use of the Olympic 
words and symbols differs from the normal trademark pro-
tection in two respects: the USOC need not prove that a con-
tested use is likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized 
user of the word does not have available the normal statutory 
defenses. 6 The SF AA argues, in effect, that the differences 
between the Lanham Act and § 110 are of constitutional di-
mension. First, the SF AA contends that the word "Olym-
pic" is a generic 7 word that could not gain trademark protec-
tion under the Lanham Act. The SF AA argues that this 
prohibition is constitutionally required and thus that the 
First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trade-
mark in the word "Olympic." Second, the SF AA argues 
that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting 
exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the author-
ized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause 
confusion. We address these contentions in turn. 
A 
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungi-
ble, and that the suppression of particular words "run[s] a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen 
v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971). The SFAA argues 
that this principle prohibits Congress from granting the 
USOC exclusive control of uses of the word "Olympic," a 
•The user may, however, raise traditional equitable defenses, such as 
!aches. See Brief for Respondents 20, n. 17. 
1 A common descriptive name of a product or service is generic. Be-
cause a generic name by definition does not distinguish the identity of 
a particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark under the 
Lanham Act. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(c). See also 1 
J . McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1, p. 520 (1984). 
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word that the SF AA views as generic. 8 Yet this recognition 
always has been balanced against the principle that when a 
word acquires value "as the result of organization and the ex-
penditure of labor, skill, and money" by an entity, that entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the 
word. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 
U. S. 215, 239 (1918). See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 
92 (1879). 
There is no need in this case to decide whether Congress 
ever could grant a private entity exclusive use of a generic 
word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the com-
mercial and promotional value of the word "Olympic" was the 
product of the USOC's "own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense." Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562,575 (1977). 
The USOC, together with respondent International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), have used the word "Olympic" at least 
since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games began. App. 
348. Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France, acting pursuant 
to a government commission, then proposed the revival of 
the ancient Olympic Games to promote international under-
standing. D. Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook 13 
(1975). Coubertin sought to identify the "spirit" of the 
ancient Olympic Games that had been corrupted by the influ-
ence of money and politics. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
8 This grant by statute of exclusive use of distinctive words and symbols by 
Congress is not unique. Violation of some of these statutes may result in 
criminal penalties. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. § 705 (veterans' organizations); 
§ 706 (American National Red Cross); § 707 (4-H Club); § 711 ("Smokey 
Bear"); § 711a ("Woodsy Owl"). See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
A.P.W. Paper Co., Inc., 328 U. S. 193 (1946) (reviewing application of 
Red Cross statute). Others, like the USOC statute, provide for civil en-
forcement. See, e.g., 36 U. S. C. § 18c (Daughters of the American 
Revolution); § 27 (Boy Scouts); § 36 (Girl Scouts); § 1086 (Little League 
Baseball); § 3305 (American National Theater and Academy). 
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Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 4 (1976). 9 Cou-
bertin thus formed the IOC, that has established elaborate 
rules and procedures for the conduct of the modern Olympics. 
See Olympic Charter, Rules 26-69 (1985). In addition, these 
rules direct every national committee to protect the use of 
the Olympic flag, symbol, flame, and motto from unauthor-
ized use. Id., Bye-laws to Rules 6 and 53. 10 Under the IOC 
Charter, the USOC is the national olympic committee for the 
United States with the sole authority to represent the United 
States at the Olympic Games. 11 Pursuant to this authority, 
9 The ancient Olympic Games were held from 776 B. C. until 393 A. D., 
when they were abolished by the Roman emperor Theodosius I. The 
Olympic Games were the most important in a "circuit" of sporting festivals. 
The "circuit" also included the Pythian Games at Delphi, the Nemean 
Games at N emea, and the Isthmian Games at Corinth. As these sporting 
festivals grew in importance, athletes turned from amateurs to true profes-
sionals, training all year and receiving substantial gifts and money from 
individuals and from their home cities. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The 
Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 68-82 (1976); 25 Encyc. Brit. 
198 (15th ed. 1984). 
10 The Olympic flag was presented by Baron de Coubertin at the Con-
gress of Paris in 1914. It has a white background with five interlocking 
rings in the center. The rings with the colors blue, yellow, black, green 
and red, in that order, "symbolize the union of the five continents and the 
meeting of athletes from all over the world at the Olympic Games in a spirit 
of fair and frank competition and good friendship, the ideal preached by 
Baron de Coubertin." Olympic Charter, Rule 6 (1985). The Olympic 
rings alone are the Olympic symbol. Ibid. The Olympic flame is formally 
lit in Olympia under the auspices of the IOC. The Olympic motto is 
"Citius, Altius, Fortius," meaning "Faster, Higher, Stronger" and "ex-
presses the aspirations of the Olympic Movement." Ibid. The motto 
originated at an international conference on the principles of amateurism in 
sports organized by Coubertin and held in 1894 at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
A French delegate, Pere Henri-Martin Didon suggested as a motto the 
words engraved on the entrance to his lycee (school), Albert le Grand. 
Shortly thereafter, Coubertin founded the IOC, which adopted this motto. 
A. Guttmann, The Games Must Go On 13-14 (1984). 
"The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing the more 
informally-organized American Olympic Committee. The USOC received 
its first corporate charter in 1950. 
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the USOC has used the Olympic words and symbols exten-
sively in this country to fulfill its object under the Olympic 
Charter of "ensur[ing] the development and safeguarding of 
the Olympic Movement and sport." Id., Rule 24. 
The history of the origins and associations of the word 
"Olympic" demonstrates the meritlessness of the SF AA's 
contention that Congress simply plucked a generic word out 
of the English vocabulary and granted its exclusive use to the 
USOC. Congress reasonably could find that since 1896, the 
word "Olympic" has acquired what in trademark law is 
known as a secondary meaning-it "has become distinctive of 
[the USOC's] goods in commerce." Lanham Act, § 2(f), 15 
U. S. C. § 1052(f). See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S., at 194. The right to adopt and use 
such a word "to distinguish the goods or property [ of] the 
person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other 
persons, has been long recognized." Trade-Mark Cases, 
supra, at 92. Because Congress reasonably could conclude 
that the USOC has distinguished the word "Olympic" 
through its own efforts, Congress' decision to grant the 
USOC a limited property right in the word "Olympic" falls 
within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus cer-
tainly within constitutional bounds. 
B 
Congress also acted reasonably when it concluded that the 
USOC should not be required to prove that an unauthorized 
use of the word "Olympic" is likely to confuse the public. 12 
To the extent that § 110 applies to uses "for the purpose of 
trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services," 36 
U. S. C. § 380(a), its application is to commercial speech. 
12 To the extent that § 110 regulates confusing uses, it is within normal 
-trademark bounds. The Government constitutionally may regulate "de-
ceptive or misleading" commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1979). 
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Commercial speech "receives a limited form of First Amend-
ment protection." Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986); 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). Sec-
tion 110 also allows the USOC to prohibit the use of "Olym-
pic" for promotion of theatrical and athletic events. Al-
though many of these promotional uses will be commercial 
speech, some uses may go beyond the "strictly business" con-
text. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). In 
this case, the SF AA claims that its use of the word "Olympic" 
was intended to convey a political statement about the status 
of homosexuals in society. 13 Thus, the SF AA claims that in 
this case § 110 suppresses political speech. 
By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, 
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SF AA 
from conveying its message. The SF AA held its athletic 
event in its planned format under the name "Gay Games I" 
and "Gay Games 11" in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See 
n. 2, supra. Nor is it clear that § 110 restricts purely ex-
13 According to the SF AA's president, the Gay Olympic Games would 
have offered three "very important opportunities": 
"1) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed 
minority. 
"2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable charac-
terization of gay men and women. 
"3) To attempt, through athletics, to bring about a positive and gradual 
assimilation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays, and to 
diminish the ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communi-
ties regardless of sexual orientation." App. 93. 
His expectations "were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to 
the event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of 'serious fun' 
would create a climate of friendship and co-operation [,] false images and 
misconceptions about gay people would decline as a result of a particpatory 
[ sic] educational process, and benefit ALL communities. " Id. , at 93-94. 
He thought "[t]he term 'Olympic' best describe[d] [the SF AA's] undertak-
ing" because it embodied the concepts of "peace, friendship and positive 
social interaction." Id., at 99. 
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pressive uses of the word "Olympic." 14 Section 110 restricts 
only the manner in which the SF AA may convey its message. 
The restrictions on expressive speech properly are character-
ized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of en-
couraging and rewarding the USOC's activities. 15 The ap-
propriate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions 
on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to 
further a substantial governmental interest. United States 
v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). 16 
One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive con-
trol of the word "Olympic", as with other trademarks, is to 
1
• One court has found that § 110 does not prohibit the use of the Olympic 
logo of five interlocking rings and the Olympic torch on a poster expressing 
opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, 
New York, into a prison. The court found that the use of the symbols did 
not fit the commercial or promotional definition of uses in § 110. Stop the 
Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. 1112, 
1118-1121 (SDNY 1980). 
15 JUSTICE BRENNAN finds the Act unconstitutionally overbroad. But 
on its face, it applies primarily to commercial speech, to which the applica-
tion of the overbreadth doctrine is highly questionable. See Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 462, n. 20 (1978) (citing Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380 (1977)). There is no basis in the record 
to believe that the Act will be interpreted or applied to infringe signifi-
cantly on noncommercial speech rights. The application of the Act to the 
SF AA is well within constitutional bounds, and the extent to which the Act 
may be read to apply to noncommercial speech is limited. We find no "re-
alistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recog-
nized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court." City 
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 
(1984). Accordingly, we decline to apply the overbreadth doctrine to this 
case. 
16 A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if 
the government's interest in the restriction is substantial, directly ad-
vances the government's asserted interest, and is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). Both this 
test, and the test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O'Brien 
require a balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of 
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ensure that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts 
so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to pro-
duce a "quality product," that, in turn, benefits the public. 
See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 2:1, pp. 44-47 (1984). But in the special circumstance of 
the USOC, Congress has a broader public interest in promot-
ing, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of 
amateur athletes from the United States in "the great four-
yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games." Olympic Char-
ter, Rule 1 (1985). The USOC's goal under the Olympic 
Charter, Rule 24(B), is to further the Olympic movement, 
that has as its aims: "to promote the development of those 
physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sport"; "to 
educate young people through sport in a spirit of better un-
derstanding between each other and of friendship, thereby 
helping to build a better and more peaceful world"; and "to 
spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby 
creating international goodwill. " Id., Rule 1. See also id., 
Rule 11 (aims of the IOC). Congress' interests in promoting 
the USOC's activities include these purposes as well as those 
specifically enumerated in the USOC's charter. 11 Section 
the speech restriction. Because their application to these facts is substan-
tially similar, they will be discussed together. 
11 The objects and purposes of the USOC are to: 
"(l) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encour-
age the attainment of those goals; 
"(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United 
States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, 
so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related 
organizations; 
"(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constit-
uent members of committees, over matters pertaining to the participation 
of the United States in the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games, 
including the representation of the United States in such games, and over 
the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when 
held in the United States; 
"(4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the 
appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur repre-
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110 directly advances these governmental interests by sup-
plying the USOC with the means to raise money to support 
the Olympics and encourages the USOC's activities by ensur-
ing that it will receive the benefits of its efforts. 
The restrictions of § 110 are not broader than Congress 
reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further 
these interests. Section 110 primarily applies to all uses of 
the word "Olympic" to induce the sale of goods or services. 
Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing 
sentation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and 
of the Pan-American Games; 
"(5) promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the 
United States and foreign nations; 
"(6) promote and encourage physical fitness and public participation in 
amateur athletic activities; 
"(7) assist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the devel-
opment of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes; 
"(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving 
amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organiza-
tions, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, 
manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic 
competition; 
"(9) foster the development of amateur athletic facilities for use by 
amateur athletes and assist in making existing amateur athletic facilities 
available for use by amateur athletes; 
"(10) provide and coordinate technical information on physical training, 
equipment design, coaching, and performance analysis; 
"(11) encourage and support research, development, and dissemination 
of information in the areas of sports medicine and sports safety; 
"(12) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for 
women; 
"(13) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs 
and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible, the 
expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by handicapped in-
dividuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals; 
and 
"(14) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletes of racial and 
ethnic minorities for the purpose of eliciting the participation of such mi-
norities in amateur athletic activities in which they are underrepresented." 
36 U. S. C. § 374. 
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uses, Congress' judgment respecting a certain word is not so 
limited. Congress reasonably could conclude that most com-
mercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to 
be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized 
uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the 
USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commer-
cial value of the marks. See Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) 
(one injury to a trademark owner may be "the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the 
public mind of the mark or name" by nonconfusing uses). 
In this case, the SFAA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, 
bumper stickers and other items, all emblazoned with the 
title "Gay Olympic Games." The possibility for confusion as 
to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the 
SF AA sought to exploit the "commercial magnetism," see 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S . Kresge Co., 
316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), of the worq given value by the 
USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized use 
could undercut the USOC's efforts to use, and sell the right 
to use, the word in the future, since much of the word's value 
comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the 
USOC's activities is directly contrary to Congress' interest. 
Even though this protection may exceed the traditional 
rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the 
application of the Act to this commercial speech is not 
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congres-
sional interest and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendment. 
Section 110 also extends to promotional uses of the word 
"Olympic," even if the promotion is not to induce the sale of 
goods. Under§ 110, the USOC may prohibit purely promo-
tional uses of the word only when the promotion relates to an 
athletic or theatrical event. The USOC created the value of 
the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. 
Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other 
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entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge 
on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. The 
SFAA's proposed use of the word is an excellent example. 
The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place over a 9-day 
period and were to be held in different locations around the 
world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with 
uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an "Olympic 
anthem" and "Olympic Committee," the award of gold, silver, 
and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three 
overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the 
modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games that gccurred 
in ancient Greece. 18 The image the SF AA sought to invoke 
was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. 
The SF AA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced 
from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it. The 
mere fact that the SF AA claims an expressive, as opposed to 
18 The ancient Olympic Games lasted five days, whereas the modern 
Olympics last for 10 days. The ancient Games always took place in Olym-
pia in southern Greece; the modern Olympic Games normally move from 
city to city every four years. (As an effort to reduce nationalism, cities, as 
opposed to countries, host the modern Olympic Games.) In ancient 
Greece there may have been a burning fire for religious sacrifice, since the 
Olympic Games were part of a religious festival. See The Odes of Pindar 
Olympia 8, ll. 1-9, p. 25 (R. Lattimore trans. , 2d ed. 1976). The torch re-
lay, however, was an innovation of the modern Olympic Committee. The 
closest parallel to the modern opening parade is the opening of the ancient 
Games with the chariot race. As the chariots entered the arena and 
passed the judges, a herald called out the names of the owner, his father, 
and his city. See Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8, at 27. There was no gen-
eral parade of athletes by locality, as in the modern Games, and the ath-
letes were naked, not uniformed. Athletes were eligible only if they were 
male, freeborn Greeks. There is no indication that the ancient Olympics 
included an "Olympic anthem" or were organized by an entity called an 
"Olympic Committee." The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of 
wild olive, rather than the gold, silver, and bronze medals presented at the 
modern Olympics. The logo of overlapping rings was created by the In-
ternational Olympic Committee. See n. 8, supra. See generally The 
Olympics: A Book of Lists 10-13 (J. Beilenson & N. Beilenson eds. 1984); 
Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8; 25 Encyc. Brit. 197-201 (15th ed. 1984). 
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a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amend-
ment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those 
who have sown." International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U. S., at 239-240. 19 The USOC's right to prohibit 
use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events 
is at the core of its legitimate property right. 20 
IV 
The SF AA argues that even if the exclusive use granted by 
§ 110 does not violate the First Amendment, the USOC's en-
forcement of that right is discriminatory in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 21 The fundamental inquiry is whether 
19 The SF AA claims a superior right to the use of the word "Olympic" 
because it is a nonprofit corporation and its athletic event was not orga-
nized for the primary purpose of commercial gain. But when the question 
is the scope of a legitimate property right in a word, the SF AA's distinc-
tion is inapposite. As this Court has noted in the analogous context of 
"fair use" under the Copyright Act: 
"The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation o( the [protected] material without paying the customary 
price." Harper & Row Publishers , Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 
539, 562 (1985). 
Here, the SF AA's proposed use of the word "Olympic" was a clear attempt 
to exploit the imagery and goodwill created by the USOC. 
00 Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the pri-
mary use of the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress rea-
sonably could have found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote 
such a production, it would implicate the value given to the word by the 
usoc. 
21 The SF AA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its discriminatory 
enforcement claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a 
State. The claimed association in this case is between the USOC and the 
Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply to the Federal Gov-
ernment and contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to equal protec-
tion claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 
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the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions 
of the Constitution apply. 22 The USOC is a "private cor-
poratio[n] established under Federal law." 36 U. S. C. 
§ 1101(46). 23 In the Act, Congress granted the USOC a cor-
(1976) (per curi am)·. The SF AA raised the issue of discriminatory en-
forcement in its petition for certiorari, and both parties have briefed the 
issue fully. Accordingly, we address the claim as one under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
22 Because we find no governmental action, we need not address the mer-
its of the SF AA's discriminatory enforcement claim. We note, however, 
that the SF AA's claim of discriminatory enforcement is far from compel-
ling. As of 1982 when this suit began, the USOC had brought 22 opposi-
tions to trademark applications and one petition to cancel. App. 61. For 
example, the USOC successfully prohibited registration of the mark 
"Golden Age Olympics." Id., at 3&'3. The USOC also litigated numerous 
suits prior to bringing this action, prohibiting use of the Olympic words and 
symbols by such entities as the National Amateur Sports Foundation, id., 
at 392, a shoe company, id., at 395, the International Federation of Body 
Builders, id., at 443, and a bus company, id. , at 439. Since 1982, the 
USOC has brought a number of additional suits against various companies 
and the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, id. , at 437, and Brief 
for Respondents 41, n. 58. The USOC has authorized the use of the word 
"Olympic" to organizations that sponsor athletic competitions and events 
for handicapped persons ("Special Olympics") and for youth ("Junior Olym-
pics" and "Explorer Olympics"). App. 33, 181. Both of these uses di-
rectly relate to a purpose of the USOC established by its charter. See 36 
U. S. C. § 374(7), (13), reprinted ante, at--, n. 15. The USOC has not 
consented to any other uses of the word in connection with athletic compe-
titions or events. App. 33. 
The USOC necessarily has discretion as to when and against whom it 
files opposition to trademark applications, and when and against whom it 
institutes suits. The record before us strongly indicates that the USOC 
has acted strictly in accord with its charter and that there has been no ac-
tionable discrimination. 
23 As such, the USOC is listed with 69 other federally created private 
corporations such as the American Legion, Big Brothers-Big Sisters of 
America, Daughters of the American Revolution, Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the United States, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Na-
tional Ski Patrol System, Inc. 36 U. S. C. § 1101. It hardly need be said 
that if federally created private corporations were to be viewed as govern-
mental rather than private actors, the consequences would be far-reaching. 
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porate charter, § 371, imposed certain requirements on the 
USOC, 24 and provided for some USOC funding through exclu-
sive use of the Olympic words and symbols, § 380, and 
through direct grants. 25 
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does 
not render the USOC a government agent. All corporations 
act under charters granted by a government, usually by a 
State. They do not thereby lose their essentially private 
character. Even extensive regulation by the government 
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into 
those of the government. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974). Nor is the fact that Congress 
has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" 
dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are cre-
ated by some governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute 
or the common law. The actions of the trademark owners 
nevertheless remain private. Moreover, the intent on the 
part of Congress to help the USOC obtain funding does not 
change the analysis. The Government may subsidize private 
entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for 
Apart from subjecting these private entities to suits under the equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, pre-
sumably-by analogy-similar types of nonprofit corporations established 
under state law could be viewed as governmental actors subject to such 
suits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
24 For example, the USOC may amend its constitution only after provid-
ing an opportunity for notice and hearing, § 375(b); the USOC must allow 
for reasonable representation in its membership of certain groups, § 376(b); 
the USOC must remain nonpolitical, § 377; and the USOC must report on 
its operations and expenditures of grant monies to Congress each year, 
§382a. 
25 The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce for yearly grants 
not to exceed a total of $16,000,000, § 384(a), but it has never done so. See 
Brief for Respondents 46. The only direct federal funding that the USOC 
has received is a $10 million grant in 1980, characterized by Congress as "a 
form of disaster payment" to help the USOC recover from the losses result-
ing from the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. See S. Rep. No. 96-829, 
p. 241 (1980); Act of July 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 857, 898. 
86-270--0PINION 
SAN FRAN. ARTS & ATHLETICS v. U. S. 0. C. 21 
their actions. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982); 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 840 (1982). 
This Court also has found action to be governmental action 
when the challenged entity performs functions that have 
been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of the Federal 
Government. Id., at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., supra, at 353; quoted in Blum v. Yaretsky, 
supra, at 1011)) (emphasis added by Rendell-Baker Court). 
Certainly the activities performed by the USOC serve a na-
tional interest, as its objects and purposes of incorporation 
indicate. See n. 15, supra. The fact "[t]hat a private entity 
performs a function which serves the public does not make 
its acts [governmental] action." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
supra, at 842. The Amateur Sports Act was enacted "to cor-
rect the disorganization and the .serious factional disputes 
that seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States." 
House Report, at 8. See Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, :779 
F. 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-770, pp. 2-3 
(1978)). The Act merely authorized the USOC to coordinate 
activities that always have been performed by private enti-
ties. 26 Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur 
sports has been a traditional governmental function. v 
26 The Commission that recommended the current USOC powers "made 
it clear that it did not want the Federal Government directing amateur ath-
letics in this country." House Report, at 9. 
27 The dissent does not rely on the fact that the USOC is chartered by 
Congress to find governmental action in this case. Post, at --. Jus-
TICE BRENNAN attempts to distinguish the USOC from other private cor-
porations that are chartered by Congress on the ground that the USOC 
performs the "distinctive, traditional governmental function" of "repre-
sent[ing] this Nation to the world community." Post, at--. But ab-
sent the additional element of governmental control, this representational 
function can hardly be called traditionally governmental. All sorts of pri-
vate organizations send "national representatives" to participate in world 
competitions. Although many are of interest only to a select group, oth-
ers, like the Davis Cup Competition, the America's Cup, and the Miss Uni-
verse Pageant, are widely viewed as involving representation of our coun-
try. The organizations that sponsor United States participation in these 
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Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government 
"normally can b~ held responsible for a private decision only 
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such 
events all perform "national ... representational," as well as "adminis-
trative [and] adjudicative role[s]," see post, at--, in selecting and pre-
senting the national representatives. 
As with the corporate charter, the dissent acknowledges that the repre-
sentational role of the USOC is not dispositive. Post, at--. According 
to the dissent, the Olympic Games are "unique [because] at stake are sig-
nificant national interests that stem not only from pageantry but from poli-
tics." Ibid. The dissent then relies primarily on the sequence of events 
preceding the USOC's decision not to send athletes to the 1980 summer 
Olympics as demonstrating "the impact and interrelationship of USOC de-
cisions on the definition and pursuit of the national interest." Post, at 
- - . But the governmental influence on that particular decision of the 
USOC is hardly representative in view of the absence of such influence on 
the vast majority of USOC decisions. Moreover, even the unique se-
quence of events in 1980 confirms that the USOC cannot properly be con-
sidered a governmental agency. Although the President and Congress in-
dicated their view that United States athletes should not go to the Moscow 
Olympics, this was not the end of the matter. The President thought it 
would be necessary to take "legal actions [if] necessary" to prevent the 
USOC from sending a team to Moscow. See 1 Public Papers of the Presi-
dents, Jimmy Carter 1980-1981, p. 636 (1981). Previously, the Attorney · 
General had indicated that the President believed that he had the power 
under the Emergency Powers Act, 50 U. S. C. § 1701, to bar travel to an 
area that he considered to pose a threat of national emergency. See 
Washington Post, April 11, 1980, p. Al. The President's statement indi-
cated a clear recognition that neither he nor Congress could control the 
USOC's actions directly. A District Court, confronted with the question 
of whether the decision not to send athletes to the 1980 Olympics was state 
action, noted: 
"The USOC is an independent body, and nothing in its chartering statute 
gives the federal government the right to control that body or its officers. 
Furthermore, the facts here do not indicate that the federal government 
was able to exercise any type of 'de facto' control over the USOC. The 
USOC decided by a secret ballot of its House of Delegates. The federal 
government may have had the power to prevent the athletes from partici-
pating in the Olympics even if the USOC had voted to allow them to par-
ticipate, but it did not have the power to make them vote in a certain way. 
All it had was the power of persuasion. We cannot equate this with con-
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significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]." Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 
163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 
170 (1970). The USOC's choice of how to enforce its exclu-
sive right to use the word "Olympic" simply is not a govern-
mental decision. 28 There is no evidence that the Federal 
Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise 
of its right. At most, the Federal Government, by failing to 
supervise the USOC's use of its rights, can be said to exercise 
"[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives" of the 
USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at 1004-1005. This is 
not enough to make the USOC's actions those of the Govern-
ment. Ibid. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 
164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 
357. 29 Because the USOC is not a governmental actor, the 
troi. To do so in cases of this type would be to open the door and usher the 
courts into what we believe is a largely nonjusticiable realm, where they 
would find themselves in the untenable position of determining whether a 
certain level, intensity, or type of 'Presidential' or 'Administrative' or 'po-
litical' pressure amounts to sufficient control over a private entity so as to 
invoke federal jurisdiction." DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Com-
mittee, 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (DC), aff'd mem., 226 U.S.App.D.C. 210, 
701 F. 2d 221 (1980). 
In sum, we remain unconvinced that the functions that the USOC per-
forms can be viewed as "governmental" action. 
28 In fact, the Olympic Charter provides that the USOC "must be autono-
mous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a 
political, religious or economic nature." Rule 24. 
29 For all of the same reasons indicated above, we reject the SF AA's ar-
gument that the United States Government should be viewed as a "joint 
participant" in the SF AA's efforts to enforce its right to use the word 
"Olympic." See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 
725 (1961). The SF AA has failed to demonstrate that the Federal Govern-
ment can or does exert any influence over the exercise of the USOC's en-
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SF AA's claim that the USOC has enforced its rights in a dis-
criminatory manner must fail. 30 
V 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
forcement decisions. Absent proof of this type of "close nexus between 
the [Government] and the challenged action of the [USOC]," the challenged 
action may not be "fairly treated as that of the [Government] itself." 
Jackson v. Metrapolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 351 (1974). 
30 In its petition for certiorari, the SF AA argued only that because the 
USOC is a "state actor" it is prohibited from "selecting among diverse 
potential users of the word 'Olympic', based upon speech-suppressing and 
invidiously discriminatory motives." Pet. for Cert. i. The SF AA now 
argues that under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), the District 
Court's entry of the injunction prohibiting the SF AA's use of the word 
'Olympic" constitutes governmental action sufficient to require a constitu-
tional inquiry into the USOC's motivation in seeking the injunction. This 
new theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed within the 
questions presented and thus is not properly before the Court. See this 
Court's Rule 21.l(a). 
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distinguish the USOC from other private corporations that 
are chartered by Congress on the ground that the USOC 
performs the "distinctive, traditional governmental 
function" of "represent[ing] this Nation to the world 
community." Post, at 
element of 
~ l 
But absent the additional 
governmental control ~ 
) 
~ n, this representational function can hardly 
be called traditionally governmental. All sorts of 
private organizations send "national representatives" to 
4 .e:;:.,_~-~ ~ 
T worl cf'competitions. Although many are of interest only to 
11 
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the Americas Cup, and the Miss Universe ~ r ~ . a l ~he 
prom-¼-B--e-B-G-0-.!l.L..t.b,8......o.l,-v-Kt.O-i..e--61lnfl1!~ The organizations that 
sponsor United States participation in these events all 
perform "national ... representational," as well as 
"administrative [and] adjudicative role[s]," see post, at 
, in selecting and presenting the national 
representatives. 
~~filffi-F'=::'gt ! fh ~- t As w1 e :::::~ c ar er, e 1ssen 
~ 
acknowledges that the representational role of the USOC is 
not dispositive. Post, at According to the dissent, 
the Olympic Games are "unique [because] at stake are 
significant national interests that stem not only from 
pageantry but fr.om politics." Ibid. The dissent then 
relies primarily on the sequence of events preceding the 
3. 
USOC's decision not to send athletes to the 1980 summer 
Olympics ~ demonstrat~ the impact and interrelationship 
\ 
of USOC decisions on the definition and pursuit of the 
national interest." Post, at But the governmental 
influence on that particular decision of the USOC is 
~ ~ ~ s--t--c.. ~er/~ 
hardly representative ~o~ i~ influence on the vast ~ 
majority of USOC decisions. Moreover, even :.,.,1-if.:~ 
~ I '7 3~ ~  /-
of events confirms that the USOC i s ae t properly k 
~ ~ 
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considered a governmental a . Although the President 
and Congress indicated their view that United States 
athletes should not go to 
not the end of the matter. 
~~ 
the -&\::Hftnte r Olympics, this was 
A 
~H-.,,u.tl...f0t" 
The President,,Jnreatent to 
take "legal actions ... [if] necessary" to prevent the 
usoc from sending a team to Moscow. See 1 Public Papers 




~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ 
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~ ysoc's actions directly. A.; J district court confronted - ) -
~ 
with the question r whether the decision not to send 
:a,, 
athletes to the 1980 Olympics was state action noted: 
) 
"The USOC is an independent body, and nothing in 
its chartering statute gives the federal 
government the right to control that body or its 
officers. Furthermore, the facts here do not 
indicate that the federal government was able to 
exercise any type of "de facto" control over the 
USOC. The USOC decided by a secret ballot of 
its House of Delegates. The federal government 
may have had the power to prevent the athletes 
from participating in the Olympics even if the 
USOC had voted to allow them to participate, but 
it did not have the power to make them vote in a 
certain way. All it had was the power of 
persuasion. We cannot equate this with control. 
To do so in cases of this type would be to open 
the door and usher the courts into what we 
believe is a largely nonjusticiable realm, where 
they would find themselves in the untenable 
position of determining whether a certain level , 
intensity, or type of 'Presidential' or 
'Administrative' or 'political' pressure amounts 
to sufficient control over a private entity so 
as to invoke federal jurisdiction." DeFrantz v. 
United States Olympic Committee, 492 F. Supp. 
1181 (D.D.C.), affd. mem., 701 F. 2d 221 (CADC 
1980). 
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